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What is involved in Chinese business success is not only
motivation and sophistication, but also well-developed
modes of concentrating and delegating authority which
enable kinsmen to work together in enduring corporate
groupings. Such modes seem to be largely absent in bi-
laterally organized southeast Asian societies, as many
observers have noted in referring to them as “loosely
structured,” “individualistic,” and “atomistic.”
—Robert L. Winzler, “Ecology, Culture, So-
cial Organization, and State Formation in
Southeast Asia”
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Figure 1. Northern Luzon, with barrios of Buyon and Mambabanga indicated.
Figure 2. Laoag area, Ilocos Norte Province.
Figure 3. Cauayan area, Isabela Province.
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Figure 5. Block map showing division of land between zanjera and landowners
(proprietarios). Inkalian lands are those owned outright by zanjera members;
inkapulo lands are those of water buyers.
Figure 6. Parcel map showing two atar blocks with individual shares (bingay) of
particular members and pieces of communally worked land (komon).
Introduction
IN MARCH 1963, Mr. Domingo, a village elder, retired farmer, and a pi-
oneer settler, pointed to an acacia tree above the opposite bank of the
Magat River as the place where the “battle with the headhunters” had
begun.1
Just below there the Kalingas2 started to cross in their bangkas [wooden
dugouts], four canoes with thirty or forty warriors, all yelling and waving
their spears. On this bank there were about fifteen of us, plus a sergeant
and four privates from the constabulary [detachment in Cauayan]. We had
our bolos [machetes] and the soldiers had rifles. The sergeant had his men
shoot into the air, and he yelled at the Kalingas to go back but they didn’t
stop. We had faced a small group of them earlier [in the month] and they
said this was their land and we must leave. Now they wanted to fight; to
take our heads, I suppose. When they were halfway across, the sergeant
told his companions to stop firing and he aimed at one of the Kalingas
standing in the first canoe. He shot him, in the chest, right through his
[wooden] shield. The others stopped yelling, and stared at his body in the
water, and then they went and got him. We never saw them again. And
they never came back. We went to our camp, our families were waiting,
and we celebrated with what little we had. We thanked God and the ser-
geant for the way it ended.
We built our houses near the river, but after a bad flood some of us
started a new barrio on the bluff overlooking the floodplains. We named
it after the trees that grew there, a kind of wild coconut [babanga]. We
1
called it Mambabanga—the place of wild coconuts. But there’s nothing
wild here now. It’s been ours for almost fifty years. We Ilocanos, most of
us from Bacarra and Vintar [Ilocos Norte], settled this area by clearing
and draining the swamps, we drove away the Kalingas, we got sick with
malaria and some people died, we built a dam and dug irrigation canals,
and we made this a good place for growing rice. We were real pioneers,
just like those people in the [American] movies, and we are very proud of
that.
Numbering over 6 million people, just over 10 percent of the more
than 59,906,000 Filipinos (1989 estimate), Ilocanos are the third largest
of eight major ethno-linguistic groups that make up the complex of Phil-
ippine lowland cultures. Ilocanos are less well known than the more
numerous Tagalogs in and around Manila or the Visayans from the cen-
tral Philippines, and are generally considered to be less typical of the
Christian Filipinos. All lowland Christian populations differ in terms of
language, religious practices and beliefs, food preferences, art forms,
and material culture. However, with the exception of Ilocanos, lowland
Filipino populations are strikingly similar in their general patterns of
culture and their overall forms of social organization.
Once referred to as the “Yankees of the Philippines” by American
officials who recruited them in large numbers to work in Hawaii and
California, Ilocanos are said to be and see themselves as hard working,
thrifty, industrious, pioneering, faithful to moral (and economic) obli-
gations, possessing a reverence for the land, and fiercely loyal to friends
and kin—characteristics that are similar to those expressed by other Fil-
ipino subcultures but exhibited by Ilocanos in greater measure. While
other Filipinos may grudgingly acknowledge some of these virtues, they
also will often add their disapproval by stating that Ilocanos are aggres-
sive, overly assertive, stingy, land hungry, prone to violence (especially
in politics), possessively jealous, and exceedingly provincial.
As the owner of a general merchandise store in Ilagan, the capital of
Isabela, the man was somewhat exceptional: he was neither Ilocano nor
Chinese. He was an Ibanag, representing one of the two indigenous low-
land peasant groups in the Cagayan Valley of northeast Luzon. Before
the early years of this century the Ibanags and the Gaddangs had been
numerically and, within the Spanish colonial system, politically domi-
nant in the towns along the Cagayan and Magat rivers.
Perhaps because the storeowner was aware of my research on an
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Ilocano community his comments about the subsequent domination
of Cagayan Valley by Ilocano immigrants were somewhat tempered.
However, even though some of his best friends were Ilocanos (al-
most his exact phrase), as were two sons-in-law, there was a touch
of bitterness to his comments about the Ilocano occupation of the
Ibanag homeland.
Before the Ilocanos came there were Ibanags, Gaddangs, and Kalin-
gas—those wild people. There were only a few people at that time. Those
Ilocanos were very poor. They had nothing. They worked for us as tenants,
but now many of them are the landlords. They worked very hard. They are
that way.
But they are aggressive, too. They assert themselves. Since the war
[World War II] they have taken over everything. A lot of [Ilocano] lawyers
came and brought their politics with them.
We Ibanags are too easy going. Now we are just a part of the Ilocos.
That’s what the Ilocanos say.
With some truth and a degree of ethnic bias, the Ibanag storeowner
attempted to characterize the success of Ilocano immigrants as some-
thing achieved at the expense of the established peasant populations in
northeast Luzon. He was both philosophical and resentful, but most of
all he was resigned to the fact that Isabela Province, in something less
than 50 years, had become thoroughly “Ilocanoized.”
Both positive and negative attributes are interpreted by nonIlocano Fil-
ipinos—and Ilocanos alike—as related to differences in “race,” environ-
ment, population pressure, and culture. As a part of what is supposed to
make Ilocanos racially different, and somehow partly to explain their dis-
tinctiveness, other lowland Filipinos maintain that Ilocanos are physically
“very dark,” a biologically undesirable trait in the view of most Filipinos.
Ilocanos, on the other hand, emphasize the environment of Luzon’s north-
west coast, one of the driest regions in the Philippines, as a severely lim-
iting factor that has helped shape Ilocano culture and society. It is also
recognized that the region is heavily overpopulated, given the environmen-
tal limitations of the Ilocos coast, and that pressures from overpopulation
have helped to shape both Ilocano virtues and vices. One of the more dis-
tinctive features of life in the Ilocos is the overall economic impoverishment
of the region, with the result that both upper and lower classes are poor rel-
ative to those in lowland areas in central and south Luzon. The view held
by the more urbane of the Tagalogs and Visayans that Ilocanos are cultur-
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ally unsophisticated and highly provincial, applies no less to upper-class
Ilocanos than it does to peasant farmers.
The Ilocanos’ lack of sophistication is said to be characterized by
an addiction to gambling (particularly cockfighting), political feuding,
artistic expressions, and a number of regional food preferences (such
as dog meat) about which, their critics maintain, only Ilocanos and
“Igorotes” (mountain people) are enthusiastic. The Ilocanos’ paro-
chialism is partly attributed to the social and physical isolation of Lu-
zon’s northwest coast, and is reflected in the fact that Ilocanos were
historically much less involved in the Spanish and later American-
influenced commercialism of Manila and other urban centers. Further
related to this, Ilocanos have traditionally taken a much smaller part
in the agrarian movements of rebellion and social unrest that pre-
ceded and followed World War II. More than 50 years ago, in obvious
tones of ethnic and philosophical bias, one Tagalog writer described
the Ilocos region as follows: “Here [the Ilocos coast] the people are
still politically illiterate. They are still unaware of the labor struggles
which are being waged all over the world; there is yet no feeling of
the class consciousness or even discontent over the existing econom-
ical arrangement” (Lava 1938:8).
However, since World War II a disproportionate number of Philippine
presidents have been Ilocanos: Elpidio Quirino from Ilocos Sur (vili-
fied for corruption during his regime); Ramon Magasayay from central
Luzon (a “part-Ilocano” and the country’s most respected president);
and Ferdinand Marcos (the Philippines’ first dictator) from Ilocos Norte.
Marcos has left an indelible stamp upon the political and economic
arrangements of the Philippines and, despite his record of political
repression and economic exploitation, is still widely—though not uni-
versally—revered in his home province where his supporters and the
province as a whole benefitted from a patronage of gifts and graft.
It was the fall of 1963 and a celebration was to be held in the dining
room of a local hotel in the town of Laoag—the capital of Ilocos Norte
Province—to initiate the reelection campaign of the province’s senator.
Invitations were extended to nearly everyone of note in the town. Being
a “visiting scholar” of sorts (no matter that I was merely a graduate stu-
dent without a doctoral degree, much less an academic position) I was
included as a guest and throughout the evening introduced as “Doctor-
Professor Lewis.”
The senator was certain to be re-elected, even though he had numer-
ous political enemies and detractors within the province. During the
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party a lawyer, an ardent and loyal supporter of the incumbent, in-
formed me that the senator was destined for “true greatness” in ways,
he said, that were remarkably similar to the career of President John F.
Kennedy: a successful legal background, a “glorious war record,” ser-
vice in the senate, great popular support, an attractive and ambitious
wife, and Catholicism—common to all Philippine presidents. Less than
two months later Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas while the sena-
tor went on to be re-elected to a second term, and subsequently to the
presidency of the Philippines. There were no doubts in the minds of his
supporters that, as the lawyer stated, “Senator Marcos will bring much
credit and glory to Ilocos Norte, to all Ilocanos.”
“Discontent over the existing economical arrangement” was actually
in evidence among Ilocanos well before the turn of the century in a
different way, as shown by the migration of hundreds of thousands of
people to other parts of the Philippines and, following American annexa-
tion of the Islands, overseas. Ilocanos have consistently made up the
largest numbers of Filipino emigrants to the United States and they
have also constituted the majority of settlers and migrant laborers in
recently settled regions of the Philippines. Filipinos in the sugar and
pineapple plantations of Hawaii, the lettuce fields of California’s Sali-
nas Valley, and the fish canneries of Alaska have largely come from the
Ilocos coast, while the majority of people now living in the recently
pioneered sections of northeast Luzon and parts of Mindinao are the de-
scendants of Ilocano pioneers (Figure 2).
Ilocos Norte is considered by its residents to be the heartland of
“Ilokandia,” despite that the greater number of Ilocano speakers are
found farther south in the provinces of Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pan-
gasinan. The argument of Ilocanos from Ilocos Norte is that the attrib-
utes that are characteristically Ilocano—that is, those traits considered
commendable—are more evident in the northernmost part of the Ilo-
cano ethnic region. In this respect, cultured pride and ethnic prejudice
are not limited to non-Ilocanos. The greatest impact that Ilocanos have
had on indigenous peoples resulted from their occupation of Cagayan
Valley, specifically the provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, where popula-
tions of Ibanags, Christian Gaddangs, and others were either displaced
or assimilated (Lewis 1984).
My research on Ilocanos began with a few weeks of preliminary
work in Manila during late 1962 and, over the next 12 months,
involved the study of two villages in northern Luzon: first in a pio-
neering community, Mambabanga, in the municipality of Luna, Isabela
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Province, between January and June 1963; second in a homeland com-
munity, Buyon, in the municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte Province,
between July and November 1963 (Figures 1, 3, and 4). My more per-
sonal interests for doing research on Ilocanos derived from 18 months
spent as an Army sergeant in the Philippines in the interval between
World War II and the Korean War, first in Manila and later at Camp
John Hay in Baguio City. A trip to the northernmost part of Luzon in
1949, from La Union through Ilocos Norte, had an influence on my de-
cision to study Ilocanos in 1962–1963, and again in 1976 and 1978.
The anthropological justification for examining Ilocano social and
economic organization is derived from my interest in understanding
what kinds and degrees of social and economic change occur when
peasant villagers move from a heavily populated, subsistence-based
homeland (Ilocos Norte) to a less populated, relatively wealthier and
more commercial frontier region (Isabela). The thesis and book that fol-
lowed, Ilocano Rice Farmers, describes and compares the social and
economic dimensions of life in Buyon and Mambabanga.
One of the major reasons for studying Ilocanos rather than other Fili-
pino farmers was the presence of more than a thousand locally run,
communal irrigation systems, called zanjeras, within the province of
Ilocos Norte. According to the then limited information about Ilocano
irrigation practices (Christie 1914), such groups were reported to have
been in existence for a considerable length of time—at least 200 years.
As one part of the original comparison between homeland and pioneer-
ing regions, the relative successes and failures that migrant Ilocanos
had in adapting traditional irrigation systems to a new region involved
questions important to agricultural practice and hydrological theory.
In this introduction the conclusions derived from the 1962–1963
study of the differing social and economic characteristics of Buyon and
Mambabanga are briefly summarized. For a fuller explanation of how
the two villages were organized and the social transformations involved
in moving from Ilocos Norte to Isabela, the reader should consult Ilo-
cano Rice Farmers (1971) as well as my subsequent publication on
patterns of migration and resettlement in northern Luzon (Lewis 1984).
It was my first day in Mambabanga, the start of my initiation to the
“ritual of fieldwork” that apprentice anthropologists are expected to
endure. On the way to examine part of the canal system that irrigated
the rice paddies below the ridge on which Mambabanga is located, the
barrio headman and I passed a large, brightly decorated cross. Set be-
side the path at the conjunction of four fields, it was festooned with
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cloth tassels and other decorations and, set before it, were two bowls
of food. Fascinated at my first encounter with something of “ritual
significance,” I asked my companion what it involved. With my poor
use of Ilocano and his better use of English, it came out that it was
to “frighten the bad billit.” Certain that I had found my first example
of a religious syncretism—in this case a mix of Christianity and Ilo-
cano folk religion—I pressed on and asked, “Billit? Is it a kind of anito
[spirit]?” Clearly nonplussed at my response, he answered, “No, it is
for the billit, the rice birds. It is to scare them from the rice in the
fields. It is a banti [scarecrow], a thing to keep the birds away.”
“But, the food?” I asked, having all too eagerly and wrongfully leapt
to the conclusion that it was a religious offering, “Isn’t it an offering,
by someone, for something?” Again puzzled by my choice of words in
both languages, he replied, “It is an ‘offering’ for those people, there
[he pointed], those people working in the field. It is their lunch.” For
me, having been anthropologically way out to lunch, it was an impor-
tant lesson, one repeated several times in subsequent months and later
years of fieldwork: be cautious about jumping to “obvious” conclusions
and whenever possible allow, in fact, actively encourage, informants to
test and correct your interpretations.
Among Ilocano statements of regional ethnocentrism, the people of
Ilocos Norte maintain that they have been more “peaceable” (that is,
politically stable) than their Ilocano neighbors in Ilocos Sur and La
Union, that they have constituted the largest number of pioneer settlers
and overseas emigrants, and that they have developed cooperative irri-
gation on a scale unmatched anywhere else in the archipelago. Whereas
communal irrigation is hardly unique to Ilocos Norte, its development
there has been on a scale found nowhere else in the Philippines, nor,
with the exception of Bali, in many other parts of Southeast Asia.
As with people everywhere, Ilocanos in Ilocos Norte are moved to
exaggerate when given to self-imagery. Nonetheless, within the small
valleys of this province are truly impressive numbers of locally devel-
oped, peasant-farmer operated, cooperative irrigation systems. Only
Bali rivals Ilocos Norte in terms of the number and organizational de-
velopment of communal irrigation systems. In contrast to the rice fields
in Ilocos Norte, Balinese fields are steeply terraced, and, for us, are
more aesthetically pleasing. In terms of Western cultural values, even
for anthropologists who are ideally given to objectivity, Balinese soci-
ety is more exotic and culturally attractive than is the Ilocos region or,
for that matter, most other areas of the Philippines. But, as is noted
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later in this volume, in terms of their effectiveness as irrigation systems,
Ilocano zanjeras are no less technologically developed and no less orga-
nizationally sophisticated than are their Balinese counterparts.
In the spring of 1976 and again during the summer of 1978, I re-
turned to Ilocos Norte for a total of 10 months, originally with a plan
to focus my research on how farmers in Buyon had adjusted traditional
farming practices to the introduction of the “Green Revolution”—the
new, highly productive varieties of rice that replaced most traditional
rice types during the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, because of
problems in obtaining government permission initially to carry out and
subsequently to release the results of an aerial survey of village lands,
it was not possible to complete more than few of the planned interviews
that would have shown how cropping patterns in particular paddy fields
had changed in the 15 years since the first study.
During the first half of 1976, having initiated the aerial survey and
the appropriate requests for government security clearances, I concen-
trated my efforts on examining irrigation cooperatives, notably on the
role they played in the introduction and acceptance of the new and
higher yielding varieties of rice. As this work progressed and the results
of the aerial survey appeared to become further enmeshed in red tape, I
began to focus on the organizational aspects of Ilocano irrigation. When
on returning to Ilocos Norte in 1978 I discovered that further delays
were involved with release of the photos, the study of how irrigation
cooperatives functioned became the central part of my research, with
questions regarding the Green Revolution reduced to secondary consid-
eration. This required a different perspective from that of the earlier,
village-level research because, as will be shown, irrigation groups are
separate, both politically and socially, from the organization and opera-
tion of villages.
Consequently, the planned study for examining the relative successes
and failures of the Green Revolution was only partially realized, and
part of that information is included here. As with the organization and
operation of irrigation systems, the Ilocano farmers’ acceptance and
modification of government programs for growing the so-called miracle
rice types shows the local logic whereby Ilocano farmers accommo-
date new ideas and things (varieties of rice, fertilizers, pesticides, and
mechanized tractors) to existing circumstances, often in ways that baf-
fle agricultural experts.
As noted, zanjeras are organizationally unrelated to barrio govern-
ments and, like the flow of water itself, memberships cuts across
village boundaries, involving people from two, three, and often more
nearby communities, and with individuals occasionally belonging to
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two or even more zanjeras. This in turn is related to the way that fam-
ily land holdings are frequently divided into numerous (six or often
more) widely separated field plots. At the same time, irrigation groups
constitute a different kind of social formation than that of villages,
and are based on the collective ownership of resources (water rights,
dams, canals, and, in some instances, land) rather than merely resi-
dence—as is the case for villages throughout most of the Philippines.
Irrigation societies are what anthropologists and others refer to as
corporate groups: social groups that control the use and inheritance of
property, meet more or less regularly, and have representative leader-
ship—but are not necessarily “democratic.” At the local level irrigation
groups are particularly interesting in terms of their social complexity
and in the various solutions they have developed for obtaining and
maintaining their resource of water. As examples of corporate group or-
ganization, they represent one of the important ways that humans in
widely separate and culturally distinct societies have solved problems
and created social structures for managing and protecting resources.
That which is both culturally unique and humanly universal is ultimately
the heart of anthropological inquiry.
Ilocano social life is based on a combination of egocentric (person
centered) systems of reciprocity: the bilateral kin group of relatives
from both male and female lines of descent, a spouse’s kin, age-mates
and friends, neighbors, work-mates, and ritual or “fictive” kin. This
“bundle” of social relationships and reciprocal obligations varies from
individual to individual, and it is neither stable nor fixed in membership.
It lacks well-defined social boundaries—what social theorists call
“corporate definition”—and except for the nuclear family, a great deal
of flexibility exists in terms of individual selectivity, which alters and re-
alters the range and intensity of a person’s social relationships. Even
the nuclear family does not include an unalterable set of social oblig-
ations. The establishment of new families, new circumstances, age of
members, residence patterns, relative wealth, and other influences can
result in the different extent of feelings and varying degrees of sibling
and filial loyalty. The total network of interdependent, egocentered sys-
tems is similar to that found throughout the Philippines and has been
designated an “alliance system.” The concept of alliance system was
first used in Philippines studies by Lynch (1959:49–55), and was later
restated by Hollnsteiner (1963:63) who related it to political power:
Where power is concerned, a network of supporters is crucial to the
persons interested in gaining and maintaining power. These followers
are provided through the alliance system, a network of reciprocal re-
INTRODUCTION 9
lationships whose members extend to one another and expect mutual
assistance and loyalty.
One is expected to go all out for an ally. He may be a kinsman, a com-
padre, a neighbor, or friend. These relationships in themselves do not
guarantee membership in one’s alliance. It is when a kinsman, compadre,
neighbor, or friend is emotionally close, and therefore tagged as an ally,
that he can really be counted on.
Alliance systems depend on the ability of individuals to reciprocate
favors and assistance from particular individuals. In political life it in-
volves the ability of leaders to provide services and remunerations for
the numbers of individuals who make up the wider set of subsystems
that in turn form their own larger alliance systems. The politically faith-
ful can be rewarded from the personal wealth of the leader and from the
wealth and patronage that go with holding political office. In addition
the alliances are highly personalized, essentially feudal in terms of the
obligations involved, and the leader of such a following needs to spend
an exorbitant amount of time and effort gaining new support, maintain-
ing that which he or she already has and, when they occur, mending
breaks in the network of interpersonal relationships.
Neither the fundamental principles of social organization nor the re-
lated set of cultural themes are essentially different for the Ilocano than
they are for other lowland Filipino groups. Yet the differences in behavior
that distinguish Ilocanos from Tagalogs, Visayans, Pampangans, and oth-
ers are significant. The fact that the Ilocano situation is different and
Ilocano behavior is often distinct from that of other Filipino groups—while
the cultural and social systems continue essentially unaltered—can be ex-
plained in essentially two ways. First, social, economic, and geographical
settings (in addition to some locally important historical developments)
have imposed considerable and varied pressures on the traditional social
and cultural forms as they exist in northwest Luzon. Second, the social
system and the pattern of cultural themes are so structured that they can
undergo a great deal of stress without fundamentally being altered. All of
this is reinforced by a set of cultural values or themes—cultural patterns
that are shared by all Philippine subcultures.
The roughly framed, embroidered message above the door read
Kaaroba Isu Ti Kabsatmo Wenno Kabagiam, which translates as “a
neighbor is the same as your relative or sibling.” As one of the first
people interviewed at the start of my house-to-house census in Mamba-
banga, Mrs. Acoba, a widow in her late sixties, explained,
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Your neighbors are not just people who live near you; they are people that
you can count upon, they are like kinsmen, sometimes they are even [real]
kinsmen. But if they aren’t you still talk to them as kinsmen and call them
“older sister,” “older brother,” “auntie,” “uncle” or even “mother” or “fa-
ther,” “daughter” or “son.” It is like you are part of a very large family.
Like members of a family, being neighbors is doing things for each
other, taking care of each other. You look after their children, you give
neighbors extra food, you let them use your water buffalo when there is
a need, you care for neighbors when someone is sick, when children are
born, when someone dies. If the neighbor is already a kinsmen or perhaps
an inlaw, then this makes the feelings towards that person, that family,
even stronger. This is because there are debts involved, utang, though
these are debts of the heart [moral obligations]: utang iti nakem.
Her own neighbors, she said, were not necessarily the same as those
of this or that neighbor; different neighbors often have different “sets”
of neighbors, and “sets” usually overlap. Being a kaaroba is a one-to-
one, potentially very sociable and highly effective relationship. It is not
simply based upon the close proximity of peoples’ homes, although it is
frequently the beginning or basis for being a kaaroba. Like other social
ties, neighbor relationships vary in importance and effectiveness, and
they are not without great disappointments, malice, envy, rivalry, and
discord, depending upon the people and the circumstances involved.
But in the best of all possible circumstances, if your neighbor were
kin as well as “field neighbor” (people who share or exchange their
labor), and if you also consider that neighbor the equivalent of “best
friend,” then the added relationship of being a neighbor makes it the
closest of all. If you were “only neighbors” you could strengthen the
relationship by becoming comadres and compadres, and godparents of
each others’ children. In this way unrelated neighbors become “kin,”
closer to each other. Mrs. Acoba further added, “Sometimes, for differ-
ent reasons, neighbors move away, and these are very sad times, and
feelings are sometimes bad. Yet, the feelings for each other depend
upon the people involved, as it does with relatives when they move away
or when you must leave them.”
Although there were none of her own kin in the barrio (she had mar-
ried into the community), and although she had no children of her own,
she said, “My neighbors are my kinsmen and their children are my chil-
dren; neighbors are always there but your kinsmen can be far away.”
She knew that when death came to her—as it did in the late 1960s—her
neighbors would make the funeral arrangements, they would say spe-
cial prayers for her on the night of the ninth day after, and they would
cry for her. And that’s why neighbors are as kin.
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The emphases in Filipino cultures are upon social acceptance, the
maintenance of self-esteem, and the avoidance of situations that can
bring shame upon oneself or someone else. These cultural themes are
not based on conformity to a set of rules or ideals or to an ethical
system. Rather, they involve adjustments and flexibility in relating to
other people in specific social situations. Filipino culture is proscriptive
rather than ascriptive: one should normally avoid behavior that may
generate conflict. At the same time, proscriptions stress social pragma-
tism with relation to the individuals concerned, the immediate and
wider social setting, and future utility that may be derived from a par-
ticular relationship. Stress upon social pragmatism is reflected in the
pattern of spirit beliefs. As one writer has noted, the spirit world is “peo-
pled principally by spirits who are normally neither for nor against one,
but dangerously able to do no end of harm if aroused and, therefore, it
is eminently logical to take all means possible to discover what these
spirits want one to do” (Lynch 1961:106).
These are the social and cultural resources that Ilocanos brought to
solving and overcoming the organizational and technological problems
involved in establishing cooperative irrigation systems. For more than
200 years in Ilocos Norte this has resulted in the development of some-
thing approaching 2,000 zanjeras.3 Yet, while possessing the same so-
cial and cultural resources, Ilocanos in Isabela, and most of them from
Ilocos Norte, constructed and maintained less than a dozen. Obviously,
the motivation for and knowledge of irrigation system construction and
management are not in themselves sufficient in establishing and perpe-
tuating such forms of cooperation.
This volume examines some of the major factors—social, demo-
graphic, and environmental—that account for the success of communal
irrigation in Ilocos Norte and, by implication, its absence in adjacent ar-
eas, other parts of the Philippines, and, more widely, in other parts of
insular Southeast Asia. However, whether this explanation accounts for
all the factors involved, or even adequately weighs those that are here
discussed, is secondary to the main concern of this volume: corporate
groups. What zanjeras show are repeated examples of how individ-
ual farmers, working in concert, developed and employed corporate
principles to the solution of a common goal or problem. It is a kind of
“solution” that has been widely and effectively employed in much of hu-
man history.
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The lawyer was born in Laoag, capital of Ilocos Norte, and although
not from a landed-agricultural background, he owned a small number
of rice fields worked by tenant farmers near Solsona. I explained that
the reasons for my being in Ilocos Norte involved research, mostly con-
cerned with understanding zanjeras. To my surprise, zanjera was not a
term with which he was familiar, so I said that I was interested in the
way that farmers organized and formed cooperative irrigation groups.
He replied, “Oh yes, the way farmers get together and bring water to
their fields. Isn’t it the land owners that get them to do that?”
Upon learning that I was interested in communal irrigation, the gov-
ernment civil engineer wanted to show me the largest of the dams
owned by the zanjeras on the Bacarra-Vintar River, located several kilo-
meters above the area I was studying, with primary canals that carried
water to 8 zanjeras, the farthest of them more than 8 kilometers away.
He noted,
It’s quite amazing when it washes out—and they do break down when it
floods, sometimes once or even twice a year. The irrigation headmen will
call out 800 to a 1,000 people to put it right again. All that work to put
back another pile of rocks and bamboo. It’s a very primitive kind of engi-
neering. It must have to do with the way that peasants think about such
things: that’s the way their forefathers did it and that’s the way they’ll fix
it up. And you can’t convince them that the rational thing to do is to let
the government help them to build a permanent dam, a structure of con-
crete and steel that won’t wash away in the first big monsoon rain.
The water master’s job was to see that the farmers who took water
from the government canal did so in an orderly way, and this required
that he monitor water levels and coordinate delivery times to see that
individual farmers got fair shares. I asked him if this wasn’t a problem
since water theft and the complaints of unfair allocations by “down-
stream” farmers seemed to be a perennial problem in the operation of
irrigation systems.
He explained that it was not a problem for the farmers that he
worked with because the people served by the government system had
organized themselves to work with him and other water masters, simi-
lar to the way that zanjeras were organized. This was easy enough, he
said, because most of them belonged to one or more zanjeras and they
knew how to get such things done. His own father had been the head-
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man, the maestro, of a zanjera in the same area. His job, he said, was
easy because of the knowledge and organization that was already there.
Mr. Barruga was head of one of the largest zanjeras in the municipal-
ity, as well as a member of two others. He was sometimes angered but
more often simply puzzled by the way that government irrigation offi-
cials acted on matters relating to the zanjeras. He did not expect such
officials to go so far as to ask zanjera leaders for advice, but he was very
concerned when, without their being consulted, the government went
ahead with projects that had important consequences for the zanjeras.
He pointed out a recently completed government intake system, built
onto the river bank with reinforced concrete and with steel doors to
control the flow of water. His and three neighboring zanjeras were sup-
posed to link their communally shared bamboo and rock dam with the
permanent water intake at the start of the wet season. Their plan was
to stall as long as possible, since the four zanjeras had only recently, in
response to a shift in the main river channel, moved the position of their
rock and bamboo weir more than 100 meters farther down the river
channel.
When I returned to Ilocos Norte two years later Mr. Barruga’s zan-
jera and the three others were still using the same dam (albeit once
replaced and several times repaired) but with the intake still in the posi-
tion occupied in 1976. However, from where we stood I could no longer
see the government intake. “Oh, that’s gone. The water came [and cut]
behind it and, anyway, the channel is now over there,” he said, pointing
some 70 meters from where the government had installed the intake.
“Even if it hadn’t broken, it wouldn’t be any good to them now.” He
smiled, “It might be a few years before the water decides to go there
again.” And, he later added,
The government people do things their way. They don’t seem to think
about what can happen for us later on. But it is not all their fault, they are
paid to build those kinds of things. The river can wash away fields, but the
government—they are getting harder and harder. We have to live with the
river and the government, and we have to think ahead; we have to make
plans for the future, for our children and our grandchildren, as our fathers
and our grandfathers did for us.
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Corporate Groups
A group may be spoken of as “corporate” when it possesses any
one of a certain number of characters: if its members … come
together occasionally to carry out some collective action …; if it
has a chief or council, who are regarded as acting as the repre-
sentatives of the groups as a collective….
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Introduction to African Sys-
tems of Kinship and Marriage
IN ADDITION to collective action, representative leadership, and the
shared ownership of property, the approach here employed considers
relative degrees of corporate organization, since groups are not simply
either corporate or not corporate. In Ilocos Norte both families and irri-
gation cooperatives exhibit gradations in corporate organization and
closure. To borrow Orwell’s phraseology, all family units and irrigation
groups in Ilocos Norte are corporate but some are more corporate than
others.
Anthropological studies of corporate organization have been concerned
primarily with the analysis of groups such as lineages, clans, villages, and
secret societies. Relatively little attention has been directed to the cor-
porateness of domestic families, precisely those units that constitute the
building blocks of larger social groups. An important exception to this pat-
tern is found in the various works of George N. Appell (1965 et al.), whose
ideas have been brought together in The Societies of Borneo: Explorations
in the Theory of Cognatic Social Structure (1976).
Appell emphasizes the importance of shifting our traditional focus
from considering principles of kinship and descent as the defining crite-
ria of corporateness to emphasizing property relations as they involve
social entities and scarce goods, since social structures are ultimately
based upon the character of property relationships that obtain between
family units.
15
It has become apparent that the conjugal family, far from being a non-struc-
tural group, is in many societies the most important corporate social group-
ing and the most important structural unit. In fact it is the consistent and
constant interrelations between such units with respect to property that pro-
vides much of the structure of such societies. (Appell 1976:7)
To illustrate the character of corporate relations found within family
units in northwesternmost Luzon, a contrast is here made between
the patterns of property ownership and property relationships in the
homeland village of Buyon in Ilocos Norte, in which families are more
corporate, and those of a technologically similar Ilocano community,
Mambabanga, a village established seventy years ago in Isabela, in
which families are generally less corporate. The following information
concerning property relations and social structure in Ilocano families is
drawn from the earlier study of these two communities (Lewis 1971).
Whereas there are degrees of corporate closure in both communi-
ties—and certainly a great deal of overlap between the least corporate
families in Buyon and the most corporate families in Mambabanga—the
comparison is made in terms of the most representative patterns found
in each barrio. Overall, the differences are important because of the
ways in which they relate to and influence two more complex forms of
social organization—irrigation groups in Ilocos Norte, and villages in Is-
abela.
The Family as a Corporate Group
The major problem in considering families as corporate groups and,
more specifically, families in bilateral societies, turns largely on the
question of perpetuity—that families disappear with the marriages and
deaths of their members. However, the question of perpetuity does not
alter the fact that in all other respects the elementary family is a corpo-
rate unit: a social group that holds property (scarce goods or services)
and relates to other families and to individuals as a recognized social
entity. Appell stresses that it is essentially the control of property, not
simply kinship, descent, or perpetuity that provides the basis for inter-
preting social relations within specific social groups.
For the purposes of ethnographic description, a social grouping can only
be isolated as corporate on the basis of its function within the specific
system in which it is embedded, i.e., whether it has the power as a social
entity to enter into jural relations. Whether it is a perpetual social en-
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tity or not has no relevance for those observational procedures by which
we isolate such entities, for it is not a feature that is universally found
cross-culturally. (Appell 1976:70)
Appell is also concerned with questions of change, either from unilin-
eal systems to cognatic ones, or in the reverse direction. That the
pattern of family organization and corresponding property relationships
are historically more recent developments in Isabela, the pioneering
region, than in Ilocos Norte, the established homeland area, is of no
particular significance except that it shows that social relationships
necessarily respond to altered conditions of resource use and control.
Whereas the situation in Ilocos Norte undoubtedly involves changes
from lesser to greater degrees of corporateness, it is not possible to de-
lineate precise changes in cause-and-effect relationships. Certainly the
most important factors of change are those that have influenced prop-
erty relationships. Although historical evidence will probably never be
sufficient to demonstrate the sBacarra-Vintar River. At this point the
rivpecific changes of Ilocano social organization, the following compar-
ison does indicate the major influences and shifts that must have been
involved. The differences that have emerged in both Ilocos Norte and
Isabela will be approached in terms of the kinds of developments Appell
considers most important for understanding changes in social struc-
ture.
New types of scarce goods and services are always being created, discov-
ered, or traded into the society, and this entails the problem of modifying
old forms of ownership or inventing new; of allocating the new types of
property to already existent social isolates or devising new ones. (Appell
1976:vii)
Population pressures and the relative availability of land are
important causal factors affecting differential family organizations
and property relationships in Buyon and Mambabanga. Buyon, with a
population of 543, has a density of 1,367 persons per square kilome-
ter of arable farmland; Mambabanga, with a population of 383, has
a comparable density of 367 persons per square kilometer. This dif-
ference between the two villages is also representative of the overall
differences between the two provinces, specifically in the more pop-
ulated rice-growing areas (Lewis 1971:18). The relative difference
means that families on the northwest coast derive a living from only
one-fourth the amount of land utilized by families in the southern
portion of the Cagayan Valley.
Typically, a family in Buyon has 0.75 hectares of land divided into six
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and often more small parcels (some no more than 100 sq m) from which
subsistence is derived. This may be done in combinations as a tenant’s
share (50%–70% of the total crop), as an independent landowner-oper-
ator, and even sometimes as a landlord’s share—when fields are too far
removed to work economically. In contrast, a farmer in Mambabanga
will derive his family’s income from 3 hectares of land, subdivided into
three equal plots, which he too may use in combinations of ownership,
tenancy, and (less frequently) landlord arrangements.
Such differences between families in Buyon and Mambabanga high-
light the highly variable conditions in cropping, soil fertility, availability
of irrigation water, plant cover, topography, climate, transportation,
marketing, and communication—all factors that affect agricultural dif-
ferences in a number of interrelated, complex ways. For a more general
summary of regional-comparative differences in the Philippines, consult
Wernstedt and Spencer (1967).
It is not argued that Buyon and Mambabanga are precisely prototypi-
cal of communities in their respective provinces, but they do represent
the general social and economic patterns of family life in Ilocos Norte
and Isabela. It is not the overall community relations as such that
make them important in this respect; rather, the intra-and interfamily
relationships and attendant property rights are of central significance,
involving 121 elementary families in Buyon and 62 in Mambabanga.
Social Networks
The social models with which Ilocanos in Ilocos Norte perceive and
interpret social reality are not basically different from those found else-
where in the Philippines. Kinship is reckoned bilaterally with inherit-
ance perceived (but seldom if ever achieved) as being equal among all
male and female offspring. The fundamental social unit is the family
composed of two or three generations. The residential settings within
which families live are sitios (hamlets without official status) and bar-
rios (officially redesignated as barrangay), which are loosely structured
on the basis of overlapping and interrelated networks of kinship, reci-
procity, and propinquity. Among Ilocanos, one somewhat unique custom
involves the use of a male land dowry, the sabong, by which property is
transferred from parents to sons (Lewis 1971:89–92). Depending upon
the extent and intensity of village sociability, the cohesiveness of com-
munity relationships is ritually expressed in the form of an annual barrio
fiesta. At the sitio and barrio levels of community life one of the most
significant differences between Ilocos Norte and other regions of the
Philippines is evident.
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Precise data are lacking, but most barrios in Ilocos Norte do not hold
fiestas, though larger towns and economic centers frequently do. The
absence of barrio fiestas, I have argued (Lewis 1971), reflects the fact
that village-wide networks of reciprocal obligation are poorly developed
and socially ineffective in Ilocos Norte. In the controlled comparison
between Buyon and Mambabanga, I summarized the differences as fol-
lows:
Buyon (Ilocos Norte) has the same normative social and cultural princi-
ples as Mambabanga (Isabela), but the total social fabric there is but
weakly developed and maintained. This has resulted in a very fragile, ten-
uous barrio system existing in little more than name alone. The situation
may be summed up by saying that, whereas the social and physical envi-
ronment of Mambabanga encourages the use and extension of social ties,
the equivalent environmental factors in Buyon act as virtual deterrents to
the same social and cultural principles. Thus, although Buyon and Mam-
babanga are both formally designated barrios, they differ considerably in
terms of their social “substance.” (1971:179–180)4
As we shall see, the social relations and expressive rituals characteris-
tic of irrigation organizations in Ilocos Norte are more circumscribed and
follow more precise, corporate lines than do those which characterize
the diffuse and poorly delineated limits of barrio relationships and fiesta
participation found in other areas. Interpersonal relationships in Ilocos
Norte do not simply accumulate to form the larger, socially open commu-
nity structures characteristic of barrios elsewhere in the Philippines, or,
more specifically, the similarly open network of those social relationships
in Mambabanga.
Whereas more typical Filipino communities are based on egocentric
networks of interrelated, reciprocal obligations (what Lynch [1959]
called “alliance systems”), villages in Ilocos Norte are socially very
limited, amounting to little more than place names on a map. Their
existence is almost entirely imposed by political administrative enti-
ties—municipalities, provinces, and a national government—which re-
quire that they exist.
In both communities individual households are engaged in a network
of social ties and obligations to kin, friends, neighbors, and workmates.
However, not all kin are actively involved in an individual’s alliance sys-
tem, nor is the intensity of kinship ties based merely on genealogical
distance. Though inoperative kin ties always have the potential for be-
ing activated, effective kin relationships are those based upon close
association and regular reciprocal exchanges. The quality of all social
relationships reflects the degree to which they are operational.
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Relations with friends and neighbors, like those of kinship, are highly
variable. Ties with neighbors, or kaaroba, can be complicated by the
fact that some neighbors are often kin, relationships which further in-
tensify the importance of being a neighbor. Though neighbors may not
be kin, the relationship involves some of the same obligations that a per-
son feels toward kin. The reciprocal obligations that exist are reflected
in the forms of address used between unrelated neighbors—manong
(older brother), manang (older sister), ading (younger sibling), tata (fa-
ther), nana (mother).
In both Buyon and Mambabanga the reciprocity-based network of
neighbors is extremely important and involves a range of goods and ser-
vices that are regularly, sometimes daily, exchanged and shared. Based
upon family-to-family ties and heavily influenced by propinquity, the set
of participants varies from one family to another in a series of overlap-
ping, open-ended relationships. The essence of interfamily ties between
neighbors is seen in the broad range of things and favors that are ex-
changed: a great variety of foods, the loaning of money to meet an
emergency, the care of individuals during times of emergency, watch-
ing over a neighbor’s house and animals during absences, assisting with
various kinds of work projects around the home, and other kinds of mu-
tual assistance. A good neighbor, I was told, cares and is cared for.
Though less easily or directly referenced in the ways that genealogi-
cal links or residence sites can be, ties of friendship are influenced and
nurtured by similar personal contacts. Along with these, both neigh-
bor and friendship ties are recognized and intensified through the ritual
bond of coparenthood, normally by becoming the godfather or god-
mother of a friend or neighbor’s child at the time of baptism. The
abstract categories of kin, neighbor, and friend are socially realized in
the highly personal web of relationships linking individuals and fami-
lies. The essential difference in neighbor relationships between Buyon
and Mambabanga is the way in which the ties of neighbor and friend re-
late to other sets of obligations. In Mambabanga the individual relates
to many people in a variety of roles; in Buyon, by contrast, the same
kinds of social relationships are much more limited and impoverished.
As in other parts of the Philippines, villages are composed of domestic
family units, but in Ilocos Norte families seem to coalesce more easily
to form still other corporate organizations, the most notable and com-
plete being irrigation cooperatives. Villages, the anthropologist’s most
cherished units of study, are simply the wrong foci for adequately under-
standing the more socially significant forms of organization in Ilocos
Norte. Instead of the barrio, this study will focus on the ways in which
families and irrigation groups relate to property (essentially property
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rights in land and water), and the ways in which individuals and groups
relate to each other in terms of such property rights and obligations.
Economic Units
In both Buyon and Mambabanga, families carry out marketing activi-
ties essentially as social isolates, in one-to-one exchanges that do not
involve other families in reciprocal social obligations. The existence of
larger amounts of economic surplus in Mambabanga and smaller ones
in Buyon does not, in the contexts of marketing those surpluses, affect
the networks of sociability in either setting. Surpluses of rice and corn
in Mambabanga frequently result in regular customer-client arrange-
ments, commercial exchanges with merchants from nearby towns. This
involves relationships that depend on the continued supply of goods and
extra services (cash advances, crop loans, transport, lower costs for the
buyer), but as such they have little emotive significance for either party.
In both communities ad hoc arrangements are sometimes made with
fellow villagers whereby one person, usually a woman neighbor or kin,
will sell small surpluses of household garden produce for friends and
relatives, and keep a percentage of the price obtained. Such arrange-
ments are essentially irregular in occurrence, involve small turnovers,
and are not in themselves the basis for further social obligations. In nei-
ther setting does the marketing of goods involve families in expanded,
on-going networks of sociability, but only in disparate economic events
that are essentially defined by immediate needs. In both barrios families
act essentially as economically independent units in selling and buying
both the items they produce and those they consume.
Buyon and Mambabanga do differ significantly in the way their re-
spective families act as economic units in the production of agricultural
goods. In Buyon individual families work plots of land in virtual isola-
tion from one another; in Mambabanga agricultural production involves
families in persisting networks of reciprocal obligation. Farm work in Is-
abela involves people in highly personalized, reciprocal work exchanges
(ammuyo) whereby farmers assist field neighbors in a variety of tasks,
the most labor-demanding of them being plowing, harrowing, trans-
planting, and harvesting. Work groups are egocentrically based systems
with the particular sets of one-to-one obligations shifting from individ-
ual to individual (or family to family), and from one adjacent field to
smother, forming essentially unending, open-ended socioeconomic links
throughout a section of fields.
As with other community ties in Mambabanga, the system is socially
open, limited only by the physical features that may set off one block of
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land from another and the simple limits of distance within which individ-
ual families can farm economically. At the same time, these personalized
ties of reciprocity are not of equal emotive significance since field
neighbors may be siblings, cousins, house neighbors, friends, barrio
mates, or even people from adjacent barrios. With three separate fields
requiring a variety of tasks for two or even three different crops, the
particular obligations actively involve families in extended networks of
economic sociability, while reinforcing the social ties that already exist.
In Buyon the small size (100–500 sq m) and wide distribution of indi-
vidual fields do not encourage work exchanges, but hamper them. If
additional assistance is necessary, labor is hired, paid for in cash or rice,
and the relationship has little more social significance than the casual
marketing of goods. Each family is its own, self-contained unit of pro-
duction. Agricultural work tends to isolate families from, rather than
involve them with, other residents of the barrio.
In Mambabanga the continuity of reciprocal labor exchanges will of-
ten go back several generations to the original pioneer clearing and
farming of lands that lasted until the 1930s. This persistence of eco-
nomic sociability has continued to influence and help maintain the
pattern of one-hectare-sized fields as a supportive social feature of the
farming technology.
Whereas families in Mambabanga are drawn into larger, more diffuse
communities partly as a result of the farming pattern, those in Buyon
families are not. The part of the agricultural technology that so signifi-
cantly affects social obligations in Buyon derives from the irrigation of
lands and involves families in well-defined, highly specific social sys-
tems that have no direct relationship to barrio organization.
Property
In both communities families are the basic units that own and control
property. The poorest families may have only the most limited real
property consisting of just a few tools, and in some instances not even
farm animals. They live on the land and work it at the sufferance
of landlords while receiving the smallest possible shares of a har-
vest—50 percent or even smaller in Buyon, larger portions in Mam-
babanga. Their rights to use the land are extremely limited and,
where the landlord-tenant relationship lacks emotive support, highly
tenuous. Yet, however insignificant the amount of property or frail
and transient their claim, it is the family that maintains the rights
linking them to the “things” involved and the “other persons” con-
cerned—tools, houses, land, and crop shares; landlords, kin, other
22 ILOCANO IRRIGATION
farmers, and merchants. All of it involves rights that are considered
inviolate, if not always honored.
Slightly less-impoverished families own tools, draft animals, and per-
haps a house and house lot while working as tenants for one or more
village or town landlords. Still better-off families own at least some
agricultural land and derive income from a variety of combinations as
owner-operators, tenants, landlords, and casual laborers. A few fami-
lies, the village elite, own twice as much land as the average villager:
one or slightly more hectares in Buyon, six or more hectares in Mamba-
banga.
Whatever the relative levels of subsistence and cash incomes, or the
degrees of possession or use rights to the property involved, the fam-
ily is the basic unit of property ownership and control in both barrios.
Family ownership is recognized in both custom and law throughout
the Philippines. In both barrios there are similar ranges of variation
between the poorest and the wealthiest peasant families, though the
poorest in Mambabanga are not so materially impoverished as their
counterparts in Buyon, and the wealthiest have considerably more land
and real income than do the most affluent in Buyon. They are dissimilar
in the needs and means that families have for maintaining property as
integral units. However much divided into separate parcels, landhold-
ings in Buyon are controlled as family estates, single units of property
that are passed from generation to generation. In Mambabanga fam-
ily lands are commonly divided with each generation. This difference
relates to several interrelated conditions affecting the family structure
and property relations in the two regions.
The networks of familial social obligations in Buyon are not as exten-
sive as those in Mambabanga, where social ties branch out radially,
overlapping and merging with the social networks of other families,
all of which eventually—but loosely—make up village organization. The
greater amounts of real income and family resources in Mambabanga
make it desirable and possible to maintain such diffuse structures.
There people can afford to, in fact must, invest in such networks of
reciprocal exchange; in Buyon there is neither the technological need
nor the economic means for broadly based social investments. The limi-
tations of real income and family resources in Buyon make it necessary
to conserve and constrain family resources, rather than allow them to
be widely distributed throughout effectively weak social networks.
Differences in property and property relationships are further evi-
dent in relative land values. Merely with respect to supply and demand,
the significance of land is much greater in Buyon than in Mambabanga.
With one-fourth the population density of Ilocos Norte and as one of the
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Philippines’ major agricultural exporting provinces, Isabela as a whole
is economically much better off and the possibilities for families to
obtain additional land, if not to own at least to farm as tenants, are rela-
tively greater. In Ilocos Norte, where the economic potential is much
more limited, landholdings, however small, assume a disproportionate
significance. In addition to the short supply, the demand for land has
been further distorted as a result of monies sent or brought back to the
region from overseas; several million dollars come in each year from the
United States. With a seventy-five-year history of overseas migration,
originally involving single males going to Hawaii and California as agri-
cultural laborers (and more recently whole families emigrating), large
amounts of capital are returned each year to the Ilocos and invested in
land. All of this has inflated land costs far beyond the productive worth
of the land for agriculture, with the result that land prices are ten to fif-
teen times higher than in Isabela.
Even the smallest landholding in Ilocos Norte has a market value
quite out of proportion to its agricultural productive worth. Landless
families have no hope of obtaining land, with even tenant-farmed fields
in very limited supply and tenant shares of 50 percent being well below
those offered in Isabela (70%). For families with small, one-quarter-
to one-half-hectare holdings, land provides some measure of economic
wherewithal, but it is a productive base that they can normally not af-
ford either to buy or to sell. In Ilocos Norte the combination of scarce
land and distorted values requires that families intensify agricultural
production and avoid the diminution of existing holdings.
In Mambabanga the combined effects of social obligations, family
resources, the relative availability of land, the need to exchange agricul-
tural labor, and the possibility of either obtaining additional lease land
or even gaining alternate sources of income, encourage the mainte-
nance of the extended family ties that make up the larger network
of kin, neighbors, friends, and workmates. Together, these individual
family networks constitute the emotively important but structurally
amorphous community of Mambabanga—a characteristic open-peasant
community structure (Wolf 1957).
In Buyon the conditions relating to property controls and property re-
lations encourage turning inward in order to conserve family resources.
This inwardness has taken the form of becoming increasingly corpo-
rate in the maintenance and control of family assets. At the same time,
the nature of interfamily relationships does not involve open-ended al-
liances but, rather, alliances with other well-defined corporate groups:
other families and, on a larger scale, irrigation groups.
Unlike the open-peasant community structure of Mambabanga,
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Buyon has no community structure other than that imposed upon it and
required by the external political systems of municipality, province, and
national government. The individual networks of family organization
do not constitute a social community; they do not unite to provide the
structural counterpoint to an open-peasant community, that is, a closed-
corporate village. Other than being the place where its people reside
and work, there is no village-wide, corporate-property base for such a
community to exist. Instead, families conjoin as corporate units to form
irrigation groups, still more complex corporate enterprises that further
enhance the corporate interests of individual families through the en-
hancement of family lands. The ways in which property is maintained,
how it is directed as a single unit over time, and the forms of alliances
taken by individual families are especially evident in the patterns of in-
heritance and marital ties.
Inheritance and Marriage
In both Buyon and Mambabanga inheritance is ideally equal for all off-
spring, though property is seldom equally divided in either community.
The ideal is more nearly approached in Mambabanga. Yet, even there,
with land more abundant and the possibilities for obtaining additional
tenancy arrangements considerably easier, equal inheritance is virtually
impossible to achieve. A number of family considerations such as the
amount of property, the needs of individual children, and the expecta-
tions of parents in their old age, all enter into the final decisions for
dividing up family resources. For instance, as a part of the inheritance a
daughter may receive extra assistance toward a higher education; a son
may be given monetary and personal assistance in obtaining a govern-
ment job; another son may be assisted in establishing his new family in
a pioneer settlement area in the Sierra Madre to the east; a daughter
who has married well may be provided a small cash settlement, a token
only of her equal share. Equal inheritance is seldom easily or equitably
arrived at. The essential difference is that in Mambabanga an amicable
settlement can be more readily approximated, with some property or
assistance provided to all offspring.
In Buyon there is simply much less available for amicable solutions
and, with respect to land, the legacy cannot be further subdivided.
The concern for maintaining family property as a single unit is espe-
cially important for parents since, like parents in Mambabanga, they
must rely upon their children for support in later years. However,
parental support will be dangerously imperiled if family lands are re-
duced in size below a total of one-half hectare. Whereas parents in
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Mambabanga may depend primarily on one child, they can more easily
obtain assistance from other children as well. As with other resources
in Isabela, family resources can be used to benefit a larger number of
family members than is generally the case in Ilocos Norte.
In Ilocos Norte the need to contain family resources, especially re-
sources in land, is accomplished through giving a sabong, or male
land dowry. The sabong is a written, contractual arrangement whereby
parents of the groom bequeath family lands to the soon-to-be-married
couple. The interfamily agreement is formally acknowledged when the
sabong contract is signed by the bride-to-be and her parents. The lands
owned are detailed as to size, location, and type, including a house and
house lot—normally the home of the groom’s parents or adjacent to it.
The unwritten part of the contract, the obligation that is thoroughly
understood, is that the newly married couple will assume the responsi-
bility of taking care of the groom’s parents. The sabong is a corporate
strategy, an arrangement that, despite Ilocano custom and Philippine
inheritance law, enables parents to avoid fragmenting the family estate
and endangering their economic security in old age.
At the same time, like other cultural customs, the sabong is a social
practice that varies considerably, from area to area and family to family.
For the poorest families it may involve little more than the transfer of
a house and possibly a house lot. For older Ilocano men who have re-
turned from years of work abroad, the sabong may be offered in the
form of a cash settlement, provided not by the groom’s family but by
the groom himself, from savings accumulated while working overseas.
In these cases members of the groom’s family (siblings or cousins) will
act on his behalf in negotiations with the bride’s family.5 In Ilocos Sur
the custom appears to be more restricted to considerations of status sig-
nificance, especially those involving upper-class people (Raul Peritierra,
personal communication). In Isabela, as part of the cultural tradition the
sabong may be used in the marital arrangements of all male children
(simply the promise that the son will eventually receive his inheritance)
but, in terms of maintaining family resources as a unit, it has compara-
tively little significance. Even in Ilocos Norte where it does have special
significance, the particular strategies show considerable variation, but
the strategies are aimed at containing property, not using it to extend
social relations as is more characteristic in Isabela.
In Buyon the practice favors the youngest son, resulting in something
approaching patrilineal inheritance and ultimogeniture. Though it does
not constitute a formalized pattern of unilineal descent, it does involve
a conscious, corporate strategy for controlling and maintaining family
property as a unit, or estate. In this significant respect the typical family
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in Buyon is much more corporate than is its counterpart in Mamba-
banga, where family lands are divisible.
At the same time, the sabong provides a partial solution to the inher-
itance that female offspring may expect, since the families that can pro-
vide a sabong for a son are also those that can expect one for a daughter.
This relates to the existing status-ranking system since families of rela-
tive wealth (however small in real terms) marry their children to those
in roughly equivalent positions. In that marital ties link the two families
involved, it is important that such alliances extend nuclear family ties
without endangering them by having a daughter marry beneath her. For a
woman, the land dowry gained at marriage is in effect her inheritance, and
she would be considered very foolish to waste it on a husband economi-
cally and socially lower down the scale than her own family.
As with other social relationships in Mambabanga, marital ties fur-
ther involve people in the community at large; marriages in Buyon are
one-to-one, formalized arrangements between equally corporate family
units. In Buyon the sabong contract represents a well-defined strat-
egy of a corporate alliance, not that of an open, bilaterally structured
alliance. Whatever the particular causal-historical circumstances that
might account for its origin, the sabong is the key to maintaining the
integrity of an estate and the corporate definition of a family.6
Families in Buyon also indicated that, more commonly in the past,
family lands could be used to help finance a son to migrate to Cagayan
Valley, to obtain work or some other economic role in Manila, or even to
emigrate overseas. This was accomplished by mortgaging the land with
the expectation (or at least the hope) that the son would pay off the debt
at a future time. In Mambabanga, the greater availability of land, both
for inheritances and for working under tenancy arrangements, means
that individuals are less likely to move away. Residence histories and
genealogies in Mambabanga show that siblings more frequently remain
in the community than they do in Buyon where those not receiving a
sabong are encouraged or forced to leave. The networks of recipro-
cal obligation in Mambabanga are more often than not able to assist
those in need to find additional tenancy arrangements locally; in Buyon
both social and material resources are inadequate to provide equivalent
kinds of help.
The major export from Ilocos Norte, Ilocanos boast, is people, those
with little or no hope of making an adequate living by remaining at
home. Their departures tend to reduce the kinship networks for those
that remain. The major export from Isabela is agricultural produce,
the economics of which encourage individuals to participate in and
maintain networks of social obligation. In Mambabanga, the systems
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of kinship, neighborliness, friendship, work exchange, inheritance, and
marriage promote community relations; in Buyon the same sets of fac-
tors do little to encourage village cohesiveness.
Family Savings
Thrift, specifically as evident in savings, is considered one of the more
laudable Ilocano virtues; it is certainly thought to be so by the twenty-
five banks and savings institutions in Laoag. Though no single bank
manager could disclose the total figures in local savings accounts, sev-
eral of them stated that of all Philippine centers only Manila, with thirty
times the population, has greater amounts of savings than Laoag City.
The ratio of savings-to-loan transactions in Laoag banks is 15:1, where-
as in Santiago, the major financial center of Isabela Province, the ratio
is 1:8, an impressive difference in magnitude of 120. Most savings in
Ilocos Norte come from what bankers estimate to be approximately one
million dollars (U.S.) arriving each week from overseas in the form of
social security checks, pensions, bank transfers, and even cash.7
Three households in Buyon are those of Hawaiianos, Ilocanos who
have worked overseas and subsequently returned to renew or establish
family life in their home villages. During their absences (the longest had
been for thirty years, the shortest for thirteen) they had sent money
to wives, parents, or siblings, some to be banked and the rest to be
used to purchase farmland. The custodial relatives of the Hawaiianos
farmed newly purchased land virtually as their own and continued to
farm it as tenants after the providers returned. After initial displays
of wealth at homecoming parties and, for older bachelors, a wedding,
Hawaiianos and their immediate family beneficiaries are careful in man-
aging their assets. Like other villagers with resources to protect, they
remain detached from wider social involvement. Though all families in
Buyon have relatives who have left for overseas employment, pioneer
settlement within the islands, or Manila’s urban slums, only a few (per-
haps no more than one in twenty) derive even the smallest assistance
from family expatriates.
Whereas the great volume of savings derives from money originating
outside Ilocos Norte, all local families attempt to set aside some sav-
ings, whatever small amounts can be derived from the sale of cash
crops. These monies are important to have as some protection against
sudden, unanticipated demands such as the need to replace draft ani-
mals, tools, housing materials, or to provide for family rituals associated
with baptisms, marriages, and deaths. Given that they cannot easily call
upon larger networks of mutual assistance, as in Mambabanga, family
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savings assume a considerable, if not critical importance. In Mamba-
banga, on the other hand, money is “saved” by quite different means, a
form of social investment not found in Buyon.
In addition to the interpersonal and interfamily obligations that may
be called upon in Mambabanga, the people there participate in what
I have called a “social savings association,” which they call an arayat
(Lewis 1971:147–155). An arayat is formed by women, representing
the domestic units, who have reciprocally agreed to contribute small
amounts of money and rice (e.g., 1 peso and 4–5 liters of rice) to other
members of the association on the occasions of baptisms, marriages, fu-
nerals, and postfuneral rites. One woman acts as coordinator and keeps
a record of individual contributions and payments. Each member’s turn
occurs as the events arise and the total contributions received by a
member help, more or less adequately, to cover the considerable ex-
penses involved. The women who participate in the arayat are of an age
and status most actively involved in the social life of the village. Older
couples with married children have decreasing needs for funds and,
with one or two uncollected payments, cease to participate, awaiting
only the final payments that they will have to call upon for the funeral
and postfuneral rites of a spouse. At the same time, the youngest mar-
ried couples may choose not to belong, in part because of the expense
involved but also because they are able to use the unused share of a
mother or mother-in-law.
Less than half of the people in Mambabanga belong to the association
at any one time. It is an added type of socioeconomic insurance that people
can take advantage of to partially offset ritual expenses. Yet it can also add
extra expenses on ritual occasions because it means that all members of
the arayat are automatically invited to such social events. Consequently,
for those families in Mambabanga who can best afford to provide the nec-
essary funds (and thereby more carefully pick and choose guests), and for
those families who can least afford the financial costs, membership in the
arayat is either unnecessary or unaffordable. The arayat is but another so-
cial mechanism that both expresses and reinforces the social ties already
existing within the community.
Like the poorest families in Mambabanga, families in Buyon can af-
ford neither the social nor the economic costs involved, and there are
no extended networks of reciprocity from which such obligations would
emerge. Instead, personal savings, not social investments, provide a
small hedge against unanticipated ritual and material costs. The differ-
ent means by which families in the two communities handle similar
expenses further illustrate their different social contexts. As a central
feature of social adaptation in Buyon, families are financially prudent
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in the ways that they plan for contingencies. In Mambabanga they are
socially provident in their selection of strategies for coping with like cir-
cumstances. The one setting favors a constriction of social boundaries,
the other their extension.
Ritual
For Filipinos, ritual, like charity, begins at home. Baptisms, marriages,
funerals, and postfuneral rites are the most important religious and so-
cial events that occur in a person’s lifetime, and the social focus of these
rituals is the family. Except for minor cultural distinctions, Ilocanos dif-
fer very little from other lowland, Christian Filipinos. The ways in which
these family-centered ceremonies are performed and the emotional sig-
nificance they have for the people involved are essentially the same in
both Buyon and Mambabanga.
As with other aspects of social life, the two barrios differ in terms
of the social involvement and the economic wherewithal that families
can afford to invest in such rituals. Just as families in Mambabanga
have more to spend and are correspondingly more involved with kin,
neighbors, workmates, and friends, the people spend more on ritual
occasions, go into greater debt (both monetarily and socially), and are
involved in wider networks. Again, because people in Buyon must be
frugal, cannot afford to go into debt, and are not so involved in extended
social networks, equivalent rituals in Ilocos Norte are socially and ma-
terially more restricted.
A wedding of even one of the poorer families in Mambabanga can
potentially (and may actually) involve people from the whole barrio
and entail considerable expense. In Buyon smaller numbers of kin,
friends, and neighbors are involved, and the amounts of food and bever-
age—though considerable by comparison with daily fare—will be much
less ostentatious than in Mambabanga. From baptisms to special
prayers for the dead, individuals ritually enter and depart the world of
Ilocos Norte with less celebration and fewer celebrants than in Isabela.
In Mambabanga family rituals and community ritual converge to
some extent in the annual barrio fiesta. Fiestas are the most
characteristic community-wide rituals in the Philippines, expressive
ceremonies that broadly reflect the social and emotive significance of
obligations that unite families in larger social alliances. A fiesta commit-
tee and a fiesta mayor collect contributions, arrange for special events
(a barrio “queen” contest, music, dances, entertainment, games, visits
by town dignitaries, repair of the barrio chapel, a visit by a Catholic
priest) and handle the considerable costs involved.
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Community consciousness is symbolically expressed in honoring a
barrio patron saint, with a special mass held at the village chapel on
the night of the fiesta. Within the context of the fiesta, individual fam-
ilies arrange their own ritual events including the baptism of children
born during the previous year, a family mass (pamisa) with prayers said
for the deceased, the decoration of a family altar with special offerings
of food for local spirits, and the preparation of a festive meal to which
kinfolk, neighbors, and friends are invited. The total amount of money
spent by families individually and the village collectively can involve
hundreds of pesos for the more affluent and thousands for the village as
a whole.
Paralleling the way in which the barrio is loosely organized, fiesta or-
ganization also lacks clear distinctions as to who should or should not
participate. Former village residents return from nearby towns or even
from as far away as Manila; relatives, friends, and workmates come
from adjacent barrios; social involvement spills both into and out of the
community with ritual boundaries set only by the extent and importance
of interpersonal networks. The only limit to being involved is that of
having some kind of active relationship with or invitation from someone
in the barrio.
Though the fiesta is expressive of the extant social relationships
within a community and involves a considerable amount of cooperative
effort, it provides no organizational structure (social, political, eco-
nomic, or otherwise) outside that context. It does not serve, probably
could not serve, as the basis for other cooperative enterprise. It is a
purely voluntary, special-purpose type of association that is all but de-
void of corporate significance.
In Buyon there is no barrio fiesta, no barrio chapel, and no celebra-
tion of a patron saint. In effect, there is no social “reality” for a saint
to be patron or guardian of. Family rituals are held as circumstances
demand (e.g., funerals and postfuneral rites) or when time and money
permit (e.g., baptisms and weddings), but they do not, of course can-
not, take place within the larger ritual context of a fiesta as is often the
case in Mambabanga. Family rites in Buyon occur within a narrower so-
cial world and do not link the family to the community at large. Families
in Buyon are linked in smaller, relatively more isolated clusters of kin,
friends, and neighbors; there is no larger, interrelated social constella-
tion that forms a socially effective, village community.
All families in Mambabanga are ostensibly Catholic and the barrio
chapel is used for the monthly, poorly attended visits of an American
missionary priest. In contrast, there is no barrio chapel in Buyon, but
a few families attend Catholic or Aglipayan services in the town of
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Bacarra or the city of Laoag. Three families in Buyon belong to one
of the Protestant churches, four others are members of fundamentalist
sects—Seventh Day Adventists, Iglesia ni Christo, Church of the Latter
Day Saints. Religious beliefs in both communities are highly syncretic,
a mixture of formal religious tenets embedded in a folk cosmology
characteristic of the Philippines as a whole. As the evidence shows,
the essential difference between the two communities involves the
respective social orientations exhibited in formal religious practice: the
religious setting in Mambabanga is focused on the barrio and, for those
that attend church, the barrio chapel; in Buyon the focus of religious
practice lies outside.
Two-thirds of the families in Buyon belong to one or more irrigation
groups and participate in annual ritual celebrations there. As with other
religious practices in Buyon, the foci of ritual activities are outside the
barrio context, the loci being variously associated with sites relevant to
the social and physical dimensions of an irrigation system: parts of the
ceremonies are held at the home of the leader, the local churches of
nearby towns, alongside the dam and portions of the canal, and the field
house or meetinghouse adjacent to the fields.
At the same time, irrigation ritual is markedly different in structure
and orientation from that of the fiesta and is as unlike the barrio fiesta
in form and content as the irrigation cooperative is unlike the barrio:
the former being corporate and well defined, the latter open-ended and
diffuse. As is subsequently examined in much greater detail, the com-
plex of irrigation rituals involves a recurrent symbolic theme which
emphasizes the corporate nexus of family and irrigation group, a rela-
tionship quite unlike that which connects family and barrio through the
diffuse structure of a fiesta.
Relative Corporateness
In both Buyon and Mambabanga the degree of corporateness varies
from family to family. Families in Mambabanga are in general better
off in terms of measurable amounts of income and real property, while
social adaptations have involved broad, open networks of reciprocal
obligation between families. Pioneering circumstances in Isabela—set-
tling an area together, clearing land cooperatively, the threat of “head-
hunters,” debilitations from malaria, and a wide range of reciprocal
types of mutual assistance—were responded to in terms of the more
traditional Filipino peasant patterns of social organization. Certainly
the greatest needs of individual families were for wider, highly flexible
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sets of socioeconomic obligation to meet a potentially broad range of
demands for reciprocal aid. Labor exchange arrangements were an im-
portant part of the pioneering technology and, as in much of the rest of
the Philippines, continue to be important today.
In both communities the amount of property owned by individual
families has a pronounced effect on the degree to which families
act as corporate units. Within Mambabanga the relatively wealthier,
higher status families are more corporate than are poorer families in
that they are necessarily more involved in the management and main-
tenance of family resources, most importantly their resources in land.
Poorer families are correspondingly less concerned as property own-
ing, corporate units. However, given the wider socioeconomic setting
of reciprocal family obligations within which all families in Mamba-
banga are involved, from the poorest to the most affluent, effective
social closure and independent social action are less reasonable so-
cial options.
In Buyon similar relative differences in corporate circumstances are
found between families with some property and those with little or
none. However, as emphasized earlier, what characterizes Buyon is the
absence of extended, open-ended networks of reciprocal obligations as
the essential element of socioeconomic strategies. In Buyon it is nec-
essary to husband family assets with great care and families are not
involved in open-ended networks of reciprocal labor exchange. Whereas
the most impoverished families in Buyon might wish to establish rec-
iprocal obligations with better-endowed families, the latter have little
need for labor exchange and nothing to gain by obligating themselves
to those who have only their poverty to share. Socioeconomic circum-
stances in Buyon require that families with land, however limited the
overall amount, conserve and constrain their resources.
The families that exhibit the greater degrees of corporateness in
Buyon own or have use rights to irrigated land. Since irrigated land is
four to five times more productive and has a market value ten times
greater than that of nonirrigated land, membership in one or even more
irrigation cooperatives significantly increases family resources. At the
same time, as members of an irrigation group, the family is linked with
other member families, not in poorly defined, open-ended social net-
works, but in well-defined relations as part of a larger, corporate entity.
The obligations of member families are primarily to the irrigation coop-
erative, not to other families as such. The irrigation itself increases the
value of the land and membership involves individuals in a demanding
set of social obligations. The corporateness of both family and irrigation
society exists in complementary relationship, with family units consti-
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tuting the discrete, minimal components of the irrigation society. As
with some families, some irrigation societies are more corporate than
others.
The Zanjera as a Corporate Group
Irrigation cooperatives in Ilocos Norte are most frequently referred
to by the Spanish-derived term zanjera, from zanja or ditch.8 At the
same time, they are equally well known to farmers by the Ilocano word
pasayak, or irrigation. Some Spanish terms are also used to designate
leadership positions, such as maestro, segundo maestro, secretario.
However, for each Spanish term there is an equivalent Ilocano word and
Ilocano is used exclusively for the hundreds of words which refer to day-
to-day activities, the places and features within a system, and the tools
and materials used by zanjeras. Though questions of origin are not req-
uisite to questions about corporate organization, I see the use of some
Spanish words as probably relating to the fact that prior to this century
legal documents were necessarily written in the language of the colo-
nial power. There remains a prestige to using Spanish because of its
historical significance and because it is still one of the languages of the
Philippine legal system.
Government agencies, such as the Bureau of Public Works and the
National Irrigation Authority, keep records on the areas of land un-
der communal irrigation in Ilocos Norte. Unfortunately, the various
government estimates do not agree, not even those available from
the same agency. In addition to the fact that government employ-
ees seldom actually measure the size of communal irrigation systems
(other than ones they have helped establish and engineer), there
are additional problems with the figures given by zanjera officials to
outsiders—government officials and researchers alike. Figures pro-
vided by irrigation groups are often little more than their own rough
approximations. Moreover, the lands of the zanjeras (i.e. the fields
belonging to and worked by the members) may be only part of the to-
tal lands irrigated by the system of canals. The conditions that apply
to the differences between member and nonmember lands are cen-
tral to the questions of corporate organization. However, based on
my own rough estimates of the average size of zanjeras in Bacarra
(45 ha), plus the fact that there are proportionally many smaller
zanjeras (2–10 ha) along the upper reaches of the river valleys, I
would suggest the overall average size of irrigation systems for Ilo-
cos Norte to be in the order of 25 hectares. From this I would
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further estimate that the total area under communal irrigation in
Ilocos Norte is between 18,000 and 20,000 hectares, with the differ-
ence perhaps representing an equivalent difference between areas
irrigated during the dry and wet seasons. Whatever the precise fig-
ure may be, it represents an extensive development in small-scale,
locally constructed, and cooperatively managed irrigation that is of
interest to both social and agricultural studies.9
Within the municipality of Bacarra, most of the smaller zanjeras
(10–20 ha) are concentrated along the margins of the valley, and derive
water from small streams or springs. Although some sloping hillside ter-
races exist, they are very limited in comparison with the spectacular
upland field systems of the Ifugaos, Bontoks, and Kalingas of the Cor-
dillera Central. These famous high-mountain terraces are all located
in areas where rainfall is heavier and more evenly distributed, and
mountain springs are relatively abundant throughout the year. Because
irrigation water in Ilocos Norte derives from low-lying rivers, streams,
and springs, steep hillside terraces are precluded.
The larger zanjeras in Bacarra (the largest is estimated to be 975
ha) are those that derive water from the Bacarra-Vintar River. For these
systems bamboo and rock weirs (puttot) are constructed in the main
river channel and divert water to fields that may be five kilometers or
more removed. The main canals (kali) constitute a maze of ditches that
cut through the irrigated fields of more distant and, finally, neighboring
zanjeras. Several zanjeras in Bacarra have dams located upriver in the
municipality of Vintar, but, as with village boundaries, this has no bear-
ing on the operation of systems.
Unlike the weirs in the main rivers, the dams on tributary streams
are constructed of concrete or, where older structures persist, rock and
cement that date from the Spanish colonial period. This type of dam
(padul) may be designed simply to divert stream flow or it may also
involve a small reservoir where a very limited amount of water stor-
age is possible. In some cases supplementary sources (though for a few
zanjeras they are the primary or only sources) come from the overflow
water of adjacent, more inland zanjeras.
The amount of work required to maintain dams on the main
river is considerably greater than that required for dams on
the feeder streams leading into the valley. This is because
the number of days individual members must work is largely
determined by the amount of damage to dams and intake sys-
tems during the rainy season (June through September), as
well as the regular maintenance required on primary and sec-
ondary canals. Those zanjeras with concrete dams require far
CORPORATE GROUPS 35
fewer days of work, both because they do not suffer the loss
of their dams and they usually do not have extensive canal
systems to maintain. Because brush weirs can be destroyed
two or even three times during the rainy season, the zanjeras
in the central valley may require as much as 60 to 90 work
days from each member each year. By contrast, those systems
with dams on tributary streams normally require no more than
30 days of their members.
The rivers of Ilocos Norte are braided with one, two, or even more
channels cutting through broad beds of river cobble. The wide riverbeds
absorb the high levels of wet-season runoff and the still higher levels
that occur with typhoon rains. One of the primary considerations in hav-
ing rock and bamboo weirs rather than concrete dams is that high water
levels may result in channels being relocated at some distance from ex-
isting diversion sites. In these instances a concrete structure, even a
permanent intake gate, would be left isolated and useless. What out-
siders (e.g., Christie 1914) have seen as “primitive” rock and bamboo
structures are technological features that can be quickly repositioned
and built in response to shifting channel patterns. At the same time,
when dams are washed away by high floodwaters, their collapse re-
duces the damage to canals and fields that would occur with permanent
structures.
The zanjeras that divert water from the main river would much pre-
fer not having to spend considerable amounts of time, effort, and money
on repairing and relocating main canals. They are well aware that the
zanjeras with concrete dams on the less turbulent, fixed-channel, trib-
utary streams spend much less time on maintenance and repair work.
However, putting in a permanent concrete structure on the main river,
either a dam or an intake gate, is not a rational alternative for them.
Bamboo and rock dams represent an adaptive technological response
to environmental disruptions and the needs of rice agriculture, the pro-
duction of which does not permit lengthy, high-cost disruptions to the
continuous supply of water.
Depending upon the flow of water, the size of the area to be irrigated,
and the location and effectiveness of the dam and intake system, the
seasonal availability of irrigation water will carry over from the harvest-
ing of the wet-season crop (invariably rice), to provide water during
the dry season on alternating schedules for most or all of the second
crop (usually garlic or tobacco), and the possibility of most fields within
a system being alternately watered for a third crop (usually mung
beans).10 The particular pattern of multicropping and the specific varie-
ties grown are further influenced by soil types and drainage, with the
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overall pattern further rationalized by the individual needs of a farmer
in terms of subsistence and marketing. Crop selection and the working
of fields are decided by individual families within the overall regime set
by the needs for irrigating rice during the wet season and market con-
siderations.
With the complex networks of canals and the fields of one zanjera
abutting those of another, the boundaries of a zanjera lack clear defini-
tion. As visible social entities, zanjeras are even more obscure since,
unlike hamlets or villages, they have no residential referents, with mem-
bers coming from two, three, or even more villages, and even villages
in adjacent municipalities. Yet zanjeras, unlike villages, are socially well
defined, corporate entities that possess tightly bounded organizational
structures, in marked contrast to their lack of physical definition (Fig-
ure 4).
Legal Incorporation
Zanjeras are well known to leading municipal office holders, even to a
few officials at the provincial level of government, politicians who ap-
preciate the fact that zanjeras are potential sources of political support
(Lewis 1971:138–142). A few lawyers, who provide the occasional legal
services that may be required, have some knowledge of how zanjeras
operate, though this largely involves matters relating to registrations
as well as the laws and government regulations that apply to irri-
gation groups as legal corporate organizations. However, even these
lawyers seem to have little knowledge of the day-to-day functioning of
the zanjeras or even the complex systems of property rights involved. In
general, zanjeras are unknown quantities to townspeople and are seen
simply as “the way farmers get together and bring water to their fields,”
as one lawyer explained it to me.
Lawyers assist newly organized zanjeras in drawing up their
constitutions and older, established zanjeras in revising and renew-
ing them every fifty years as required by law. Constitutions are
required as part of a zanjera’s registration with the Philippines
Securities and Exchange Commission. These charters provide in-
formation on the location, origins, and stated aims of the zanjera.
They also include more detailed information (some are more than
twenty pages overall) listing the duties and responsibilities of
regular members and officers, the schedules and procedures for
meetings and elections, the amounts and types of work involved,
and the various penalties and fines assessed members who fail to
meet their obligations. In some instances the charters are signed
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(or thumb-printed by those who cannot write) by each member;
in others they include only the signatures of the “Board of Direc-
tors,” as the elected representatives are known. The constitutions
are then properly certified by a notary public with the zanjeras be-
coming corporations in a true legal sense.
However detailed the constitutions may be, they do not include some
of the most important information on the corporate-property aspects of
zanjeras. Just as there is more to any business or industrial corpora-
tion than meets the public eye, the zanjeras are much more complex
organizations than their articles of legal incorporation indicate. It is
not merely that zanjeras are secretive and do not wish to disclose all
of the features that make them corporate. The information provided
in constitutions is that specifically required for the legal purposes of
incorporation, but certainly not all of that which, for legal purposes,
zanjeras consider important for their effectiveness as social groups.
Charters are now required by one or more agencies of government.
In the past the impetus for having legally notarized charters seems
to have come from the zanjeras themselves, especially the larger, cen-
trally located zanjeras most concerned with protecting their rights to
water and forms of communal property (Appendix 4). Currently, with
a national government greatly concerned about agriculture, a much
greater effort is made to see that all irrigation groups are registered
with various agencies, ostensibly to better coordinate rural production
from the national level. In any event, authorities ask for and receive
only the kinds of information that they consider important for legal
incorporation. That the folk or emic corporate structures of zanjeras
might involve much more than is required by law is not a part of official
comprehension.
Finally, most members of the zanjeras are unaware of what is actually
in the charters, especially with most of them written in Spanish. Individ-
ual members learn from each other what the rules and expectations of
membership include rather than from the incomplete information found
in the constitutions. Constitutions are less important for what they say
than for what they are: certified documents that verify communal water
rights and the existence of the zanjera as a legal entity. For the older
zanjeras the charters are important in that they substantiate the pri-
ority of their claim. Their claims to both place and time are important
in terms of their relationships with outsiders: individual farmers, other
zanjeras, and agencies of government.
For both families and zanjeras the primary features affecting corpo-
rate structure are the relationships pertaining to property. For families
the relevant property rights and concomitant social relationships are
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those that relate to freehold and leasehold farmland, and additional
land rights (discussed below) that can derive from membership in a
zanjera. The property and assets of a zanjera include rights to water,
canals and canal rights-of-way, and meetinghouses. In some zanjeras
they also include capital savings, various primary and secondary owner-
ship rights to parcels of land, and in some instances secondary rights to
whole blocks of irrigated fields. For zanjeras and families, water rights
and land rights are intertwined and complementary to the corporate in-
terests of both.
Membership, Ownership, Water, and Land
While the charters list and describe some, but not all, of the responsibil-
ities of members, they do not include statements on the requirements
for membership. Comments concerning “we the members” do not in-
volve explanations of who may belong to a zanjera or how membership
is achieved. Since membership entails rights of access to property (wa-
ter and, in some cases, land), the rules which limit and define that
access are crucial to the group’s existence as a corporate enterprise.
One of the more simple distinctions involving membership concerns
the admission of landlords. Though no references appear within the
charters, each zanjera has unwritten but specific rules as to whether
members must work the land themselves or whether they can also be
landlords. Of the total of 47 zanjeras in Bacarra, 26 prohibit landlord
participation, specifically with respect to voting or being eligible for
positions of leadership. For these irrigation systems memberships are
restricted to persons who actually farm the land, either as owner-opera-
tors or as tenants. The remaining 21 zanjeras permit landlords both to
vote and to stand for office.
However, the category of landlord is not defined in terms of social
class since the largest number of people deriving incomes in the form of
landlord shares consists of fellow villagers, “peasant landlords” (Lewis
1971:119–127). In some instances, I was told, the rule of permitting
landlord memberships exists to allow for the continuation in office of
an older, highly valued member who no longer works land within the
zanjera. On the other hand, the admission of upper-class landlords is
seen as undesirable in that, as one peasant landlord remarked, “such
people do not understand our problems.” Leadership, it is argued, re-
quires knowledge and experience that can only be gained sufficiently
by an individual having worked his way up through the system. Not
only would landlords lack experience and understanding, but members
feel uncomfortable (“ashamed”) when having to associate with them
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on a person-to-person basis during occasions (work days, meetings,
elections, and rituals) when interactions should be open and involve
companionship.
Though none of the zanjeras in Bacarra have upper-class landlords
in positions of leadership (though at least two did in the recent past),
there are zanjeras in the nearby municipalities of Vintar and Pasuquian
that have leading political figures as headmen. In the middle Laoag
River valley, the maestro of one large zanjera was a high-ranking gen-
eral and a relative of Ferdinand Marcos. Though officially listed as the
maestros of these zanjeras, these particular individuals do not concern
themselves with or engage in the actual work or direction of day-to-day
activities. This is done by the segundo maestro, or vice president, who
is acknowledged by the membership to be the effective leader. As far as
could be determined, these cases represent the inclusion of socially or
politically important individuals as honorific figures who attend the one
or two major ritual events each year, and who have in the past or can in
the future provide assistance.
Whatever the rules concerning working or nonworking members, the
irreducible condition of membership is whether or not one’s fields are
irrigated by a zanjera. Simply enough, persons do not belong if their
fields are not within the zanjera system. On the other hand, not all of
the fields irrigated by a zanjera are actually those of its members. As
much as half or even more of the land irrigated by a zanjera may belong
to nonmembers. Memberships are distinct from two categories of non-
members (the inkapulo and the biang ti daga, see below), whose lands
are irrigated by the system. The conditions pertaining to nonmember
water users are significant in terms of defining the precise corporate
limits of a zanjera, for these are social boundaries that do not correlate
with the physical layout of the irrigation system.
Inkapulo: the water buyers
One category of nonmembers that may receive water from zanjeras is
referred to as the inkapulo people, the one-tenth or ten percenters.
Just as often referred to as razco (from the Spanish rasgo or parcel of
irrigated land), and even sometimes porcientos (percenters), inkapulo
fields are those found in the lower and usually poorer irrigated sections
of a system, areas in which water may be in relatively short or irreg-
ular supply during the dry season. Conversely, the fields may be in a
waterlogged area which seldom completely drains, or have higher than
desirable water levels, in which case only rice can be grown. Whatever
the relative abundance of water in any given year, the razco water users
pay ten percent (the inkapulo) of each irrigated crop to the zanjera.
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They have no formal obligation to the zanjera other than this, though if
an extreme emergency required extra labor they might be asked—and
they would undoubtedly agree—to assist.
Because of their location at the margins of a system and not being
regular members, their situation with respect to the reliability of a regu-
lar supply of water is uncertain. During periods of water shortage and
limited water schedules for membership lands, the supply of water to
inkapulo users may have to be cut off. The payment of ten percent
rather than a fixed fee is automatically adjusted to the variable supply
of water. If the number of inkapulo users is sufficiently large, they will
select (or elect) their own representatives to deal with the zanjera. A
central site, usually the home of an inkapulo representative, will be
used as a central collection point for the zanjera’s ten percent share of
the crops.
The absence of inkapulo water buyers may mean only that a system
has no surpluses, or that all overflow water is obligated to downstream
zanjeras. As is discussed later, in some instances inkapulo users, for a
variety of reasons, form their own zanjera and enter into a corporate-
to-corporate, negotiated relationship with the parent group. Whether
a group of inkapulo water users is able to create and maintain such a
zanjera, which is necessarily dependent upon another, depends upon a
range of social and hydrological conditions.
Though included within the total lands irrigated by a system, inka-
pulo lands and inkapulo users are both physically and socially periph-
eral to a zanjera, important mainly for the annual income they provide.
This can amount to a few hundred or, for larger zanjeras, several thou-
sand pesos a year, all of which helps to pay operational costs (e.g.,
bamboo, cement, equipment rentals, legal costs) as well as the consid-
erable expenses associated with feeding work groups and carrying out
ceremonial activities.
The relationship of a zanjera to its water buyers is much less signifi-
cant to the internal structure and corporate organization of the group
than are the relationships and circumstances that characterize the sec-
ond category of people (the biang ti daga) whose lands are found within
some of the larger zanjeras. These relationships are central to the prop-
erty rights and corporate integrity of most large irrigation systems.
Biang ti daga: the original landowners
Within most larger zanjeras, those located along the Bacarra-Vintar
River, there are parcels of land, sometimes whole blocks of fields,
called biang ti daga, a term best translated as “the business (or con-
cern) of the land.” These fields derive from formal agreements with
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landowners who, at the time a zanjera was established or subsequently
expanded, gave up use rights to a portion of their land in exchange for a
continuous supply of irrigation water. Depending on the difficulties and
expenses expected with initially constructing a system (e.g., position-
ing the dam, the length and difficulty of routing the canal, problems of
rights-of-way, leveling the land to be irrigated, potentials for providing
water during the dry season, and so forth), zanjera officials negotiated
for portions of the owners’ lands, in some instances as much as two-
thirds of the total land involved. The blocks of land obtained and those
remaining to the landowners are set out in block maps (Figure 5) and
covered by individual contracts (Appendix 1). The landowners’ portions,
the biang-ti-daga land, are provided water in perpetuity. In some cases
no further obligations are involved; in others the landowners provide to-
ken, annual contributions of money or sugar-cane wine (basi).
Whatever the amounts of land gained in the initial exchange, the
agreements are that the fields obtained by the zanjera are held corpo-
rately and used by individual members for only as long as the zanjera
provides water. Should the zanjera fail to maintain a regular and suffi-
cient supply—as the result of a major breakdown in the system or a
preemption by a government irrigation scheme—the original landown-
ers, still having the primary rights of ownership, can then reassert use
rights to all of their land.
Because these agreements often go back for one or even two centu-
ries, the original situation may have been greatly altered. Whereas
there were larger landholdings in the past—negotiations for, say, twenty
hectares of land might have involved no more than a single
owner—inheritance and particularly the sale and resale of lands in this
century have resulted in a highly complex, often confused situation of
legal titles. The blocks of biang-ti-daga land have been subdivided by
inheritance, sale, and resale over many generations. Also, there are in-
stances where documents were lost or destroyed during World War II,
others where individuals have failed or not wanted to change registered
titles, and still others where records have simply disappeared as a con-
sequence of the vicissitudes of time.
In a number of instances, I was told, zanjeras have legally consoli-
dated their shares of the land when they learned that formal ownership
rights had lapsed. In these instances a search of tax records had shown
them that the descendants of the original biang-ti-daga landowners had
become unaware or no longer cared about their primary claims to the
corresponding zanjera blocks. In other instances, primary ownership
rights were simply lost or ignored when the corresponding biang-ti-
daga lands were sold, often several times over, to new owners. What-
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ever the particulars of individual cases may have been, zanjeras seem to
have quickly and quietly applied for absolute ownership to their blocks
of land when opportunities presented themselves. One example of this
type of corporate consolidation is shown in Appendix 2.
In many cases, the legal situations surrounding biang-ti-daga lands
have become enormously complicated. Unlike the conditions pertaining
to inkapulo lands, the initial and continued existence of the zanjeras
depends upon their ability to provide water to the lands of the biang-ti-
daga owners. The blocks of land obtained by a zanjera are fundamental
corporate features of most systems in the central part of the valley,
since they involve usufruct property that is communally controlled, and
also property that is in potential jeopardy.
Atar: membership shares of land
A hundred years ago the situation was legally and administratively
much simpler since zanjeras had only to deal with a few upper-class
landlords. The historically recent diminution of larger holdings and the
fact that peasants now own many of the fields that once belonged to the
upper class (Lewis 1971:26–27) mean that the conditions relating to ti-
tles held by biang-ti-daga owners and the claims held by zanjeras are
both complicated and uncertain. The zanjeras holding sizeable amounts
of exchange land are well aware of this situation since acquired fields
can constitute large portions or even all of the area worked by members
of a zanjera.
The portion of land obtained in the exchange with the original land-
owners is called atar, which literally translates as “a newly cleared
field,” referring to the association of paddy construction and, some-
times, land-leveling with bringing irrigation to the area. Atar lands con-
stitute the major part of the corporately controlled property, adminis-
tered under a form of secondary ownership by the zanjera and allocated
in nearly equivalent-sized parcels to individual members. The members
themselves hold tertiary rights to their atar shares (bingay), rights that
are passed from generation to generation as a part of a member’s fam-
ily estate and invariably listed as a part of a young man’s land dowry, or
sabong.
The total amounts of atar land and the size of the individual shares
allocated to members vary from one zanjera to another depending
upon the number of members involved and the overall amount of land
obtained in the exchange of water for land. A common size for atar
shares was originally about one-quarter hectare, though actual field
plots were judged according to the amount of rice that a field would
produce. Actual measures of land (given edaphic factors) might vary
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from one atar block to another, or even from one field to another.
Excepting that some of the founding officers were given larger, or
additional, atar shares for their contributions in engineering the sys-
tem or negotiating the exchange, atar parcels are viewed as equal
membership shares: one bingay, one measure of work; one bingay, one
vote.
A distinctive physical feature of atar lands is that the individual fields
within a block are long and narrow, making atar plots noticeably differ-
ent from surrounding, privately owned fields (either biang ti daga or
inkapulo), which are the more typical squared or blocked shapes found
throughout most of the Philippines (Figure 1). The exaggerated, rectan-
gular pattern of atar fields relates to the practice by which zanjeras
distribute equivalent bingay units to individual members (Figure 6).
As a simplified, hypothetical example, a membership of fifty persons,
with a total land area of 25 hectares to be irrigated and the zanjera
obtaining for itself one-half of this in the exchange agreement, the
12.5-hectare atar portion would be subdivided to give each member
2,500 square meters, one-quarter-hectare shares. Assuming the total
atar block to be 200 by 625 meters, the officers of the zanjera would
divide the longer measure by the number of members (50) to give each
family an atar share measuring 12.5 by 200 meters. Each individual’s
bingay faces directly onto the main canal (on the short end), with no
intervening fields to intersect the flow of water.11
For two reasons, however, the elongated strip seldom represents the
total area of an atar share. First, as a result of inheritance or the sell-
ing of part shares, several kinsmen or other zanjera members will have
divided the one-quarter-hectare lots into three, four, or more pieces.
Some of these part-shares are as small as 100 square meters and each
part-sharehold carries a proportionate obligation of work and portion
of a vote. Secondly, and to complicate the matter still more, the overall
amount of atar land may never have been obtained in a single, contigu-
ous block of fields in the first place (Figures 5 and 6).
When lands were obtained from the original owners, two or more sepa-
rate blocks of atar fields were often acquired, in part because the zanjeras
initially dealt with a number of landowners and it was simply impossible to
obtain all of the atar land in a single section. At the same time, sections of
land differ in terms of being closer to the source of water, quality of soils,
drainage, and so on. The separate blocks of atar land obtained by a zanjera
represent the different areas negotiated for and the more or less desirable
qualities of the lands involved. Larger zanjeras have greater numbers of
atar blocks, each of which is identified by name (on the basis of their soil
types or some other local feature) or by number.
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In order to make shares equitable, members were allotted parcels
in each section, the total number of separate parcels making up their
atar share, or bingay. In these cases an individual’s one-quarter-hectare
share might be composed of three or four (or even more) paddy fields
located throughout the irrigation system.12 In addition to making indi-
vidual holdings more or less equal in terms of soils and drainage pat-
terns, such a distribution precludes a problem frequently encountered
in irrigation groups where all of a water user’s land is located in one
section of the system: the greater reliability of water for fields at the
head of a system than for those in more distant sections. Such inequities
can lead to sectional disputes within an irrigation system. On the other
hand, with individual shares subdivided and distributed throughout the
system, it is in the interests of all members to see that each section of
the zanjera is equitably provided for.
The corporate interests of both zanjera and member are inextricably
linked through their respective rights to atar land, in addition to the
zanjera’s corporate rights to water, dams, and canals. The loss of water
as a consequence of a system’s inability to continue functioning would
be a major loss where freehold lands are involved, but for an atar-based
system it would mean the loss of the land as well. This feature of atar-
based systems sets them apart from zanjeras in which all or the vast
majority of lands are freehold. The presence of only member-owned,
freehold land provides a different, somewhat less corporate basis for
zanjera membership.
Inkalian: freely owned land
The majority of zanjeras in Bacarra, mostly the smaller irrigation soci-
eties located on the tributaries feeding into the valley, are not based on
lands obtained in barters of water for land. Without blocks of atar land
they have no corresponding areas of biang ti daga. The fields irrigated
by these zanjeras are owned in freehold by the members themselves
or are the fields of inkapulo water buyers. In these zanjeras corporate
property is restricted to water rights, dams, canals, canal rights-of-
way, meetinghouses, and, in some instances, small parcels of communal
land, discussed below.
These zanjeras were organized by the landowners themselves who,
as working farmers or landlords (i.e., with tenants doing the work),
developed irrigation systems for their own lands. This procedure did
not involve a water-for-land exchange as in atar-based systems. Mem-
ber lands in these zanjeras are referred to as inkalian, from the base
word kali (canal): the canal builders.
In zanjeras with only inkalian lands—an estimated 25 of the 47
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surveyed—members own roughly unequal portions of land, with fields
indistinguishable in shape from the surrounding paddies of nonmem-
bers, or the biang-ti-daga fields within atar-based systems. They are
thus different in physical form from the membership lands of atar-based
systems.
Work requirements for inkalian members are based upon an agreed
size (usually ⅛ ha, ¼ ha, or the amount of rice a field will produce) and
individuals provide equivalent or proportional labor. However, average-
sized shares are much less a precise concern and there is considerable
variation from the mean. Whereas an individual may have two, three, or
even more fields within a system, these zanjeras do not (cannot) have
the highly rationalized systems of field distribution that characterize
zanjeras with separate blocks of atar lands. Although there is the poten-
tial for claims of unequal access to water, these zanjeras are among the
smaller ones (10–20 ha) within the municipality and this tends to mod-
erate problems of sectionalism.
Inkalian-based systems are also those that permit landlords to be
members. Several individuals suggested to me that the owners of larger
holdings, both upper-class landlords and wealthier peasants, tend to
play disproportionate political roles in the operation and management
of inkalian-based systems. Given landlord participation and the absence
of communal-corporate lands, inkalian-based zanjeras are less egalitar-
ian or democratic than are those with blocks of atar land. However,
none of the zanjeras are strictly egalitarian or devoid of the status-rank
differences that make up rural peasant societies in the northern Philip-
pines.
In only 6 of the 47 zanjeras surveyed do members have only atar
land; an additional 12 have both atar and inkalian lands. Zanjeras
with both types of membership were said to have developed where
founding officers and wealthier members had owned freehold lands
within the system and where they had also received shares of atar
lands. In one instance I was told that the founding leaders were given
pieces of freehold land for their initial contributions in establishing
the zanjera, but whether such land was originally provided from the
atar block or obtained in a clear exchange with the original landown-
ers was unknown. In another instance it was said that several of the
founding leaders had owned larger pieces of land, some of which
were set aside as their biang ti daga while the remainder became
part of the overall atar holdings. Their biang-ti-daga portion was said
to have been “more favorable” (larger) than those of other landown-
ers. As is the case today, the individual solutions that prevailed for
any zanjera at a particular time were both highly specific in meet-
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ing perceived needs and reasonably flexible for covering a number of
contingencies. However, the current distribution of land types is far
from being a precise guide to what happened more than fifty years
ago. It appears that leaders often asked for and received special con-
sideration but, because of elapsed time and the desire to downplay
the importance of such rewards, details are imprecise.
The types and proportions of land in zanjeras today represent the
group solutions that farmers initially arrived at and have since modified
as new problems and opportunities arose for bringing irrigation to and
maintaining it in specific areas. The conditions that now obtain are dif-
ficult to reconstruct precisely, partly because older documentation is
limited, inadequately detailed (e.g., with the charters), or out of date.
However, what is lacking in historical specifics is more generally evi-
dent from the corporate solutions found in extant situations. Clearly,
zanjeras with larger amounts of different types of land involve greater
degrees of corporateness. The final category of zanjera lands involves
still other property-corporate concerns for large, atar-based systems.
Komon: communal property
In addition to irrigating inkapulo, atar, biang-ti-daga, and inkalian lands,
zanjeras also include areas of komon land, after the Spanish comun or
common. Thirty-two of the zanjeras in Bacarra have some komon land:
the smallest reported was 50 square meters, the largest more than 8
hectares. The smallest communal holdings are not farm land but are
the sites on which meetinghouses are located—the balay ti zanjera, the
home of the zanjera or, as they are also commonly called, kamarine,
from the Spanish camarin or meetinghouse. Smaller zanjeras will have
only one meetinghouse, whereas larger ones may have two or more lo-
cated at various places throughout the system.
Additional amounts of komon land are usually irrigated fields, lands
that are farmed collectively by the membership, with part of the crops
set aside for the food consumed on work days and on ritual occasions.
Extra produce is sold and the money used to pay zanjera expenses.
Irrigation groups that lack communally owned fields may make arrange-
ments with one or more local landlords to farm plots as a group tenant,
with the tenant’s share going into the zanjera’s treasury. On the other
hand, if large amounts of komon land are available, a zanjera can set
aside fields for the use of its officers, a kind of honorarium (paglakay)
given them to farm for the duration of their office. Ideally, these fields
accompany the office, though when they have been associated with a
family line for several generations problems can arise over the reluc-
tance of former officers to give them up (Siy 1982:77). An alternative,
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and one that avoids such an issue, is where officials simply receive part-
shares of the produce from the communally farmed plots of komon land
or, in the poorest zanjeras, are compensated with “time off” from the
labors required of regular members.
A few zanjeras have greater amounts of communal land than they
need to cover expenses and honoraria. These surpluses provide a re-
serve of land that can be used for trading or, in emergencies, even
selling should additional lands be required to relocate canals or meet
other outstanding costs. All komon land can be used for such emergen-
cies but systems with the largest holdings of komon land have the
greatest margin of protection. At the same time, the wealthier zanjeras
can use extra amounts of komon land to further increase zanjera funds
and even assist some of their members. A few of the largest zanjeras
make surplus komon lands available to members by lottery or by rotat-
ing their use among members. The members so selected work the plots
as tenants with the landlord’s share going into the zanjera’s treasury.
Komon lands may be owned outright by the zanjera (fee simple) or, as
with atar fields, may involve secondary rights (fee tail) with primary ti-
tle still held by the biang-ti-daga owner. Fee-simple rights to komon land
can be acquired in a number of ways: by direct purchase, if sufficient
treasury funds exist; from land willed or given to the zanjera by an heir-
less member; from land reclaimed or rebuilt along the margins of the
Bacarra-Vintar River; from land that was earlier a canal or canal right-
of-way that had to be relocated; or from very old atar land for which the
biang-ti-daga owners are no longer known and for which primary titles
have lapsed (Appendix 2).
One particularly noteworthy example of how lands were reclaimed
from the Bacarra-Vintar River was concluded during 1976 when offi-
cials of a zanjera contracted a bulldozer to level and fill a one-and-a-half-
hectare area adjacent to a curve in the riverbed. Originally part of the
biang-ti-daga lands within the system, it was included in a larger area
destroyed by flood in 1936. A bar of river cobbles parallel to the bank
had resulted in the formation of a slough that gradually filled with river
sediments. In the years immediately following the flood, zanjera officials
directed the planting of trees along the cobble bar to anchor the for-
mation more firmly. Forty years later, with no subsequent flood damage
and after the fields had been bulldozed to a level above the high-water
mark, new fields were constructed. No work was undertaken, however,
until a title search revealed that all claims to the area had lapsed. The
fields are now farmed by zanjera members on a combination lottery-ro-
tational arrangement.
The amounts of komon land, as well as the potential for obtaining
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additional komon lands, are greatest in the larger zanjeras. The con-
struction or reconstruction of new fields from abandoned canals, newly
acquired unirrigated lands, or abandoned sloughs is greatly facilitated
by having a large labor force, as well as having greater reserves of land
and money to invest in such projects. Simply in terms of land, labor, and
capital the larger zanjeras are in a better position to expand their cor-
porate estate than are the smaller ones with fewer members and little
to invest.
For the smaller zanjeras of inkalian owners, corporate-communal
property other than water rights, dams, and canals may include only a
meetinghouse and perhaps a small plot of komon land. Correlated with
their smaller corporate estate they are correspondingly much simpler
in organization and much less socially elaborate than the larger, atar-
based systems. The existence of sizeable blocks of atar land and corres-
ponding areas of biang ti daga necessitate much more complex systems
of property control and formalized social relationships. Whereas all zan-
jeras are corporately based, the larger, atar-based systems are neces-
sarily more corporate than are the smaller, inkalian-based systems.
At the same time, the differing degrees of corporate elaboration
involve the respective members in somewhat different ways. In all zan-
jeras the rights of the group to water and the rights of the family to
land are essentially complementary and mutually supportive relation-
ships involving respective corporate interests that dovetail. However, in
zanjeras that possess atar blocks and larger holdings of komon land, the
dovetailing of family units into the structure of the zanjeras involves a
more complicated network of rights and obligations. With atar lands, in-
dividual families can not only be deprived of water, but they can lose all
rights (their tertiary rights) to the land. Differences in corporate struc-
ture are also evident in the contrasting patterns of organization and
leadership that characterize the smaller inkalian and the larger atar-
based systems.
Organization and Leadership
The size of an irrigated area in large part determines the extent and
complexity of zanjera organization, though total area is not the only fac-
tor involved. Large areas of inkapulo land serviced by a small member-
ship can mean that a zanjera with a total irrigated area of fifty hectares
has a smaller membership than one with the same area having only
inkalian lands. In general, however, zanjeras with the greatest areas
under irrigation have the largest memberships and the most elaborate
leadership structures.
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Memberships vary from the smallest zanjeras with as few as 20–30
farmers, to the largest with 300 on up to 1,000. Because his total farm
may be divided into ten or more small, widely scattered plots totaling
as little as one-half hectare (including dry-farmed hill plots and rainfed
rice paddies), a farmer may belong to two or even three zanjeras, in
addition to having one or more plots irrigated from a government sys-
tem. Participation in a zanjera is always prescribed, but individuals are
not precluded from having multiple memberships. It is even possible
for an individual to be the leader of two groups (I know of at least one
instance), though the demands of leadership make such multiple roles
very difficult.
In general multiple memberships are limited, especially for individu-
als belonging to the largest zanjeras, because participation in two or
more can involve farming more distant fields as well as working at
conflicting times on dams and canals still further removed. The simple
physical problems that dual memberships involve work against active
participation in more than one zanjera. Individuals did not, however,
see the problem as involving conflicts in social obligation. The leaders
of six zanjeras, all farmers of high status and relative wealth (one hec-
tare or slightly more of land), held land in neighboring zanjeras but all
had arranged for tenants to work the fields in the more distant zanjeras.
At the same time, however, three of these individuals worked lands as
tenants for biang-ti-daga landowners within the zanjeras in which they
were officials. Such variable practices of land use involving an individ-
ual in the multiple roles of independent farmer, tenant, and landlord are
quite common in Ilocos Norte, Isabela, and probably other areas of the
Philippines as well (Lewis 1971:119–127).
The admission of new members to a zanjera follows no fixed pattern.
When more members are required, means will be arranged for admit-
ting them. In zanjeras with only inkalian fields and no atar lands it is a
much simpler process to admit new members since the zanjeras have
no corporate controls over the lands owned and farmed by their mem-
bers. If the individual applicant is already an inkapulo water buyer and
his labor is needed, it may be arranged that he simply provide the re-
quired hours of work rather than the ten percent of his crops. If, on the
other hand, the delivery system is being expanded and improved, new
members may have to give up smaller portions of their land (10%, 20%,
or even more) and these additions become part of the inkalian-based
system’s komon lands. The remaining portion of the new member’s land
is owned on the same basis as the land of other members. In each case
the respective needs of the zanjera and those of the new member are
negotiated through bartered exchanges of water, land, and labor.
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This rock and brush weir (padul), shown here during the dry season, spans the
entire Bacarra-Vintar River. At this point the river is a single channel over 100
meters across. The water, moving from left to right, is diverted into the intake
(wawa ti kali—mouth of the canal) at the lower part of the photo. This single dam
serves nine zanjeras with an area of more than 500 hectares and a main canal
of 12 kilometers. This system and alliance of zanjeras has been described by Siy
(1982).
Four weirs are visible in this aerial photo taken during the wet season. A total of
six zanjeras derived water from these in 1963 (but in various other combinations
in the years before and after). All of the irrigation groups work cooperatively on
major repairs to the dams shared and those of neighboring dams. The white wa-
ter at the left-hand side of the third dam shows where a breach has occurred, the
result of a storm the day before. In addition, at most points where canals cross
one another (right-center area) there are watergates (pagbibinoludan) for divert-
ing water from higher to lower canals in emergencies such as the one shown
here. The mix of long, narrow atar and wider biang-ti-daga fields is faintly visible
above and below the road.
The core work unit within larger zanjeras is the gunglo, a group or gang of 20 to
30 members headed by a panglakayen (leader). Here a gunglo cleans grasses from
a section of main canal. The man in the lower foreground is the panglakayen for
this group. These individuals are elected from among the older, more experienced
members of the gunglo or from the zanjera at large. A part of their responsibilities
involves participation on the zanjera’s “board of directors.” In the larger zanjeras,
gunglos provide the nucleus of close, interpersonal relationships for individual mem-
bers. Within this context panglakayens assume much of the role of older brothers,
are regularly addressed as such (manong), and, like other officers, share in the labor
and comradery expected of all members.
Workers from five cooperating zanjeras repair a broken portion of a dam fol-
lowing the receding of waters after a wet season storm. Before this and shortly
after the storm, a temporary weir (pasarigsig) was set in place near and running
parallel to the river bank in order to maintain the flow of water in the main
canal. This smaller structure is just visible behind the men at left-center. The wa-
ter flows from left to right against six rows of lashed and interwoven bamboo,
river cobbles, and branches of bamboo placed on the downstream side to reduce
undercutting. This dam is wider than most because of the narrowness of the
channel and the corresponding force of the current.
Three canals flow from top to bottom in this picture. The center canal, the low-
est-lying and smallest of the three, is siphoned under the largest canal and exits
to nearby fields at lower left. By means of two connecting gates (pagbibinoludan)
located on each side of the wide ponding area at the center of the photo, and
from what has now become the middle canal, emergency water can be diverted
into the two adjacent systems. In a kind of reciprocal assistance, a steel gate
can be lowered where the canal at the right passes beneath the road, water then
backs up and raises by several feet, and a supply of emergency water is provided
by the higher system.
The president and vice-president of a zanjera that derives its water from a trib-
utary stream stand on a concrete dam (puttot). These structures are characteris-
tic of small, less-turbulent water sources and require much less maintenance
than the brush and rock weirs, which must be rebuilt and relocated as a result of
flooding and shifting water channels in the main rivers. The intake and control
gates are at the right-center.
Men from a zanjera transplant seedlings in one of the communally owned fields
(komon), while behind them three other members harrow rice paddies that will
again be flooded and transplanted from a nearby seedbed. Rice and dry season
crops from these corporately controlled fields will be used to provide much of the
food consumed on work days and at ritual feasts. A part of the produce, along
with income that may be derived from the sale of surplus water, will be set aside
and sold to cover zanjera expenses: cement, bamboo, lumber, hire of earth-mov-
ing equipment, special foods, and even legal fees. In the relatively wealthiest
zanjeras there may even be a surplus sufficient to provide to members a kind of
annual “bonus” (pagraramanan) from the income on komon lands and the sale of
water.
A ritual offering (umras) is prepared and displayed in the home of a president or
vice-president on the eve of the main ritual—the pamisa or mass—held before the
onset of monsoon rains. In this picture the wives of zanjera officials stand beside
plates of cakes and candied-puffed rice. At the center of the table are two plates,
one of glutinous and the other of nonglutinous rice, each with an uncooked egg.
Behind is a bottle of Coca Cola and one of San Miguel beer. At the rear of the
table are carved and painted figures of saints, although zanjeras have no specific
patron saints as such.
Ceremonies at the kamarine (field or meetinghouse) include a lavish feast. The
sons who will eventually inherit their fathers’ memberships and obligations are
also included, a recognition of their future involvement, and they are the first
to be served (upper-left). The president (third from right) is surrounded by
the headmen of neighboring zanjeras and, after they and other special guests
(e.g., public officials, lawyers, government representatives) have been served,
the president and his zanjera members will eat.
One of the primary functions of the Federation of Zanjera Associations of
Bacarra (FZAB) involves the supervision of individual zanjera elections. De-
pending on the size of the zanjera, two, three, or more officials from the
federation will attend elections, speak to the assembled members to remind
them of their responsibilities, distribute ballots, collect and count votes, and
announce winners. Above, zanjera members record the votes—counted and
read aloud by a federation representative—for the presidential candidates (top
two rows on board), vice-presidents (following two rows), and seven candi-
dates running for the five positions of panglakayen. Elections are also the
occasion for feasting and drinking.
The most important reason for the existence of the Federation of Zanjera
Associations of Bacarra (FZAB) involves presenting the concerns of its mem-
bers to government officials and local politicians. In this photo, the president
of the federation (seated right-center) listens to a representa-
tive—accompanied by two assistants from the Provincial Irrigation Office—as
he explains that government rules state that each dam must represent one
irrigation group. The president and his officers (only two of whom are shown
at far right) explain that such a regulation cannot apply since dams are fre-
quently shared by two or more zanjeras and, for those on the Bacarra-Vintar
River, the number sharing a dam may change from year to year as channels
shift and zanjeras relocate dams and intake systems. To support their claim
of corporate independence they have brought along copies of their zanjera’s
constitution and their records of incorporation as they are listed with the
Philippines Securities and Exchange Commission.
As mentioned earlier, inkapulo water buyers may be more or less or-
ganized themselves, with one or two individuals representing them to
the zanjera, a convenience for both sides at the two or three times a
year that the ten percent of production is collected. If, say, because
of an improved delivery system a zanjera is able to expand its mem-
bership, the inkapulo users may be added to the zanjera as a group,
further adding to the divisions of work groups (gunglo) that make up the
zanjera as a whole. Whether or not new memberships are accepted in
inkalian-based systems depends upon the perceived advantages to the
zanjera, its ability to provide additional members with an adequate wa-
ter supply, the willingness of individuals to accept the responsibilities
of membership, and the possibility that some land may be bargained to
the zanjera as well. Each case depends upon the merits of the situation
for both parties. However, once agreed upon, the particular mechanism
for including more members is a matter of relative ease. The perceived
needs of the zanjera decide whether or not such action can be under-
taken.
For the larger, atar-based zanjeras the admission of new members
is more complicated since the presence of corporately owned or con-
trolled lands involves different sets of property rights and obligations.
Some zanjeras have sections of both atar and inkalian lands, and some
individual members have both kinds. As one informant stated, “It is bet-
ter to have all one kind of land [i.e., membership type], just like all
members would be workers [and not landlords] since this makes us all
the same.” In fact, however, this has not prevented the combining of
atar and inkalian lands in a single system.
Because atar shares have been much divided into part-shares, zan-
jeras with atar lands normally have a considerable potential for inter-
nally expanding their labor force if new lands can be found to augment
existing atar fields. Such a potentially expandable labor force is espe-
cially useful in the bigger zanjeras since large groups of men and capital
assets can be brought together to extend irrigation to adjacent areas.
The construction costs and labor requirements of such projects might
be well beyond the resources of a smaller zanjera. Whether by small
increments of one field at a time or by incorporating larger areas, ex-
pansions involve negotiating with individual landowners. If the zanjera
obtains additional sections of atar land, the sections are partitioned and
individual plots distributed among the membership. According to infor-
mants, however, this has not occurred “for a long time” (perhaps not
since the early part of this century) because there are no larger sec-
tions of potentially irrigable lands that are not already under irrigation.
Where additional lands are still being acquired, it is accomplished in
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small increments (100–200 sq m) in negotiations with individual own-
ers, and the plots are added to the komon rather than the atar land
holdings (Appendix 1).
Because atar shares, or bingay, are already much subdivided and
additional increments are small, new lands are distributed among the
membership by lottery or on a rotational basis to compensate for earlier
losses. Whatever the actual means used, land is invariably redistributed
among existing members. Unlike the addition of inkalian lands, which
necessarily brings new members, the addition of atar lands increases
the corporate resources in land. Any increase in the number of mem-
bers comes essentially from the inclusion of a member’s close relatives
and those who are not already full-share members. In a demographic
setting where land is all too scarce and close kin ties always expand-
able, zanjeras can invariably be expanded internally. Consequently,
adding outsiders to work atar lands seldom if ever becomes a problem.
At the same time, adding new members with inkalian-freehold land to
atar-based systems is not too difficult since their inclusion does not au-
tomatically give them access to atar lands.
Still another solution for increasing the overall size of the physical
system (but not the zanjera) can be found in the establishment of an
auxiliary zanjera, what Ilocanos call a sapuyot zanjera. The word sa-
puyot refers to a water barrier at the end of a canal, from which surplus
water is passed on to other systems or to inkapulo water buyers. In the
absence of mutual agreements to expand the existing zanjera to include
a group of water buyers, the inkapulo group may form its own zanjera
and come to constitute a separate though necessarily highly dependent
group. Such a step will require extended negotiations with the parent
zanjera and may involve the sapuyot group in making a payment of land,
yearly payments (to make up for the loss of the ten-percent crop pro-
duction), providing extra labor to work on the dam and main canal, or
combinations of these. Taking the name of the parent group, the auxil-
iary zanjera will usually add the word sapuyot to the parent zanjera’s
name. For example, with an original zanjera named Pasayakan the new
group would be called Sapuyot Pasayakan.
Smaller zanjeras of twenty to thirty members usually have a presi-
dent (the Spanish term maestro is more commonly used than the Ilo-
cano pangolo), a vice-president, a secretary, and possibly a treasurer.
The three or four officers of these zanjeras plan activities, call members
together, direct work parties, deal with government officials, interact
with the officers of neighboring zanjeras, and organize and direct ritual
activities. Since all members work together in consistent, face-to-face
associations, the overall operation and decision-making process in-
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volves the entire membership to a much greater degree than is the case
with larger zanjeras.
The largest zanjeras (300 members or more) have more elaborate
structures of official positions. They include a president, a vice-president,
directors (one for each 25–30 members), a secretary (and possibly an as-
sistant secretary), a treasurer (and possibly an assistant treasurer), two
collectors (and possibly more), two organizers (and possibly more), sev-
eral managers, cooks (several women organized into one or more crews),
and an auditor (a lawyer or accountant hired by the zanjera). The pres-
ident, vice-president, and directors constitute the elected, decision-mak-
ing body, the zanjera’s “board of directors.” Though corporate charters
may stipulate that they meet periodically (once a week or somewhat less
frequently), officials normally get together only as circumstances re-
quire—frequently during the wet season, less frequently as problems de-
crease. Their discussions cover all important matters relating to internal
activities (work plans, ritual activities, water schedules, financial matters,
etc.) and those pertaining to outside groups (inkapulo water buyers,
neighboring zanjeras, government agencies). Their consensus of activities
to be undertaken is subsequently made known to the membership at large.
The two senior positions are filled by individuals who have previously
served as directors, panglakayen. Since experience and a broad knowl-
edge of zanjera procedures are considered prerequisites, the two top
leadership positions virtually require that individuals have spent a number
of years as a director, or as head of a gunglo or gang. Given that direc-
tors are themselves individuals with experience as regular members, the
two senior leadership positions are usually occupied by men forty, fifty, or
more years of age. While personal traits, relative wealth, and family ties
are always factors that mediate the importance of age and experience (in
some smaller zanjeras there are presidents in their late thirties), the hi-
erarchical complexities and property relationships of the larger zanjeras
demand broad experience of their officials.
Each director is responsible for both representing his gunglo and im-
plementing the decisions of the board of directors. Though the directors
hold higher positions of leadership, it is leadership by example, and in
clearing canals and repairing dams they work closely with fellow gunglo
members. In the role of panglakayen they stop regularly to note the overall
progress of the group’s activities, to signal or acknowledge work breaks,
and to make suggestions to the youngest and least experienced of mem-
bers. Within the gunglos of larger zanjeras they provide the same highly
personalized, interactional leadership that the maestro of a small zanjera
provides his twenty or thirty members.
Even the top leadership positions of the largest zanjeras are not
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removed from person-to-person interaction with the regular members.
On the one hand, their work as officers involves them in the planning
and delegation of work, but on the other, as fellow members, zanjeros,
they frequently participate in the day-to-day work of the group. Except
for the women cooks and the auditor (a person whose class and occupa-
tion make him socially peripheral), zanjera officials are expected to work
with regular members, “as one would work with his brothers,” a mem-
ber stated. Just as older and respected close friends and neighbors are
called manong (older brother), the zanjera leaders are addressed in
terms of close kinship and respect.
Rather than having them chosen by election at large, the president,
vice-president, and directors commonly select individuals to fill the offices
of secretary, treasurer, organizers, collectors, and managers on the basis
of personal ability and character. The secretary must be able to read and
write, often in two or more languages since documents and occasional cor-
respondence may be in Ilocano, Tagalog, or even English or Spanish. The
treasurer, who must also maintain a set of records, will be selected for es-
sentially the same reasons. Residence, at least in reasonable proximity to
the home of the president, may also be a consideration, since the secre-
tary and the treasurer must consult more or less regularly with the senior
officers, particularly in the larger zanjeras.
An organizer is responsible for notifying members of scheduled work
parties and other official activities. In larger zanjeras, two or even three
people may be required to notify the members or at least some represen-
tative members from various areas, and in emergencies (e.g., the loss of
a dam) this must be accomplished quickly. Collectors are responsible for
collecting and recording the payments made by inkapulo users, income
from komon lands, and the fines members must pay for missing workdays.
Though not an especially arduous task, collecting can be time consum-
ing and, since zanjera funds are involved, the collectors must work closely
with the treasurer and provide records for auditing at designated times of
the year.
The one or more managers are responsible for organizing feasts and ritual
events, activities that range from setting up field kitchens for larger work
parties to arranging feasts for the entire membership when working on the
main canal or on the repair of dams. The most important and demanding oc-
casions of feasting are the annual or biannual ritual feasts (discussed below),
which entail a considerable amount of planning and preparation. The man-
agers must also work with the treasurers, as well as the collectors and cooks.
On one other important occasion, the periodic elections (usually held every
four years), they work with the president and vice-president.
Probably no two zanjeras have exactly the same number of offi-
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cials. The size of the membership, the specific relationships with other
zanjeras, the amounts of income derived from inkapulo water buyers,
and the production derived from crops grown on komon lands all influ-
ence the particular structure of leadership in any particular irrigation
group. At the same time, the degrees of status and honorific distinctions
vary from zanjera to zanjera, and from individual to individual, and
some leaders are more assertive and domineering than others. How-
ever, from the very smallest to the largest zanjeras, the emphasis is
on maintaining close, personalized relationships between members, and
between officials and members.
Whereas one-quarter-hectare atar shares may have been the norm
when the larger zanjeras were formed, some one hundred or more years
ago, individual bingay have by now been much reduced in size (from
¼ to ⅛ to 1/16 ha) or shares have been subdivided among members and
kinsmen. Where the reduction of share sizes has increased the over-
all workforce without corresponding increases in the area irrigated, kin
share the work responsibilities for a share, acting as a corporation of
part-members in terms of their tertiary rights to the atar share and in
meeting their proportional obligations to the zanjera. It is up to individ-
ual members or membership-sharing groups to see that sufficient labor
is supplied as requirements demand. How this is achieved by a particu-
lar family or extended family group is not dictated by the zanjera, which
requires only that the obligations be met in terms of providing the as-
sessed number of workers as scheduled.
In addition to members having to contribute work within a gunglo,
there are alternate arrangements whereby gunglos provide one or more
representative workers for maintenance and repair work on small pro-
jects involving the dam or primary canals. On these occasions, the work
groups are composed of individuals drawn from gunglos throughout
the system. The times for involving individuals in these cross-member-
ship groups are usually arranged during the dry season when water
schedules are necessary. Water schedules are determined by the senior
officers and gunglo leaders from estimates of the water flow and the
distances between water sources and fields. The involvement of direc-
tors from all sections, plus a cross section of workers from the crews
involved, further assures the equitable distribution of irrigation water.
These practices, coupled with the fact that individuals have fields
located in different blocks of atar land, reduce the possibilities of
sectional divisiveness within the larger zanjeras. Whatever the initial
historical considerations involved with such practices, zanjera officials
are well aware of their consequences. As one official described it, “We
are a big zanjera and like a big family we must all know and work with
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one another. It is important that we also work together that way [i.e.,
in small, crosscutting groups].”
The problem of maintaining levels of sociability is in no small way af-
fected by the emphasis given to the feasting carried out in the context
of both small and large work projects. These events reflect just as much
conscious concern for the importance of sociability as do the lunch-
time meetings of business associates in the professional clubs of nearby
Laoag City. As one leader explained, “We work very hard but we are
not carabaos [water buffalos]; we eat and drink together and we have
fun.” However, unlike a business association (e.g., the Rotary or Kiwanis
Club), the members of a zanjera share the ownership of important re-
sources. For zanjeras with sizeable pieces of komon land and relatively
important sources of income, especially from the sale of water to inka-
pulo buyers, the use of food produced by the zanjera is an important
integrative feature of zanjera sociability and solidarity. One’s mem-
bership in a hamlet or village provides nothing equivalent in terms of
group property, sets of social interaction, or community-wide ritual.
In what is otherwise a somewhat impoverished social and economic
environment, the zanjera provides direct economic benefits to individ-
ual families by increasing the value and productivity of their land, and
it also provides important social occasions, specifically feasting, on the
days when some or all of the members must work. Unlike a village, the
zanjera generates group sociability, like group work, as a closed corpo-
rate unit rather than through individual, open networks of obligation.
Relationships with Other Zanjeras
None of the zanjeras in Bacarra are physically isolated. Because each
shares at least one boundary with a neighboring system, the overlap-
ping network of canals and the indistinct physical boundaries present
a picture of merging, interlocking irrigation systems (Figure 4). Only
the major blocks of irrigated land, each containing up to a dozen or
more zanjeras, are clearly separated by physical barriers such as the
Bacarra-Vintar River, larger tributary streams, the town, major roads,
or intervening hills. This nexus of systems has important social and
technological aspects involving a series of informal and formal relation-
ships that bind zanjeras reciprocally in various important ways.
A shared dam, a jointly used section of primary or secondary canal,
the overflow of one system going to another, the presence of connecting
watergates for emergency water, mutual help on major work projects
(e.g., rebuilding or relocating dams and primary canals)—all of these
conditions can involve a zanjera with one or more other systems.
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The specific number of arrangements may cover a variety of both formal
and informal reciprocities. The sharing of more permanent features
(e.g., a concrete dam on a small stream, access to a spring, a section of
canal) will involve written contracts, whereas ad hoc, emergency assis-
tance (or even in some instances the sharing of a rock-and-bamboo weir
for a period of years) will more commonly entail only verbal acknowl-
edgments between groups. As with all contractual arrangements, the
obligations are those of a zanjera to one or more other zanjeras, each
acting as a corporate body. At the same time, inter-zanjera cooperation
does not diminish the autonomy of participating zanjeras, nor do the
social arrangements represent forms of or moves toward consolidation.
For example, in 1978, Zanjera Danao, located on the north side of the
Bacarra-Vintar River and west of the municipio, shared a brush-and-
rock weir with three other zanjeras: Daya, Lubo, and Laud.13 However,
when first observed in 1963 Danao had only one partner (Lubo); when
observed briefly in 1970 there were two partners (Lubo and Daya); and
at various times in the past, I was informed, Danao had not shared with
any other zanjeras. Adjustments and readjustments of dam sites in re-
sponse to shifting river channels and the need for relocating intakes
have involved Danao in constant changes in its agreements with the
one neighboring upstream system (Daya) and the two downstream sys-
tems (Lubo and Laud). At the time of my last visit in 1978 plans were
made by the four zanjeras to reestablish three dams, with Danao again
sharing with Lubo. Informants could recall only the major changes and
rearrangements covering the past thirty to forty years. Earlier than that
particular agreements are too removed for most individuals to recall
with clarity.
For the historical moment, the situation for Danao in 1978 was that
two hundred meters from the dam and intake a primary canal branched
away to the fields of Zanjera Daya, the limits of which are east and up-
river of the Danao field system. One hundred meters beyond the first
water diversion, a second primary canal angled off to provide the pri-
mary source of water for the fields of both Danao and Lubo, with Lubo’s
field system located two kilometers further west and somewhat north
of Danao. The remaining section of the intake canal passed through
Danao’s fields, paralleling the Danao-Lubo canal, and was the main
canal of the fourth partner, Zanjera Laud, located one-half kilometer
west of Danao. While it does not exactly conform, Figure 4 is based
upon this association and shows some of the ways that water sources
and canals interlock.
The three primary canals of Daya, Danao-and-Lubo (i.e., the section
they share), and Laud cross at several points in the first kilometer,
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and those of Lubo and Laud cross once again beyond the fields of
Danao. There are also cross-overs involving the canals of three other
zanjeras—one east and the other two west—which are not a part of
the reciprocal alliances already described. At most of these crossings
there are watergates (pagbibinoludan) for diverting emergency water
from higher canals into lower ones. Moreover, where canals are adja-
cent to one another for short distances it is possible to put water from
either system into the other. The reciprocal emergency exchange from
a lower to a higher canal is done simply by dropping a water bar just
beyond the connecting gate on the lower system, allowing the water
to back up into the higher ditch. For the moment, for Danao and its
three allies these systems of exchange are ineffective (at least those
near the intake) because all four zanjeras take water from a single
source. However, the plans to reestablish two or three dams would
result in the watergates again becoming operable. Similar emergency
exchange mechanisms are found throughout the valley and, when weirs
are damaged or destroyed, emergency water can be supplied from other
systems until repairs are carried out.
Danao’s set of relationships is more complex still. An additional sup-
ply of water from a small creek is shared by Danao with Zanjera Laud,
an arrangement that is entirely separate from Danao’s sharing its main
canal with Zanjera Lubo. Quite near its own fields Danao has built a
small concrete diversion dam, just below where a hillside spring emp-
ties into the creek. This supplementary water goes directly to Danao’s
fields without entering the main canal shared with Zanjera Lubo. Ad-
ditional water runs over a sluice channel of the dam into a reinforced
stream-bed, and continues 100 meters to a second concrete dam owned
by Zanjera Laud, from where it is directed into the Bacarra-Vintar River.
This complex of water controls and diversions was initially constructed
by the two zanjeras during the 1870s, apparently only a decade or so af-
ter Danao became established, and the two dams and reinforced stream
channel have been improved and enlarged upon a number of times
since. Consequently, Danao has a special contractual agreement with
Zanjera Laud regarding the sharing of the stream-and-spring source of
supplementary water; another agreement with Lubo for sharing a sec-
tion of the main canal; and a combined set of agreements with Zanjeras
Daya, Lubo, and Laud for sharing the same dam and intake system of
the Bacarra-Vintar River. The first two of these arrangements exist in
written, contractual form because, among other things, they concern
property rights to land (the canal and canal rights-of-way) and a fixed
source of water (the spring). The arrangements and rearrangements
involving the sharing of the rock-and-brush weir on the Bacarra-Vin-
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tar River exist on the bases of verbal agreements only, largely because
changes are simply too frequent to warrant formalizing each case. Ver-
bal agreements are not necessarily less obligatory or important.
With frequent changes of water channels and the necessity of relocat-
ing the shared dams (at least on that portion of the river), written
documents would be out of date in a relatively short time. Consequently,
the four participating zanjeras have not, in the last fifty years at least,
formalized the relationships with legal documentation. In contrast, on
portions of the river where channels are more stabilized, agreements
are, I was told, formally documented. The absence of documentation be-
tween Daya, Danao, Lubo, and Laud in this instance is in no sense an
indication of their being less concerned or committed to one another
than those zanjeras that do formalize such agreements. It relates only
to the dynamic reality of their situation, which necessitates both com-
mitment and flexibility.
In addition to mutual cooperation, there is invariably a potential for
conflict. Shared or disputed water sources and canals are the most fre-
quently cited factors in inter-zanjera conflict. Though careful negotiations
are entailed whenever two or more zanjeras agree to share a dam on the
main river, a supplementary source of water, or a section of canal, there
is a continual concern by the zanjeras furthest removed from the intake
system about receiving proportionally fair shares of water during the dry
season. There are no mechanisms equivalent to the redistribution of water
to atar blocks within a system that will guarantee an equitable distribution
between systems. Though irrigation schedules are carefully arranged and
mutually agreed to by officials from the zanjeras involved, suspicion and
dissatisfaction appear to be endemic.
Although the positioning of dams relative to those of neighboring
groups can be a point of contention, argument over this aspect of water
rights is less frequently an issue than it might be, as the examples noted
above demonstrate. The four zanjeras are mutually supportive in pro-
viding water from connecting watergates and in using water bars, with
the result that cooperative resolution of such a problem as relocating
a dam is of primary concern. When it becomes necessary for a zanjera
to relocate its dam to a point that would be disadvantageous to itself or
to its neighbor, the two (or more) parties may simply agree to share a
dam—and they do so without any loss of corporate integrity.
The number of dams and shifting arrangements noted since 1962 be-
tween the zanjeras Danao, Daya, Lubo, and Laud show how important
these aspects of cooperation are. However, with most lowlying areas
now under irrigation and the best river-diversion sites now in use, it
would be very difficult for a new zanjera to establish a dam and network
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of canals, especially where such a development would threaten an exist-
ing system and, by extension, the established network of alliances with
other systems. Conflicts do arise (see next section) but the complexities
of interdependence between established systems act as a strong mod-
erating influence.
The circumstances for sharing water occur for reasons other than
just the necessities of shifting dams and intake systems. For instance,
the sapuyot systems have emerged as dependent zanjeras, having to
bargain land, labor, and sometimes capital to gain access to and share
water with a parent zanjera. Zanjera Palayas in the northern part of
Bacarra is an atar-based system of some 200 hectares (approximately
half of it biang-ti-daga land), which dates to 1830. On its western
boundary is the much smaller zanjera, Sapuyot Palayas, consisting of
approximately twenty hectares of member-owned inkalian land. All of
the sapuyot’s water is obtained from the overflow of Palayas, though it
is sufficient only for the wet season and one dry-season crop.
Sapuyot Palayas emerged in the 1930s when the inkapulo buyers of
Zanjera Palayas, wanting a more regular supply of water, bargained by
offering an increased labor force plus two one-quarter-hectare parcels
of land. Though Sapuyot Palayas has only 32 members—representing
the landowners and not the actual numbers of farmers, most of whom
are tenants—it must contribute labor on the basis of one-quarter-
hectare plots, this being the size of atar shares within the parent
atar-based system. This increased the labor force of Palayas, which has
340 members of its own, by an additional 80 workers. In keeping with
the size of gunglos in Zanjera Palayas, which has seventeen with twenty
workers in each, Sapuyot Palayas has four such groups. Although the
two zanjeras work on major projects together, they maintain themselves
as separate groups with separate field kitchens, just as they do when
working with other zanjeras. Palayas does not join with the sapuyot in
the formation of cross-gunglo work teams, nor do the sapuyot members
participate in Palayas’ annual ritual.
Though directly dependent upon Zanjera Palayas, the sapuyot is
nonetheless a separate corporation with its own charter and elected offi-
cials. Palayas is concerned primarily with the reciprocal relationships and
obligations between the two of them and does not involve itself directly
in the internal affairs of Sapuyot Palayas; it does not have to. Though the
members of Sapuyot Palayas would like to have water for a third crop, they
accept the arrangement without overt criticism. At the same time, the is-
sues that affect the parent group are ones that affect the sapuyot system
and in this respect the latter is necessarily a loyal satellite.
In another case sharing occurred when a zanjera lost a section of its
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main canal adjacent to the river as the result of erosion, which required
that it ally with another zanjera (though not an immediate neighbor) to
share the latter’s canal where it passed through its own fields. Both zan-
jeras draw water from the Bacarra-Vintar River. As a result of negotia-
tions, the second zanjera agreed to provide a measured flow of water from
a secondary water source, a spring, from which water was diverted to the
shared canal and eventually onto the fields of its partner. In still another
instance a sharing agreement exists for only part of the year, the dry sea-
son, with the two zanjeras taking water from separate sites in a smaller,
less turbulent side channel during the wet season but then, with the dry-
ing up of the smaller channel, pooling their efforts to get water from the
deeper, more distant main channel. This arrangement requires that each
year they rebuild the dry-season dam and dig out a 100-meter channel
through river gravels.
All inter-zanjera cooperation derives from respective shared needs and
perceived gains, most on the basis of emergency situations, others on
longer-term considerations, plus whatever zanjeras are able and willing
to negotiate. I found no cases where the sharing of a water source or
canal led to the consolidation of systems, though, as with sapuyot zan-
jeras, larger parent systems may dominate the process of water allocation.
The complex of corporate and individual rights makes the possibility of
merging highly unlikely, especially for zanjeras with blocks of atar and
biang-ti-daga land. Whereas all zanjeras want to improve the delivery of
water or even expand the total area of corporate ownership—which nowa-
days is done only in very small increments if at all—none indicated a
willingness or desire to give up their autonomy to become part of a larger
entity. Only under the threat of losing all water (which for a zanjera having
atar lands would mean the loss of its membership land-base as well) would
such a suggestion be seriously entertained.
One alliance in Bacarra involves three small zanjeras, which are dom-
inated by another that is larger than the three of them combined. This
coalition has a long, complicated history including losses of dams and
primary canal routes for the three smaller zanjeras. Though it is now
impossible to learn what the original terms of the alliance involved,
the three junior members gave up parcels of land (of an undisclosed
amount) and agreed (according to them) to contribute higher levels
of assistance than would normally have been expected. The three also
claim that water is unevenly distributed, with two of them receiving
very little during the dry season, though they acknowledge the priority
of the senior member’s claim and recognize that the system cannot de-
liver more than it already does.
In 1976, following upon a government regulation requiring that
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no more than one irrigation cooperative can exist for each water
source, the dominant zanjera initiated a revised constitution that
would have subsumed the smaller zanjeras as parts of a single sys-
tem. This move was strongly opposed by the three satellite systems
with stated threats of court action, and the plan was dropped. Accord-
ing to the dominant member of the alliance, the provision of water to
the three other members has involved major reconstruction and im-
provements of the original delivery system, an amount of work and
expense that was not entirely offset by the addition of a larger work
force or the amounts of land gained. The dominant zanjera required
of its smaller associates labor and assets which it considered reason-
able compensation and which the three junior members agreed to,
however reluctantly. Though the association is said to be an unhappy
one, even by outsiders, the smaller zanjeras are unlikely to do more
than occasionally voice their discontent since gains appear to more
than offset the losses that would be involved.
The most extensive example of zanjeras cooperating over the use of a
single water source involves a confederation of nine zanjeras, the small-
est with 14 hectares, the largest with 140 hectares, and an overall total
of more than 500 hectares (Siy 1982:57–106). Here too, the alliance re-
sulted from earlier changes in the Bacarra-Vintar River’s course and
corresponding disruptions to canal rights-of-way and, as with the above
examples,
linkages were developed during periods when the very existence and sur-
vival of several of these zanjeras were threatened; these arrangements
did not come about simply to take advantage of the marginal benefits
or economies of scale that such relationships offered. They were formed
when the relevent organizations were left with little choice but to do so.
(Siy 1982:63)
Relationships between zanjeras can alternate between friendly
cooperation and discontent. However, the shared needs and interests
of systems make for a considerable degree of cooperation and accord,
even where recognized inequities exist in water distribution. As Siy
has noted (1982:145–147) for his case as well, the complexities of
intra-system organization and inter-zanjera relationships make ma-
jor improvements extremely difficult, and organizational concerns are
very important in the rational decision making that goes into ques-
tions of technological change. In addition, a perceived outside threat
to the zanjeras of Bacarra is considered greater than any discontent
or potential conflict that may divide them—the possibility of govern-
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ment interference. For over fifty years this concern has centered on
the existence of a government concrete diversion dam farther inland
on the Bacarra-Vintar River and from which irrigation water is car-
ried south via a major canal to fields in the lower Laoag River Valley.
Though some lands in both Bacarra and Vintar are also irrigated from
this system, and some zanjeras even benefit from overflow and seep-
age, the zanjeras of Bacarra are greatly disturbed by the removal
of water that would otherwise be available to them during the dry
season. This concern has led to the formation of a higher level of or-
ganizational cooperation for the zanjeras of Bacarra.
The Federation of Zanjera Associations of Bacarra
During the 1930s zanjeras situated in the central part of the municipal-
ity—those with brush-and-rock weirs on the main river, and those with
blocks of atar and biang-ti-daga land—formed an association, the Fed-
eration of Zanjera Associations of Bacarra (FZAB).14 The impetus for
organizing this association came from an upper-class landlord, a law-
yer-politician and relatively wealthy owner of biang-ti-daga lands in two
different zanjeras. Subsequently made an honorary leader of one of the
zanjeras, and head of the federation itself until his death in the late
1950s, this individual gave time, money, and considerable effort to the
FZAB’s drive to prevent the construction of the government diversion
dam in nearby Vintar.
Though unsuccessful in preventing the dam’s construction, the feder-
ation has remained an effective organization for expressing zanjera
concerns to officials of municipal, provincial, and national governments.
Until 1973 and the imposition of martial law in the Philippines, the fed-
eration enjoyed some measure of influence in its endorsements of politi-
cal candidates—mayors, councillors, governors, congressional repre-
sentatives, and senators (Lewis 1971:138–142). Though now largely
deprived of the ability to influence officials through the ballot box, the
federation is still listened to by officials because it does represent the
concerns of a large number of people in Bacarra. It has also come to
function as a mediating body in inter-zanjera relationships and even
some intra-zanjera activities.
Since its formation in the mid-1930s the FZAB has grown to fifty
zanjera members, though not all are entirely within the confines of the
municipality. As with village boundaries, the canals and field systems
cut across the territorial limits separating Bacarra from Laoag, Vintar,
and Pasuquian. Similarly, not all zanjeras in Bacarra are equally ac-
tive members of the federation; the smaller, more remote systems are
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much less involved in matters that directly affect zanjeras in the central
part of the municipality—almost always matters to do with government
agencies.
The FZAB generally follows the organizational structure of a zanjera.
Its officers include a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, au-
ditor, and a board of twelve directors. There is a written constitution
and elections are held every four years. Officers are elected from the
membership at large, with each zanjera, irrespective of size, having one
vote and represented by its president or a designated alternate. How-
ever, beyond this formal outline, the organization of the FZAB is quite
different from those of individual zanjeras. Unlike a zanjera, the federa-
tion has no property, neither water rights nor land, and its only assets
are its voluntary membership dues, which are not always regularly and
enthusiastically paid by members. The smaller, poorer, and more iso-
lated zanjeras are less concerned with the issues that confront the
centrally located systems. With respect to property and the collective
power related to the use of property, the federation has no corporate
features or corresponding powers of coercion. Consequently, member-
ships are determined only by the willingness of individual zanjeras to
belong or not belong. In all respects the federation is a voluntary asso-
ciation (Banton 1968).
The federation differs from the kinds of associations most commonly
studied by anthropologists (Anderson 1971) in that its members are corpo-
rate groups, not individuals. A similar situation is described for corporate
market vendors in the Philippines by Davis (1973). As with similar vol-
untary associations, the FZAB exists because its members share common
interests and concerns, which are structured in terms of problems that are
essentially external to the individual zanjeras involved.
Though the government dam east of Vintar has been operating for
more than forty years, the federation is still very much concerned with
government developments on the Bacarra-Vintar River. The governmen-
tal agency directly responsible for the maintenance of this dam and
irrigation conditions in general (and this includes most situations in-
volving the more than 1,000 zanjeras in the province) is the Provincial
Irrigation Office (PIO). The PIO operates the government systems and
deals directly with individual zanjeras and, sometimes, the FZAB.
Next in line of concern for zanjeras is the Bureau of Public Works,
a national agency responsible for both developing new projects and for
registering private irrigation groups. The general attitude of higher-
ranking officials in these two agencies is one that tends to see the
historical proliferation of zanjeras within the province as impressive,
both in number and scale. But it also views them as technologically
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backward. Largely composed of middle-and upper-class, university-
trained professionals, these agencies seem to have little understanding
of what zanjera irrigation entails technologically, much less socially.
They see themselves as the agents of “progress” and “modernization”;
and, as with farming practice in general, peasant technology is in
essence tolerated only until it can be changed and improved upon by
government experts.
Zanjera officials, and particularly the leaders of the federation, pos-
sess a much better understanding of the exogenous factors affecting the
conditions of communal irrigation than do the representatives of gov-
ernment. Since it is the individual farmers who depend upon irrigation
for their livelihood, and since it is collectively the zanjeras that must try
and come to terms with government agencies rather than the reverse,
zanjera officials must know when to give in, to be passive, or to resist by
collective pressures. In this respect the federation attempts to educate
and coordinate the farmers’ responses. Zanjera leaders are well aware
of the power government agencies have to help or disrupt their irriga-
tion systems, and they perforce tread carefully and respectfully in their
dealings with public officials. The government, in contrast, seems to be
largely unaware of the physical and, still less, of the socioeconomic im-
pact that its actions can have for zanjeras. Two examples of government
efforts to improve irrigation illustrate the problems involved for zan-
jeras.
In a situation similar to that described for the zanjeras Danao, Daya,
Lubo, and Laud, there are several (the actual number has varied from
three to five at different times) zanjeras east of Bacarra that have vari-
ously shared the use of dams along a short stretch of water just within
the municipal limits of Vintar. In 1975 engineers from the Provincial Ir-
rigation Office announced that a single, concrete intake system would
be constructed on the south bank of the river, and that it would serve
the then four zanjeras taking water from three dams immediately above
and below that point. Engineers argued that this modern structure, with
controlled intake gates, would rationalize the existing network of dams
and criss-crossing canals. Whereas a rock-and-brush dam was still to be
employed and replaced when destroyed by flooding, the modern con-
crete intake would provide a permanent structure that would eliminate
damage to and the excessive silting of the intake canal.
Completed in the spring and dry season of 1976, the concrete
intake nonetheless required that the four zanjeras consolidate in a sin-
gle dam (downstream) until it and connecting canals had been built.
Just prior to the onset of the wet season the dam was relocated to
the fixed position. Its utility was short-lived, however. A heavy run-
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off resulting from a typhoon—a not uncommon event—cut the bank
from behind the intake system and debris (apparently logs) destroyed
the structure completely. The four zanjeras quickly rebuilt the single
structure earlier abandoned downstream. Though still using the sin-
gle intake location in 1978, this small alliance of four zanjeras planned
once again to reestablish two or three dams.
It is not, as was suggested by a government official, that zanjeras are
automatically or somehow innately opposed to the improvement of irri-
gation systems. They are opposed to what they see as poorly conceived
improvements that involve greater risks and the loss of time, labor, and
money. They are also opposed to changes which are forced on them,
which experience tells them will not work, and which threaten the cor-
porate system of relationships and property rights of their members.
The dams and intake systems on the major rivers of Ilocos Norte are
adapted to the very kinds of problems that a fixed, permanent struc-
ture is not—the constant shifting of river channels and bank erosion. In
the case just described, zanjera officials, of the zanjeras involved and
of the FZAB, did express their concern to PIO representatives, but well-
meaning officials were determined to do what they considered to be
best for the farmers. With the irrigation authorities insistent and with
the government taking the capital risks involved (though almost all of
the labor was contributed by the zanjeras), the zanjeras went along with
the change deciding that they would make use of the structure for as
long as it lasted. However, it lasted less than a full season.
Such small-scale modifications in government efforts to “modernize”
existing systems can be more-or-less easily accommodated or, through
inaction, subverted, though the work force that government agencies
may require for construction can result in considerable demands on
the time and labor of zanjera members. Much more threatening and
potentially destructive are recent large-scale plans for expanding and
rationalizing irrigation in the major river-valley systems of the province.
Over the past decade the provincial government of Ilocos Norte has
sought to develop a major irrigation project in the Laoag River Valley.
Involving two or more dams and reservoirs, the argument put forward
by provincial irrigation officers stresses that existing communal sys-
tems are inadequate and that irrigation would be improved by having
a major delivery system eliminate the numerous canals and dams that
now cover the area. The argument is based largely on the perception
that an efficiency of scale and a centralization of authority would make
for a much greater effectiveness than now exists.
Initially rejected for funding on technological grounds, the expansion
and rationalization of irrigation in Ilocos Norte is still an important pri-
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ority. Just as the expansion and modernization of roads, rural electrifi-
cation, port facilities, agricultural productivity, and marketing condi-
tions are important, the improvement of irrigation is an important goal
of provincial and national officials. Unfortunately, it appears that there
is little thought as to how such mega-irrigation schemes will affect the
social dimensions of communal irrigation. Government proposals do lit-
tle more than mention the fact that communal irrigation exists; they
involve no detailed analysis of existing systems.
This type of change most concerns zanjeras, both for the physical im-
pact on communal irrigation (making it large scale, impersonalized, and
unable to respond quickly or effectively to local problems) and, more
significantly, for what it would mean socially and economically. Socially
this kind of change would destroy the organizational structures of zan-
jeras; economically it would mean the loss of lands for the individual
members of the zanjeras with blocks of atar land. As has already hap-
pened in a few instances where zanjeras have been unable to continue
diverting water and where an alternative supply of water was available
from a government system, the original landowners have gone to court
in order to get back the atar lands that were given up in exchange for
the irrigation of their biang-ti-daga fields.15 Since the original contracts
in the exchange of water for land required the ongoing provision of
water, the displacement of zanjera dams and canals by a government
system means that atar fields can legally revert to the original landown-
ers.
Whether such plans involve large-or small-scale governmental
schemes for rationalizing irrigation, federation officials usually learn of
them after decisions have been reached by government officials. Except
for the one major development on the Bacarra-Vintar River during the
1930s, communal irrigation in Ilocos Norte has largely been shielded
from outside interference in the past simply because of government in-
action and indifference. Today, however, government intrusions are very
real, and, especially with an authoritarian national government, the zan-
jeras realize that they have little hope of influencing major decisions
that can directly and irreparably alter their lives. Meanwhile, they send
delegations and make representations to local authorities and govern-
ment agencies about their concerns. Whereas they do not bemoan the
passing of political instability and the factional blood feuds that marked
the years before the imposition of martial law (Lewis 1971:138–146),
they do lament the loss of their ability to influence elected officials on
issues that affect their well-being.
The primary function of the federation is to maintain relations with
government agencies. As is normally the case in dealing with public
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officials, relationships between zanjera leaders and government repre-
sentatives are on a personal basis whenever possible. Both government
and zanjera personnel prefer to relate on a person-to-person, highly so-
cial basis. Though the issues may be of great concern, and even imply a
direct threat to the zanjeras, the meetings are invariably carried out in a
cordial and sociable setting; it would be unthinkable for either party to
assume an aggressive stance (unless thoroughly provoked) in such deal-
ings. One example illustrates the patterns of interaction and the kinds
of problems that concern the federation.
Government directives usually equate irrigation groups and particu-
lar sources of water: one dam, one irrigation system. In 1976 the
Provincial Irrigation Office of Ilocos Norte listed 32 zanjeras for the
municipality of Bacarra, whereas the Federation of Zanjera Associations
of Bacarra counted their membership as being 47. When the provincial
list was brought to the attention of FZAB officials (a consequence of
my own inquiries), they asked for a meeting with one of the PIO en-
gineers and an assistant. Because the assistant was a close relative of
one of the federation officers and because they wanted the PIO repre-
sentatives to be prepared to talk about the government’s position, the
concerns of the FZAB were made known to the engineer through the
assistant before the meeting began. The federation representatives in-
cluded the president, the secretary, two board members, and the past
president of the federation—a highly respected man with a great deal of
knowledge about earlier events and considerable experience in negoti-
ating with PIO officials.
A sumptuous meal was provided at the home of the president that
included a whole roast pig, a variety of special-occasion foods, and
several kinds of alcoholic beverages. More than two hours passed be-
fore either side mentioned the issue that concerned them. Federation
representatives began the discussion by noting that each zanjera was
an independent, functioning unit and whether they shared a dam with
one or more other zanjeras (as did the president’s own zanjera), was
immaterial to their recognition as separate and distinct legal entities.
Besides, the president emphasized, they were all individually registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission; they all had constitu-
tions attesting to their incorporation in the past. The documents for the
alliance to which he belonged were shown to illustrate this position.
The engineer countered that it was unreasonable to consider zan-
jeras as separate when two, three, or even more used a single water
source. The officers of the FZAB replied that, one, there were often sec-
ondary water sources that might not be shared with primary partners;
and, two, sharing arrangements were not unchanging in any event,
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since dams and partners shifted frequently in the matter of a few years.
They stressed that a government policy could not abrogate the fact that
they are recognized, legally incorporated groups, and that the identity
and independence of each was important in terms of their internal and
external relationships.
After much discussion the federation won its point, not because the
official could or would alter the regulation, but simply because it was
impossible to enforce under the circumstances. As with all of their inter-
actions with municipal, provincial, and national government officials,
and following the familiar pattern of social interaction throughout the
Philippines, the federation officials made the occasion a social event.
With municipal officials and representatives of both provincial and na-
tional governments, zanjera and federation officials make direct and
personal approaches about matters that may possibly affect them.
Major ritual events (discussed below), especially the annual feast
and religious services held at the end of the dry season, are occasions
that may include as guests the mayor, vice-mayor, judges, representa-
tives of the Provincial Irrigation Office and the Bureau of Public Works,
lawyers (hired by the zanjeras), wealthier members of nearby villages,
upper-class townspeople (the owners of biang-ti-daga lands), leaders of
neighboring zanjeras, and one or more officers of the FZAB. Aside from
their ritual importance, these occasions are useful for initiating and
maintaining the relationship that individual zanjera leaders and federa-
tion officials consider important for furthering zanjera interests.
In addition to its dealing with local dignitaries and government officials,
the federation is also concerned with inter-zanjera issues. Although the
complex of reciprocal ties between neighboring irrigation systems serves
to buffer or constrain disputes, one-to-one resolutions of conflicting inter-
ests are not always possible. When two or more zanjeras cannot reach
agreement over an issue that separates them or, when in an alliance, a
more powerful one cannot successfully coerce a junior partner (e.g., where
a parent system dominates a sapuyot system), one or more of the zanjeras
involved can ask the federation to arbitrate. Though not legally binding, the
federation’s recommendations carry some weight since, as fellow zanjeros,
they are much more likely to understand the problems involved than would
an upper-class judge—a person more likely to be moved by points of law
and lacking appreciation of the relative merits of irrigation matters. The
only restriction to a federation officer’s being involved in arbitration is that
he cannot be a member of either zanjera, nor can he, as head of a zanjera,
be an important alliance partner of either adversary. If a dispute cannot be
resolved to the satisfaction of all parties, court action may be taken as a last
resort but, according to informants, it is seldom done.
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One case that the federation was unsuccessful in arbitrating con-
cerned the boundary between two zanjeras, a creek that separated the
atar lands of the two systems. The creek is noted as the boundary in
one or more legal documents. As a consequence of typhoon flooding the
creekbed had shifted a considerable distance, resulting in the loss of
several hectares of land to the offended party. This zanjera insisted that
the affected land remain theirs, while the other zanjera maintained that
the creek regardless of its present position, still marked the boundary.
The federation recommended a compromise, with fields being returned
to the offended party and with its neighbor receiving the space for-
merly occupied by the creekbed. Neither zanjera was willing to accept
this recommendation and the matter was taken to court, where it was
still unsettled in 1978. Federation officers were disappointed with both
groups in this case. Though individual zanjeras are reluctant to let out-
siders decide the merits of a dispute, the federation provides, if not an
ideal arrangement, at least the best one available, offering relative fair-
ness and an appreciation of the issues involved.
Shortly after it was formed, the federation began to provide a direct
service to the individual member zanjeras, offering to supervise their
elections, which are at times potentially divisive. Among the smaller
zanjeras with privately owned landholdings, elections may be little more
than pro forma events of general consensus and the federation is not
asked to officiate. By contrast, the election of officers in the large, atar-
based zanjeras is usually much more significant because of the greater
variety and amounts of property and assets, as well as their greater size
and structural complexity as social systems. The holding of zanjera of-
fice, particularly the highest office, entails considerable prestige and at
least some economic rewards, usually in the form of the paglakay fields
set aside for zanjera officials.
Federation officers supervise only the actual balloting, whereas election
activities precede the event by several weeks, with candidates, especially
those running for president, seeking support among the gunglo leaders
and the general membership. Though offices are nominally open to all, can-
didates for the two main offices (president and vice-president) should meet
certain criteria: they should be widely respected within the zanjera, have a
broad background in zanjera activities (as a regular working member and,
especially, as a gunglo leader), have the ability to articulate issues to both
members and outsiders (and usually have some formal education), and be
the kind of person who can represent the zanjera to politically and socially
important people without being “ashamed” (nabainen). One example illus-
trates the procedures and some of the concerns about elections.
Zanjera Baknang is composed of more than two hundred members
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and is divided into eight gunglos. Its president had served for three
terms (elected by “everybody,” I was told) but the election in 1978 in-
volved two major candidates: the current vice-president and a relatively
wealthy individual who had only returned to the village in which he
lived some four years previously, bringing with him a small retirement
and savings gained from working in Hawaii for almost thirty years.
The vice-president was considerably poorer than his opponent, though
he was better known to the zanjera members than the Hawaiiano.16
Zanjera Baknang, unlike most zanjeras, permits landlords (both those
owning inkalian lands and the use-right owners of atar lands) to vote.
Their support was sought by the Hawaiiano candidate who was himself
a nonworking member; the former vice-president depended upon his
considerable experience as group headman and his direct relationships
with working members.
In addition to each of the presidential candidates, there were two as-
pirants for the other major office of vice-president, each of whom was
campaigning with one of the two senior candidates. The board of direc-
tors, the men who head the gunglos, were running on their own and
were elected (in all cases re-elected except for one who was retiring)
by their co-workers within their gunglos. Their election was much more
like the consensus support given senior officials in the smaller zanjeras.
The lesser offices of the zanjera—secretary, treasurer, organizers, col-
lectors, cooks—in Baknang are essentially appointive; the holders of all
of them, I was told, were “staying on.”
A regulation required that before balloting began, the treasurer must
note the existence of any outstanding debts by individual candidates.
To the surprise and obvious embarrassment of the Hawaiiano, he was
shown to owe approximately 200 pesos for absences accrued by mem-
bers of his family (who in this case were his tenants) who had failed
to appear for designated work parties at various times. Though he was
personally upset by this revelation, it was not, I was assured, so damag-
ing as to cost him significant numbers of votes, and he paid his debts
before the voting began. Following this, the president of the federation
addressed the members. As his comments emphasized, the essence of
his thirty-minute speech concerned the obligations of zanjera members
and official candidates to each other.
You must remember that you are all brothers; you are part of the same
[zanjera] family. When the election is over, those of you who have voted
differently, must shake hands and love one another, just as brothers do.
Strong [adverse] feelings will not be good for you or your zanjera. You
must be as one family again.
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The fact that some of the voters were landlords was of concern
to the four federation officials, all of whom represented zanjeras in
which only working members were allowed to vote.17 Allowing landlords
to vote was not considered desirable since working members would
feel ashamed when interacting with upper-and middle-class townspeo-
ple who, it was argued, do not understand how a zanjera functions.
Moreover, in Baknang’s election, proxy votes were made on behalf
of one-third of the members, where wives (of both working and non-
working members) voted for their husbands. Although this too was
considered undesirable by the federation officials (“the wife does not
understand all of the problems; not like a husband”), the voting of work-
ing members’ wives was considered much less contentious than the
voting of landlords—wives or husbands.
The voting was held outside the home of the retiring president, and
considerable amounts of food and drink (soft drinks, beer, sugar-cane
wine [basi], and “gin”), were offered to members and guests, with a
special indoor table set for the most prestigious guests and landlords.
Members’ names were checked off by both the zanjera secretary and
one of the FZAB officials. Federation representatives supervised the dis-
tribution of printed ballots, the setting up of makeshift booths and ballot
boxes, and the final tally of votes. Beginning in mid-morning, the bal-
loting was completed by mid-afternoon and the votes were recorded
on a board as they were read off by the FZAB representatives. When
the votes were finally tabulated the former vice-president had won by
a significant margin of four to one. With each vote recorded publicly
and the decision quite obvious early in the count, the Hawaiiano left
before the totals were complete, to avoid the embarrassment that his
presence would mean to both himself and others. When the results were
officially announced by the FZAB representatives, the president-elect
made a short acceptance speech which, like that of the federation’s
president, emphasized the importance of the kinship and friendship of
zanjera members. Later, it was said, he would go to the home of his de-
feated opponent “to make things right again.”
The presence and involvement of federation representatives at elec-
tions was said to help allay any concerns about irregularities, an
especially important consideration at elections, such as Baknang’s
which involved other than just working members. The election pro-
vided yet another setting for exchanges between zanjera leaders,
FZAB leaders, and the dignitaries that attended. In all of the fed-
eration’s activities the interactions between zanjera and government
officials are important as channels of communication. The federation
serves its members by gathering and distributing important informa-
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tion. For instance, agricultural extension workers in Bacarra regularly
make contacts with federation officials and individual zanjera leaders
rather than work through village leaders. Extension workers are well
aware that the interest and support of the federation can be an impor-
tant first step in reaching and convincing individual farm families to
promote new varieties of rice or similar technological innovations.
At the same time, the federation passes on what it considers to be
significant information to its members, and filters out what it considers
impractical or unimportant—largely by ignoring it. It also puts forward
its collective interpretations of events and information that may affect
irrigation farming. Such activity is not particularly coordinated, nor
does the federation have a specific official to deal with informational
matters. However, issues of direct concern (e.g., a tax on communal
irrigation groups or a new government dam) will bring officers and
concerned members together for a concerted, planned response. In
addition to semiannual meetings, emergency meetings of segments or
all of the federation membership may be called to deal with matters
important to particular zanjeras, suballiances, federation members, or
zanjeras in general.
An example of the federation’s secondary role in making information
available to its members was brought to my attention when I inquired
about a type of rice observed growing in a block of fields. This rice was nei-
ther as tall as the traditional varieties (Lewis 1971:49–64), nor as short as
the new, higher-yielding types—the so-called miracle rice. This particular
variety is known locally as gorospe, an inappropriate name, for the new
varieties have designations like IR-36, IR-38, C-4, C-10, and so on; quite
obviously from its appearance this was not one of the traditional Ilocano
varieties. Gorospe, I was told, is the name of a man who is a member of
a zanjera in the Laoag River Valley. Mr. Gorospe had been growing one of
the new types of rice (C-4) and noting—as farmers have for centuries—that
there were several taller, mutant plants in his fields and those of his neigh-
bors, he separated them from the rest and planted the seeds in one of his
dry-season rice fields. Because of poor drainage, one or two of his fields
remained flooded throughout the year, with the result that if there was
an especially high water level during heavy monsoon rains the shorter-
stemmed, high-yield varieties were sometimes drowned. By the following
year he had planted his inundated fields with three crops of the new vari-
ety. As an officer of his zanjera he passed on this information to his fellow
members and the officers of neighboring zanjeras, and, according to infor-
mants, since local mutants were available in all areas, gorospe was being
grown in some water-logged fields of surrounding municipalities within a
few years. In Bacarra the spread of this information was accelerated when
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it came to the attention of federation officers, and this indigenous develop-
ment from one of the higher-yielding rice types created at the International
Rice Research Institute south of Manila, is now grown in some of the low-
lying, poorly drained plots of central Ilocos Norte.
As a voluntary association of corporate, individual communal irriga-
tion groups, the federation provides a variety of functions and is in-
volved in activities that go well beyond its original aims. Despite its
appearance of representing a higher lever of political organization, the
federation has no powers of its own; the locus of power remains with
the individual members. Its constituents recognize and emphasize that
the FZAB has no authority over them, either to enforce its recommenda-
tions concerning intersystem conflict, or even to collect its membership
dues. However, they also recognize that with respect to outsiders and
external influences the federation provides a reasonably effective
means of stating and pressing their individual and collective concerns.
The federation does not diminish the corporateness of individual zan-
jeras; on the contrary, it strengthens and protects their autonomy and
independence through its collective action.
Whereas federation officials meet more or less frequently as a group,
usually in the home of one or other official where at least some refresh-
ments will be served, these occasions are irregular and the costs are
covered, not from a common fund, but from the willingness and ability
of the host to provide. Unlike zanjera meetings, general meetings of the
FZAB are not well attended, the most consistent absentees being the
more distant and isolated zanjeras, the same groups that are less con-
cerned with issues affecting the larger, atar-based zanjeras.
The federation differs from individual zanjeras in another important
way: the absence of formalized ritual. As will be shown in detail in the next
section, each zanjera has one, two, or even more major socioreligious cer-
emonial events each year. The federation has none. On the other hand,
federation officials frequently do attend, as special and honored guests,
the ritual events of individual zanjeras, both annual ceremonies and large
work feasts. Aside from the prestige involved and the contacts made for
their own zanjeras, these occasions represent one of the few rewards for
holding office within the FZAB. This kind of ritual participation between
zanjeras and with officers of the federation reflects the various levels of
interaction that link the concerns and activities of individual groups. In
speaking about the loose confederational features of the federation and its
differences from individual zanjeras, one FZAB official stated,
Of course we [the Federation officers] are all friends and we sometimes
have a glass of basi together. But we have no pamisa [group ritual]; that
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would not be right…. Besides, we have no money to do that…. When the
zanjeras, each of our zanjeras, has its pamisa then we are invited, and
we invite them. In that way we celebrate, each of us with his compan-
ions [fellow zanjera members], and we invite the maestro and the segundo
maestro of other zanjeras … and of course the [other] officers of the Fed-
eration also.
Zanjera Ritual: A Fictitious Family
As previously mentioned, the pamisa is a family-centered ritual that in-
cludes prayers for the dead, the decoration of a family altar, offerings
for local spirits, a festive meal to which kin, neighbors, and friends are
invited, and visits to the cemetery—all of which are highly variable ac-
cording to family circumstance. Normally pamisas are carried out in the
larger ritual context of a barrio fiesta, though they are not limited to
these occasions. For instance, in Mambabanga most pamisas are sched-
uled for one of the two biannual fiestas; in Buyon, which has no barrio
fiesta, family pamisas are frequently associated with All Hallows’ Eve
and family visits to the cemetery.
It is thus somewhat paradoxical to find zanjeras employing the
pamisa as a group ritual. The sense of this transformation from family
setting to group setting is expressed in the way that members meta-
phorically talk about a zanjera. They employ a fiction, a corporate
fiction, of the zanjera being a family. Both within and outside the forma-
lized ritual context, members regularly affect the simile of the zanjera
as constituting a family. As explicitly stated by one seventy-year-old
zanjera leader, “The Zanjera Baknang is a family, established by our
forefathers … [and] in the zanjera we are all brothers.”
In a way parallel to how family pamisas reflect corporate family orga-
nization, zanjera pamisas connote the corporate structure of irrigation
groups. By contrast, the barrio fiesta reflects the lack of social cohesion
and corresponding social openness of village organization—a mosaic of
interlocking personal alliances.
Zanjera pamisas are held either during the first or second week of June,
just prior to the onset of monsoon rains, or in mid-December in conjunc-
tion with what in the past was the harvesting of traditional rice varieties,
or they are held on both occasions. I was told that approximately half of
the zanjeras hold pamisas on both occasions. As with family pamisas, the
opulence of zanjera ritual varies greatly according to circumstance.
The activities in and setting for the pamisa are divided over two days,
beginning at the home of either the president or the vice-president, and
when two pamisas are held in a year the burden will alternate between
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the two senior officers. The pamisa begins with the ritual offering of spe-
cial foods, an umras (from the Spanish honras, or obsequy for the dead), or
panglagip (a remembrance) for the founding members and, additionally, as
propitiation to local spirits (anitos) associated with and able to disrupt an
irrigation system. The umras itself includes a variety of cakes and candies
prepared by the cooks (cocineras) and made from glutinous rice. These are
placed on a candlelit table or altar along with one plate of uncooked gluti-
nous rice and another of uncooked nonglutinous rice (each with a whole
uncooked egg set in the rice and, sometimes, individual bottles of beer and
Coca Cola set nearby) and all of it backed with painted carvings of saints.
However, the zanjera, unlike a barrio and its associated fiesta, normally
has no specific patron saint.
Each member of the zanjera is given an equal portion of the sweet
cakes, neatly wrapped in banana leaves, to take home to his family. Though
women play a larger role in this part of the pamisa and in the special
prayers made later, essentially only the wives of officers are involved. The
wealthier zanjeras provide a feast at this time to which local dignitaries
(municipal mayors, vice-mayors, judges, honorific maestros, officials of the
Provincial Irrigation Office, the Bureau of Land Management, and usually
the lawyer who represents them in legal matters) are invited and these
guests are served at a special table, usually in the home of the pamisa or-
ganizer, while regular members and most officers eat out-of-doors.
Following the meal and the distribution of rice cakes, religious ser-
vices are held with a special prayer said by a Catholic priest (or a
clergyman of the Aglapayan Church, the Anglican Church, or even one
of the Protestant churches). In some cases a zanjera will hire one or
more chanters (kantura) who intone the mass for the deceased mem-
bers of the zanjera. However, for most zanjeras, given the costs and
problems of getting a religious person to attend, the wives of the zan-
jera officers go to the various churches of Buyon, make a contribution,
and ask that special prayers be said for the deceased members of the
zanjera. Fundamentalist churches (e.g., Mormon, Iglesia ni Christo, Je-
hovah’s Witness, Seventh Day Adventist) are not included since these
denominations do not perform special prayers of this type.
Except for the size of the zanjera “family” and the absence of a visit
to the cemetery, the events on the first day of ceremonies differ rela-
tively little from those of a pamisa held by a single household. The major
difference for a zanjera pamisa is in the holding of events on the fol-
lowing day, when activities are shifted to the kamarine, the dam, and
the main canal. In a sense, this is a substitute for the visits that a fam-
ily would make to the graveyard, since the irrigation system (the dam,
canals, and meetinghouse) is where the spirits of their ancestors are
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found, at least with respect to matters relating to irrigation. The zan-
jera pamisa also differs in that it and the zanjera family are distinctively
male-oriented, exhibiting a pronounced patriarchal bias from the more
evenly balanced male-female relationships in Ilocano and Filipino fami-
lies in general.
Early in the morning the officers and volunteer helpers go to the ka-
marine, which during the pamisa is emphasized as being the balay ti
zanjera (the house and home of the zanjera), to prepare the feast for the
members. One or more pigs are slaughtered early in the day and some
of the blood either poured or directly bled into the main canal in order
to “enrich the crops that grow in the fields.” The meat is then cooked
over an open fire and prepared as lechon, or whole roasted pig. The
cooking is carried out primarily by the cocineras, the only women pre-
sent during the day’s festivities. A variety of other foods, which, both in
kind and quantity, are quite festive and, except for rice, are not ordinary
fare are prepared. At the same time, various kinds of beverage, both al-
coholic and non-alcoholic, are available.
Before the meal is served at mid-day the head officers go to the
mouth of the canal to release a small (50 × 25 cm) raft made earlier
in the morning and constructed from four banana-tree stalks. The raft
is covered with a variety of umras offerings—cooked portions of gluti-
nous and nonglutinous rice in half-coconut shells, a half-shell of basi
(sugarcane wine), a stick of barbecued pork, stewed pork, and (on an
enamel plate) betel nut, homemade cigars, cigarettes, and a few coins
amounting to less than one peso. At this point the president of the zan-
jera enters the water, ducks several times below the surface, and is
ritually cleansed. He then releases the raft into the canal with the cry
of “Para-ayos, para-ayos, para-ayos!” (Let the water flow, let the water
flow, let the water flow!). The raft is allowed to float but a short distance
down the canal before all but the offerings of meat and rice are removed
and it is free to drift on.
Following this, the president and the officers go to the dam where,
taking one of the heavy woody mallets used in repair work, the presi-
dent drives in a sharpened bamboo stake to ritually initiate the irriga-
tion year. By this act the president demonstrates to his fellow zanjeros
his awareness and humility as a working member of the zanjera family.
With these actions completed, the officers return to the main area
where they greet the guests from allied zanjeras. The food is then set
out for the members. Individuals are accompanied by their sons, who at
this time are asked to come forward and be served the first food, be-
cause, it is emphasized, they are the sons who will eventually inherit
the obligations and privileges of the zanjera. The guests and regular
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members are served by the officers, who are the last to eat. As with
the display of humility by the president, this is to emphasize to their
colleagues that they are one family, and that as officers they are like
older brothers (manong). Members stay for shorter or longer periods
throughout the afternoon.
Of the six pamisas I attended, no two were entirely alike. For the
smaller and poorer zanjeras the feasting and ceremonial activities are
much less elaborate. The specific umras items involved and the ways in
which they are offered (instead of a raft they may be placed on a small
platform or altar alongside the canal or dam, or simply put on rafters
within the kamarine) vary from group to group. In three of the events
observed, boys were not fed before adults, though in all cases the boys
did attend. However, the general patterns of making offerings to the
spirits of their ancestors and to propitiate local spirits are basically
similar. In each case, the men dominate the activities, just as they dom-
inate the work of irrigation. The zanjera “family” is composed primarily
of men, followed by their sons, who will inherit their fathers’ member-
ships. The zanjera “family” involves females in only minor, supportive
roles—the few who serve as regular cooks and the wives of officers who
say prayers and make umras during the pamisa. Girls, unlike boys, are
virtual nonentities in the zanjera “family.” Though the simile of a family
is used, it is a ritual fiction that differs broadly from typical Filipino fam-
ilies in which females play much more important roles and have much
more evenly balanced relationships with males.
One kind of spirit associated with irrigation systems is called a
masasarrat (or sometimes karkama, both of which translate roughly as
“ghost”), the apparitions of which take the form of either a man or an
animal. These spirits become associated with particular places, though
usually not the kamarine “because there are so many people there.”
They are more frequently found at the dam, reservoir, main canal, or at
other important structures within the system. They are the ghosts of the
founding members and require of current members that the system be
well maintained. A failure to propitiate these spirits or properly care for
the system can result in damage to the zanjera.
It is not, however, always easy to tell whether an apparition is an an-
cestral spirit or simply one of several kinds of anitos, local spirits that
are potentially, though by no means necessarily harmful, but spirits who
must nonetheless be dealt with. For instance, one kind of anito that is
found in association with zanjera systems is called a sanselmo, an anito
that is directly associated with water and is described as a “big light.”
This spirit can lead people either to being lost in the mountains or to
death at sea.18 The sanselmos are directly associated with water, but
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are not dangerous to the system as such and the zanjera does not make
offerings to them, although individuals may very well do so.
The major concern with supernatural beings attaches to the ances-
tral spirits that are directly and specifically involved in the operation of
the system. The masasarrats, like any ghosts of people, are a part of the
family tradition of the zanjera. Just as the sons of members are the link
to the future of the zanjera, its ghosts are its link to the past.
A much less formal ritual occasion occurs when neighboring zanjeras
meet to jointly construct or repair a dam or section of main canal that
is shared. Such an event is called a basbas (literally a “repairing”). The
repairs may be scheduled at regular times following or immediately pre-
ceding the wet season, or they may result from an emergency, most
commonly in September when typhoon rains necessitate repair work on
the dam or the main canal. Basbas that occur on a more regular, sched-
uled basis between two zanjeras are somewhat more formal.
Each zanjera provides its own food and kitchens are set up adjacent
to one another, though they remain physically separated and supply
only their own members and guests. Sometimes the members mix to-
gether while working and on those occasions the lines between gunglos
and between different zanjeras are not maintained. However, with some
zanjeras the separation of gunglos is strictly maintained. The sched-
uled, annual repairs may coincide with collections taken from the inka-
pulo people who, in addition to providing the ten percent of their crops,
will bring sugar-cane wine or other alcoholic beverages. Some or even
all of the representatives of the inkapulo users may be asked to partici-
pate in the feasting.
The only umras offering on these occasions is the placing of glutinous
rice-cakes near the canal or dam where the work is being undertaken.
Each participating zanjera provides its own offering, directed to the
masasarrats of its founding members. Whether the basbas is regularly
scheduled or only an ad hoc, emergency event, the associated rituals
are much less elaborate than those of the annual or semiannual
pamisas. Basbas exchanges and the accompanying shared work are
much like the work exchanges between house neighbors in what Ilo-
canos call tagnawa (Lewis 1971:106–108).
Comparisons
Publications specifically on the structure and organization of locally de-
veloped, communal irrigation in the Philippines have been primarily
limited to Ilocos Norte (here and the work of Siy 1982).19 A number of
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studies have focused on the role of irrigation systems from the perspec-
tive of or relative to village organization (Bacdayan 1974; Fegan 1979;
Lewis 1971; Takahashi 1970) with the result that much of the more
detailed information on the organization of irrigation systems, particu-
larly the relationships between systems, seems to have been frequently
overlooked. On the other hand, there has been a growing amount of
research on the development and improvement of communal irrigation
and the problems (“local constraints to rural development”—a common
euphemism) encountered with its acceptance by peasant farmers (e.g.,
IRRI 1973). These applied studies have not undertaken any local logical
and functional analysis of what established peasant systems are; rather,
they have focused on what peasant irrigation systems should be, at least
from the viewpoint of agricultural researchers and developmental agen-
cies.
A difficulty for anthropologists is that irrigation frequently involves
social alignments, coalitions, and confederations that go beyond and are
independent of village organizations. While village organizational struc-
tures may provide the bases for irrigation systems—as examples below
regarding mountain people in northern Luzon and northern Sumatra
suggest (Bacdayan 1974; de los Reyes 1980; de los Reyes et al. 1980;
Lando 1977)—it is erroneous to presume such a relationship or to
assume that irrigation is but an epiphenomenon of village organiza-
tion. The openness of lowland Filipino communities suggests that the
research of irrigation systems is best served by starting with the prop-
erty-resource interests of farm families and the ways in which they
relate to other families and to irrigation societies as groups.
As I have argued here, the environmental and social factors that have
affected irrigation in Ilocos Norte have also influenced the corporate
structure of individual families. In comparing the relative successes
of Filipino and Chinese businesses in Baguio, Davis has shown that
whereas “the corporate nature of the Chinese kin group encourages col-
lective economic behavior,” Filipino families lack equivalent corporate
definition and closure (1973:197–204). All families are relatively corpo-
rate, but I have shown that, compared to the conditions of Ilocanos in
Isabela, families in Ilocos Norte are highly corporate and this social de-
velopment has directly complemented the development and operation
of communal irrigation systems.
Though directly comparable materials are lacking on irrigation
groups in most other regions, enough information exists to make at
least broad generalizations possible. The following examples include
both Ilocano—and Ilocanos in adjacent homeland as well as more dis-
tant pioneering regions—and non-Ilocano areas. It is also possible to
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compare Ilocos Norte to an important area outside the Philippines
where indigenous irrigation systems have had a long history—the island
of Bali.
Irrigation Systems in Ilocos Sur
A survey of 51 communal irrigation systems, all of them outside Ilocos
Norte (de los Reyes 1980; de los Reyes et al. 1980), shows communal
irrigation groups that are similar to the least corporate, inkalian-based
zanjeras, with individuals owning their own land and the shared asset
of the group being its access to water. Of the 51 systems, 5 are found
within Ilocos Sur (de los Reyes 1980:5–41), and 4 of them approximate
the inkalian model, while the fifth provides some evidence of having
corporately owned blocks of atar land. Though this evidence is largely
circumstantial, the example does indicate that the corporate principles
of atar-based zanjeras are not necessarily restricted to Ilocos Norte. It
can also show how similar information may indicate like systems else-
where.
The Silag-Butir irrigation association is located in central Ilocos Sur
within the municipality of Santa Maria, 35 kilometers south of Vigan
and more than 120 kilometers south of Laoag. Of the five described for
the province, it is both the oldest (formed in the “late 1800s”) and the
largest in terms of both membership and area (300 individuals on 115
ha). Members’ holdings are reported as varying between 50 square me-
ters (0.005 ha) and 1 hectare, a range that indicates neither individual
nor corporate ownership, though the size of the smallest plots at least
suggests the possibility of subdivided atar shares, a practice regularly
encountered among zanjeras in Ilocos Norte.
Of particular interest is what de los Reyes describes as a category of
“special members”:
In addition to the regular members, the association has 35 special mem-
bers. Unfortunately, we were not able to determine how the system of
special membership came about. We only know that the special members
are not required to pay the irrigation fees nor are they to contribute labor
in system maintenance, but they are allowed to use the system’s water
during the wet season. (de los Reyes 1980:39–40)
The exemptions from fees and work suggest the presence of biang-ti-
daga owners, the descendants of original landowners who continue to
receive water and who are not required to meet obligations of member-
ship.20 None of the other fifty communal irrigation systems described
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by de los Reyes exhibited a similar group of privileged individuals. In
Ilocos Norte it is only in atar-based zanjeras that a category of people
receive water without being assessed fees or work, all of this being fun-
damental to the original exchange of land for water. If the same is the
case with Silag-Butir, then the “special members” are not members at
all but are the biang-ti-daga owners who, nonetheless, have lands within
the system.
Further, Silag-Butir is divided into four parts—“grassland,”
“wooded,” “swampy,” and “elevated” areas, with only the last receiving
water during the dry season (de los Reyes 1980:39). This at least sug-
gests the existence of atar blocks of land, which again are characteristic
of the more corporate systems in Ilocos Norte. Moreover, the aver-
age-sized holding in each block is 0.38 hectare overall, based on 0.36
hectare for three of the areas and 0.42 hectare for the fourth. The
separation of atar blocks based on geographical-soil characteristics, in
order to provide members equivalent shares of the land types found
throughout the system, has been noted as a regular feature of the larger
atar-based zanjeras. With a total of 115 hectares, Silag-Butir is certainly
within the range of the bigger atar systems in Ilocos Norte.
Unfortunately, no mention is made as to whether or not membership
holdings are apportioned in the four different areas, nor do the data
give any indication of whether the 115 ha include the lands of the “spe-
cial members,” though it is reasonable to assume that they do, whether
the system is atar based or not. By itself the division of lands into four
relatively equal areas is little more than a hint that there are corpo-
rately controlled blocks of atar land within Silag-Butir. However, when
seen as a part of the other, more substantial evidence, it has a greater
implication.
In her section on “Conflict and conflict management,” de los Reyes
(1980:39) makes no mention of disagreements over the fair distribution
or theft of water, issues that are repeatedly referred to in the other
fifty examples and that are perennial problems in systems this size. The
two examples of conflict mentioned describe issues between the associ-
ation and outsiders (the interference of local politicians and a contested
ownership of the dam site), but no conflict between members or over
issues involving water distribution. The absence of internal conflicts,
especially when only one area within the system receives water during
the dry season, supports the interpretation that Silag-Butir’s lands are
corporately controlled.
Finally, and most suggestive of all, Silag-Butir is the only one of
all the fifty-one groups mentioned that has “rituals which are specifi-
cally focused on the use of irrigation” (de los Reyes 1980:40). As with
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zanjera rituals in Ilocos Norte, these include a pamisa, the limited
description of which is in keeping with practices in the north. A sec-
ond ritual, the paayos (a variant of the Ilocos Norte term parayos or
para-ayos), is held in June to encourage the flow of water. The author
first states that rituals are performed to assure a good harvest and
then adds “… the festivities are also held to honor the deceased per-
sons who constructed the system. ‘Our way of remembering them’, as
an informant puts it” (de los Reyes 1980:41).
Though the evidence for Silag-Butir being an atar-based system is
limited, it does conform to many of the distinctive patterns exhibited
by the most corporate zanjeras in Ilocos Norte. Though other questions
about parallelism or diffusion cannot be considered on the basis of the
available information, it does indicate that, in at least one instance,
similar corporate arrangements are found outside Ilocos Norte. More
intensive studies in other parts of Ilocos Sur and possibly La Union may
well reveal a limited number of like organizations.
Of equal comparative interest to conditions on the Ilocos Coast are
irrigation systems in areas of the Philippines that have been pioneered
in recent decades by Ilocanos, especially by large numbers of immi-
grants from Ilocos Norte. In two of the most important resettlement
areas—Cagayan Valley in northeastern Luzon and the Padada Valley
of southeastern Mindanao—there are no indications of atar-based sys-
tems. Communal irrigation in these two areas is much limited and quite
different from Ilocos Norte.
Irrigation Systems in Isabela
The precise number of truly communal irrigation systems in Isabela is
difficult to determine. In 1963, for instance, the Provincial Irrigation Of-
fice listed 18 local irrigation groups for the whole province. Of these
only 6 were effectively communal, in the sense that they involved a num-
ber of participating farm families and were not controlled by a single
landowner, though, as one of the following cases shows, they may be
dominated by one or more families. The six communal irrigation sys-
tems are situated in the central, rice-producing part of the province in
the area between Santiago and Ilagan. Two of them are adjacent to the
community that I studied and, consequently, more information is avail-
able on them than on others (Lewis 1971).
In terms of participation in the communal irrigation systems of Isa-
bela, Mambabanga is probably exceptional in that there are members
of both associations living in the barrio. The lands of the two irrigation
systems are found on a secondary floodplain of the Magat River within
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the municipality of Luna. Both draw water from the same source,
Macanao Creek, which in turn is fed from springs at various points
along the face of a small rise separating the secondary floodplain from
the higher, less fertile tertiary floodplain.
The smaller of the two associations, the Society Mambabanga (150
ha), was initiated by the original settlers who had founded Barrio Mam-
babanga in 1918, at which time application was made for the water
rights on the upper portion of Macanao Creek. However, it was not
until 1938—and then only as a consequence of the efforts of one vil-
lage elder—that the construction of a dam and connecting canals was
actually begun. The village elder happened to have the single largest
landholding within the village, with his total of 43 hectares being just
over one-third of all the lands inundated and with all of his land located
in the advantageous position nearest the dam. The size of his holdings
(some of them obtained from less successful individuals among the orig-
inal settlers) and, according to informants, his withholding of water at
strategic times, created great animosity within the community.
Resentment came to a head when, through a legal maneuver, he ac-
quired sole rights to the water. His continued attempts to buy up lands
from more hard-pressed farmers plus his introduction of new tenants
(“outsiders” to the older community of pioneering families) adjacent to
the main part of the village resulted in his complete alienation from the
original members of the community. Largely because of this, together
with charges and counter-charges of witchcraft, and his advanced age,
he sold the land and moved to a distant town.
The landholdings and water rights were purchased in the mid-1950s
by a Chinese mestizo, a wealthy man with other holdings in Pangasinan
Province. Having learned of the problems associated with the system in
the past, this individual went out of his way to correct the injustices per-
ceived by members. Meetings were held with all water users, officers
were elected (most of them the landlord’s own tenants), work schedules
established, and an equitable set of water schedules agreed to. In addi-
tion, the custom of an annual feast was begun, with special foods and
beverages provided by the landlord.
The actual number of members in the association, now or in the past,
has been difficult to determine. For some individuals it consists of the
families (less those who have left) that owned the original 150 hectares
planned for but never adequately irrigated when the system was begun
in 1938. Work and membership shares are supposed to be based on one-
hectare fields, but with the major landowner having more than one-third
of all the land within the system, it is not clear whether he alone or he
and his fifty tenants (the actual number varies from year to year) are
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true members. Voting at meetings is informal at best, with attendance
irregular, and “recognized people” being involved—“recognized” in that
their land is in the system and that they (or members of their families)
provide work when asked by officials to do so.
The system is still dominated and the water rights still controlled by
one individual, and the Society Mambabanga remains only marginally a
communal enterprise. The main considerations of the members in the
village of Mambabanga are that it works reasonably well and that the
allocation of water is equitable given the physical limitations of the sys-
tem. Their objections to the previous arrangements were not that things
had been done undemocratically but only that they had been done un-
fairly. Though they are well aware of the potential for abuse that exists
in such an arrangement, they see little need nor much to be gained from
efforts to change the system.
Inkalian systems in Ilocos Norte are also sometimes dominated by
strong individuals or cliques of leading families; some of these zanjeras
are far from truly representative of communal interests. Like the Soci-
ety Mambabanga, there is much greater concern for consistency and
fairness than there is for representative governance. The major differ-
ence between such systems in Ilocos Norte and the example of the Soci-
ety Mambabanga is that the disparities in wealth between leaders and
members are considerably less in Ilocos Norte than in Isabela, where
large, absentee-owned, single-family corporations are much more com-
mon. With the direct participation of leaders in irrigation activities in
Ilocos Norte, the systems there are more personal and at least reflec-
tive of group concerns.
In contrast to the Society Mambabanga, the Union Bacarrena at 304
hectares is more than twice as large, with a total of 88 members owning
lands of 0.5 hectare to more than 10 hectares. The lands of the associa-
tion are a part of an original 1,100-hectare land grant made to sixty
families in 1915, all of them immigrants from various barrios in Bacarra.
Today Union Bacarrena is a term applied only to the irrigation society,
with most members living in communities north of Barrio Mambabanga.
The members in Mambabanga (eleven families in all) live there as a con-
sequence of a major flood in 1937, when they had been living in a village
on the secondary floodplain and sought and received permission from
the older families of Mambabanga to establish their homes there. The
irrigation system was developed over a period of ten years, 1920–1930,
starting out with 150 hectares and subsequently expanding to its cur-
rent size of just over 300 hectares.
The Union Bacarrena is organized like the inkalian systems in Ilocos
Norte: members own their own land and are either farmers or landlords
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(but not tenants); the society owns the water rights, dam, and network
of canals; individuals are assessed work based on the total amount of
lands owned (one hectare for one day’s work); officials are elected and
include a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and a board
of directors. A feast, which does not involve specific rituals focused
on irrigation or the founders of the association, is held each year and
members are assessed contributions. There are a few water buyers on
lands peripheral to the system—a total area of about 10 hectares—and
they are required to pay ten percent of their crops. Offers have been
made to include them as full members of the association, but because of
irregularities in the delivery system they prefer to continue paying the
percentage cost rather than joining. At the same time, the members fur-
thest removed from the dam and main canals complain of consistently
inadequate water and blame those nearest the intake, with the result
that absenteeism among them was said to be high. Some of these indi-
viduals have withdrawn entirely from the organization and no longer
acknowledge their memberships and associated responsibilities, though
regular members accuse them of taking water without paying fees.
With water derived from a small creek by means of a fixed concrete-
and-log dam, communal labor is largely restricted to work on the main
canals, and members are required to contribute 20–30 days each year
or pay a fee (6 pesos) in lieu of each day’s work. One of the main causes
of dissension is absenteeism and the failure of people to pay fines. Other
issues include conflicts over water shortages and theft and, as with un-
paid fines, the association is unable to enforce its own regulations. The
most active and committed members express concern over the viability
of the association, but, according to a retired officer, there have al-
ways been such problems. In terms of its ability to operate as a system,
the union seems considerably less effective than similarly organized,
inkalian-based zanjeras in Ilocos Norte.
Environmental and social conditions in Ilocos Norte make this
greater efficiency both necessary and possible: environmental in that
agriculture is less intense and involuted in Isabela (with one-tenth the
population pressure; cheaper and easier access to land to buy, lease,
or farm as tenants; adjacent pioneering hill areas still available; better
soils; more evenly distributed rainfall) and with fewer overall pres-
sures to make irrigation work more effectively; social in that families
are organizationally more open and less corporately defined, involving
individuals in larger networks of reciprocity, all of which ultimately com-
pete for a member’s personal commitment. Farm families in Isabela are
neither faced with the same intensity of pressures that exist in Ilocos
Norte, nor have they developed (or had to develop) the corporate mech-
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anisms that facilitate the forms of cooperation and property sharing
required for communal irrigation. As in other areas of the Philippines,
communal irrigation in Isabela seems to work best where it is effec-
tively noncommunal and dominated by one or more forceful (and often
wealthy) individuals.
Part of the contrast between the two areas exists because family
landholdings are much larger in Isabela than they are in Ilocos Norte
(approximately 3 ha vs. 0.5 ha), with the result that the ratio of people
to land is much smaller. The Union Bacarrena with 88 members on 304
hectares can be contrasted with a similarly organized inkalian system
in Bacarra having 500 members on 185 hectares. The relative shortage
of farmland and the greater collective pressures on members simply do
not permit the apathy that characterizes communal participation in cen-
tral Isabela.
The models for both atar and inkalian systems were known and con-
ceivably could have been applied to communal irrigation in Isabela.
However, given the relative availability of land and the character of
family and community organization that developed in response to pio-
neering conditions in Isabela (Lewis 1971:81–172), it quite reasonably
follows that immigrant Ilocano farmers developed inkalian and not atar-
based systems. Moreover, communal irrigation systems in Isabela are
far fewer in number and, as evidence from the two cases examined
shows, less cooperatively effective than those in Ilocos Norte. As indi-
cated in de los Reyes’ work (1980), other systems in the Philippines
are of this type, with the more corporate atar systems being limited to
northwesternmost Luzon. In situations similar to those encountered by
Ilocano migrants in Cagayan Valley, other Ilocanos established commu-
nal irrigation in southeastern Mindanao.
Irrigation Systems in the Davao Region
Ilocano resettlement in Southeast Mindanao followed World War II.
Among the areas settled in Davao del Sur and Davao del Norte prov-
inces, the Padada Valley south of Davao City and the Tagum River
area to the north have been opened to rice farming largely by Ilo-
canos and Visayans, and individuals from both groups have developed
communal irrigation systems there. Some, like the New Ilocos Irriga-
tion Association near Magsaysay in the Padada Valley, are composed
entirely of Ilocanos, while others, like Matan-ao Marber Irrigation
System in the adjacent municipality of Bansalan, are composed of
both Ilocanos and Visayans. Whatever the ethnolinguistic composition
(though the examples provided by de los Reyes suggest that Ilocanos
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have more frequently initiated communal irrigation in the Davao Gulf
region), the irrigation associations are all ones in which members own
their own lands and the corporate concerns of systems are limited to
water rights, dams, and canals.
As is the general pattern in Isabela, the six associations described by
de los Reyes are dominated by more forceful and wealthy individuals,
and the problems most frequently encountered concern water theft and
water distribution (1980:65–101; de los Reyes et al. 1980:311–355). In
none of the examples from southeastern Mindanao is there any indica-
tion of corporate land ownership such as occurs with atar systems.
Likewise, as in Isabela, landholdings are relatively large in southeastern
Mindanao (ten times as large), compared to the pattern of extremely
small holdings with either atar or inkalian systems in Ilocos Norte.
Consequently conditions in the region, as in Isabela, do not favor the
greater corporate definition of families or of communal irrigation. Only
one part of the Philippines exhibits similar population pressures and
a long history of communal irrigation systems in a situation roughly
comparable to Ilocos Norte, and that is the Cordillera Central with its
spectacular high mountain rice terraces.
Irrigation Systems in the Cordillera Central
Only three studies are specifically about the social organization of mon-
tane irrigation systems in the Philippines, all of them on the Bontok
or Mountain Province. Unfortunately, comparable data on the social di-
mensions of irrigation systems for Ifugao, Kalinga, Tinguian, Nabaloi,
and Kankanai peoples are either extremely limited or lacking alto-
gether. The one holistic analysis of Bontok irrigation is by Bacdayan
(1974) regarding the western portion of the province, while the survey
made by de los Reyes and others includes important comparative data
on sixteen communal systems from elsewhere within the Bontok cul-
tural region (de los Reyes 1980; de los Reyes et al. 1980). Together,
these three studies provide a reasonably clear picture of Bontok irriga-
tion systems and are especially important since it is possible to link
this information with available studies on Bontok family, descent group,
ward, and village organizations. The relationships of irrigation to other
forms of organization make communal irrigation systems there signifi-
cantly different from those found in the Philippine lowlands.
Cognatic systems are pervasive with Malayo-Polynesia, but within
this vast region there are exceptions that involve unilineal and bilateral
descent groups that have apparently developed from an original cog-
natic structure. In the Philippines the more corporate exceptions are
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most evident with so-called Igorote tribal populations. In an overview
of social organization in the Cordillera, Eggan (1967) emphasized the
importance of bilateral descent groups and the related development of
larger corporate residence groups such as wards and villages. Drucker
(1977) has presented an important discussion of descent systems and
property inheritance among the northern Bontok as they relate to the
ownership of irrigated rice terraces.
Drucker demonstrates how historically heightened pressures on land
have resulted in socially restricted systems of descent. With respect to
nonirrigated land (forests, pastures, and gardens) the pattern of owner-
ship previously involved landholding by individuals, bilateral descent
groups, men’s house groups (sociopolitical wards called atol), or even
the community at large. At present most unimproved lands are commu-
nally owned since, as a result of new income sources, pressures on
these lands have declined.
Where gardens are privately owned, the pattern of equal inheritance
by all offspring is followed. On the other hand, pressures on irrigated
rice lands have remained very high and property is transferred from
generation to generation by what Drucker calls “paralineal” inherit-
ance, with the eldest son receiving the rice fields of his father, the eldest
daughter those of her mother, and other children dividing up whatever
might remain (1977:9–15). Whereas Ilocano families in Ilocos Norte
have become increasingly corporate, the corporate basis of social life
among the Bontok involves kinship and community groups that extend
well beyond the corporateness of individual domestic units. Conse-
quently, both the social and natural settings in Mountain Province have
resulted in markedly different kinds of irrigation organizations from ei-
ther of the two kinds developed by Ilocanos.
Though Drucker clearly shows the relationship between land short-
ages, subsistence strategies, social organization, and inheritance, he
does not provide an interpretation of how families, descent groups,
wards, or villages relate to or are involved in the operation of irrigation
systems.
Fortunately, Bacdayan’s study of a western Bontok community does
illustrate this and, coupled with the survey data of de los Reyes, it
provides a reasonably clear picture of the articulation between irri-
gation systems and community groups. Bacdayan outlines the history
and organization of a community irrigation system in Tanowong, a
village in the municipality of Sagada in the western Bontok region.
The Tanowong system, with a most impressive 25-kilometer canal,
involves “roughly 1,000 people” and serves four closely related ham-
lets.21 The existing system is based on an established set of terraces
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and multiple water sources plus major renovations begun in 1954
when, as a result of decreasing water supplies, a remote supply was
sought, eventually leading to the construction of the 25-kilometer
canal. However, this later, major undertaking did not, Bacdayan notes,
produce any changes in the “traditional framework of communal ac-
tion” (1974:257–258).
The most important group in terms of community action is the men’s
house or dap-ay group (Bacdayan notes that ato is the more commonly
used term in Bontok ethnography) and in Tanowong there are up to
thirty members in each, with eight in all for the community as a
whole—four in one hamlet, two in a second, and one in each of the re-
maining two. I repeat in some detail his description.
The dap-ay are the religious, social, and political centers of village life
where major decisions are made and through which the villages are mobi-
lized and grouped for communal action. While there is explicit competi-
tion among dap-ay, they always co-ordinate their efforts for the welfare of
the community as a whole…. The dap-ay serve as focal points of mobili-
zation and accountability where decisions require implementation, such
as the collection of materials or money, and the procurement of labor
for community trail and irrigation repairs…. While the dap-ay is the unit
of mobilization and accountability in community-wide endeavors, the nu-
clear family within the dap-ay is the unit of assessment for whatever is
required by a community project. (Bacdayan 1974:248–249)
In further linking the importance of irrigated rice lands to community
organizations Bacdayan adds,
It follows that rice terraces are one of the most highly valued kinds of
property for inheritance. Given this fact, plus the fact that the religious
ceremonies, which are very significant kinship group and communal rites
of intensification, are keyed to the rice cultivation cycle, the ownership of
a rice terrace is like a badge of citizenship and of continuity, rootage, or
identity in the group. This cultural significance of the rice terrace is the
background for the intense concern shown over the dwindling water sup-
ply. (Bacdayan 1974:252)
Bacdayan’s paper is not directly concerned with questions of
corporate organization, the main thrust of his work being to show
the considerable measure of success which the villagers of Tanowong
had with using traditional social organization to accomplish a major
task that involved them with distant villages and with representatives
of the Philippine national government. Nonetheless, his work does
provide an important example of how the corporate structures of
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irrigation and community systems are linked in this one area of Moun-
tain Province. Moreover, though lacking both the specific details of
irrigation in Tanowong and the relevant information on community
structures, the description of sixteen irrigation systems by de los
Reyes and others supports the kinds of irrigation-community relation-
ships outlined by Bacdayan.
The sixteen systems described by de los Reyes and her colleagues
represent villages from throughout Mountain Province. The smallest
has an area of only 1 hectare (divided into two sections), with a mem-
bership of 20 farmers and a field-size range of 100–400 square meters.
The largest has an area of 35 hectares (all in a single area) with 300
members and a field-size range of 10–10,000 square meters. Of the 16
systems, 5 are noted as having “irrigation associations,” all having been
initiated by officials of the National Irrigation Administration long after
the actual construction of the systems. The remaining 11 organizations
are variously described as being managed “by the users themselves”
or “barrio officials.” The author’s comment on one of the five associa-
tions seems in large part to characterize the government’s efforts and
frustrations in trying to “organize” mountain farmers.
The association’s activity ended, however, immediately after the organi-
zation meeting. At present, the operation of the Agcuyo system is not
managed by any formal association, nor by any formal leader. (de los
Reyes 1980:43)
In describing another association the author noted,
The operation and maintenance of the system is supposedly under the su-
pervision of the system’s irrigation association. As it is now, however, the
association officials are not active in overseeing all aspects of the system’s
management. Nonetheless, the association leaders still attend to some of
the needs of the system. It appears, however, that they do so not because
of their irrigation positions but because they are also incumbent barrio
leaders. (de los Reyes 1980:144, emphasis added)
And in still another,
The Nabineng system is not managed by a formal association. However,
the barrio officials of Mayag, who are recognized in their capacity as com-
munity leaders, extend to the farmers whatever help or advice they may
seek on matters relating to the operation of the system. (de los Reyes
1980:133)
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Thus, the most characteristic social feature of Bontok irrigation is the
congruence between the leadership of villages and irrigation systems.
Unlike Ilocano zanjeras, which have no direct ties with barrios, much
less a congruence in officials, Bontok villages and irrigation systems ap-
pear to be virtually synonymous in this respect. Though the studies of
de los Reyes and her colleagues provide no specific details on the roles
of extended kin groups, wards, or the communities at large, there is
little question from the examples provided that village officials are the
irrigation officials. At the same time, ethnographic studies clearly show
the importance of corporate groups in Bontok villages (Botengan 1976;
Drucker 1974, 1977; Eggan 1960, 1967; Keesing 1949; Reid 1972). The
distinction may perhaps be made that whereas Ilocano irrigation sys-
tems are communally based (i.e., characterized by the collective use
and ownership of a resource or property), Bontok irrigation systems
are truly community based. Given the local presence of corporate forms
of organization and cooperation, plus the need to improve agricultural
production and the environmental conditions that make it feasible (wa-
ter sources, soils, terrain, etc.), it reasonably follows that an indigenous
irrigation system will employ and rely upon existing corporate groups
rather than create an association independent of existing institutions. A
further example from de los Reyes’ work refers to just such local con-
cerns.
The Fian-na system is not currently managed by a formal association. The
farmers feel that as long as they are united as a group, they do not need
a formal association which, in their opinion, might be used by the govern-
ment to control their system. Also, they believe that if they were to form
an association, they would be constrained to accept the terms imposed by
the NIA (National Irrigation Administration) on the rehabilitation of exist-
ing systems, namely, the repayment of any financial assistance extended
by the agency. Furthermore, they fear that the existence of an association
may foster corruption among its officials and consequently cause disunity
among the farmers. (de los Reyes 1980:118)
In addition to the underlying corporate basis of the congruence
between village and irrigation organizations, Bontok communities, un-
like so many lowland ones, are physically separate from each other
and immediately adjacent to their terraced fields. Whereas propin-
quity is undoubtedly a factor in the relationship between the two
organizations, the corporateness of Bontok social systems does pro-
vide the basis for irrigation organization. In none of the examples
provided by de los Reyes and her colleagues is there any indication
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that alternate forms of organization (such as those that exist in Ilocos
Norte) have emerged. The formal relationship between village and ir-
rigation systems is also evident in Sumatra.
Irrigation Systems among the Toba Batak
Richard P. Lando (1979) has provided an important, comprehensive
work, which can perhaps stand as a model for the anthropological study
of irrigation systems in their social and cultural contexts. In this re-
spect his study is holistic but without viewing the social organization of
irrigation as merely an adjunct to the social life of a village. In the case
of Toba Batak irrigation groups (bondar) there are a variety of types,
some of which coincide with village organization and others that are
entirely independent. Vergouwen, in an earlier publication that briefly
mentioned bondar in terms of his study on social organization and law,
noted,
… there are those [associations] that owe their existence to the irrigation
of fields by streams, or by irrigation canals, bondar. These associations
… [are] units with distinct interests of their own, having their own inter-
nal organisation, their own administration, and their own legal rules. …
In other regions, however, the water interests go together with the other
interests of the ruling lineage in village and territory, so much so that
sometimes a close and independent unit based upon common water inter-
ests is hardly to be discerned, and the administration of the water for
a good part coincides with that over land and the people. (Vergouwen
1964:344)
The Batak are divided into a number of exogamous, named patriclans
(marga), which are united through asymmetrical marriage exchange
systems. Villages, such as the one studied by Lando (1979)—Lintong ni
Huta on the south shore of Lake Toba—are composed of a number of
related patriclans and (within these) lineages. These groups, alone or in
combination, are the bases for cooperative, corporate enterprise.
Kinship often defines the limits of membership, the rights, and the
responsibilities and obligations of a group of people engaged in a com-
mon undertaking or the administration of a corporate resource. (Lando
1979:95)
Irrigation systems in the Lintong ni Huta area exhibit several varia-
tions on a common theme, with the particular organization of an associ-
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ation dependent upon a combination of environmental, social, and his-
torical factors. As Lando noted, “The corporate organization of irriga-
tion systems was an idiosyncratic matter of the locality” (1979:192). All
conform to principles of customary law (adat), principles that are broad
enough to allow for differences in place and changes over time. Six
small irrigation associations within the village are the joint property of
the descendants of the men credited with founding the systems, though
the fields within are owned by individual families and passed from fa-
ther to son.
Unlike Ilocano zanjeras, bondar members are less regularly in-
volved in the day-to-day operation of systems. Many associations in
Batak have paid employees who attend to the ongoing management
of activities.
Batak farmers pay levies for their water to the controlling body of the irri-
gation association and are liable for labor on the system at most for two or
three days a year. Employees of the system, paid in rice, perform the du-
ties of maintenance and water allocation which in other kinds of irrigation
organizations in Southeast Asia are the obligatory duties of all members.
Batak irrigation associations are operated more like public utilities rather
than cooperative associations. (Lando 1979:9)
Excess water could be used in two ways—sold for a share of the rice
grown (plus some annual work on the system) or used to clear and aid
in the construction of a terrace; in the latter case landowners were re-
quired to give up one-fourth of the newly irrigated land to the bondar
(Lando 1979:198). Lands obtained in this way became the property of
the association, and were either rented to outsiders (with the rent be-
coming part of the general fund) or rented to young men of the owning
lineage. This form of land acquisition is roughly similar to the ways that
atar systems in Ilocos Norte incorporate additional holdings as zanjeras
expand.
The author noted that over time some descent groups become
smaller, and in order to maintain themselves, expanded memberships
have become based on residence and voluntary assistance arrange-
ments. Within this, however, genealogical ties have provided the overt
principle of organization (1979:223). However, one large bondar was
the major focus of Lando’s study and it included members and descent
groups from thirty-eight small hamlets throughout the village. The con-
struction, organization, and evolution of this association was the major
concern of this work. Silean Banua is the largest and most important
irrigation system in Lintong ni Huta, having 120 hectares, 206 “levy-
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paying” members, an 8-meter-high dam, and a trunk canal 8 kilometers
in length. Initiated in either 1866 or 1867, taking fifteen years to sup-
ply some fields, and not supplying all portions of the system until 1924,
Silean Banua was developed under quite different arrangements from
the smaller associations mentioned above.
The size of Silean Banua and the fact that the entire village of Lintong ni
Huta cooperated in its construction and financing meant that the entire
village held rights to the system, rather than a single kin group which is a
commoner pattern. (Lando 1979:35)
Originally developed by descent groups, Silean Banua is now man-
aged by various golongans (“groups” or voluntary associations) which
may be based on local lineages, common residence in a hamlet, or a mix
of individuals from two or more hamlets. Golongans have replaced the
level of cooperation that had earlier been the basis of association be-
tween kin groups. This change resulted largely from the outmigration
of large numbers of Batak during the Dutch colonial period. Despite the
change from being a kinship-based group to a voluntary association, the
irrigation system remained a locally based, highly corporate structure.
The adat of water rights remained intact and most importantly the system
remained an organization independently controlled by the village…. The
outside perimeters of Silean Banua are still intact, the inside boundaries
have shifted radically. (Lando 1979:263)
As Lando himself noted, the situation is very similar to the case
described by Bacdayan (1974) involving the reformulation of village-
to-irrigation system relationships by the Bontok. Both examples show
marked similarities in terms of accommodating changes by the corpo-
rate systems specific to the two communities. Again, the situations
in both Mountain Province and highland Sumatra are strikingly dif-
ferent from that of Ilocos Norte where villages have no descent or
residence groups that might provide a corporate infrastructure for the
organization and management of communal irrigation. Still another set
of corporate configurations can be seen in communal irrigation in Bali,
a situation different from those already examined.
Irrigation Systems in Bali
For Southeast Asian scholars—be they concerned with culture, society,
political systems, human ecology, religious beliefs, art, drama, music,
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or myth—all roads ultimately lead to Bali. Its setting, its people hold a
compelling fascination for us. To anthropologists it represents the very
quintessence of what we find in somewhat less romantic, more mun-
dane ethnographic form elsewhere. With respect to the topic of this
study, the Balinese subak has stood as a culturally elaborate, socially
complex ideal of communal-corporate irrigation.
As the Geertzes and others have shown (Belo 1936, 1970; Boon 1977;
Covarubbias 1937; Geertz 1959, 1980; Geertz and Geertz 1975; Lansing
1974), Balinese social organization is highly corporate, ranging across
groups such as the domestic family, quasi lineages (dadia), castes or ti-
tle groups, hamlets, temples, subaks, and various forms of cooperative
association (seka). For this comparison it is not necessary to elaborate
the overall corporateness of Balinese society or to detail the participa-
tion of individuals in these various corporate “planes of social organi-
zation” (Geertz 1959), but only to show the relationships of members
to irrigation groups and, in turn, of irrigation systems to villages. Com-
pared with other areas of Southeast Asia, the studies devoted all or in
part to Balinese irrigation systems are considerable, providing a histor-
ical background and regional breadth not found elsewhere (Birkelbach
1973; Geertz 1967, 1972, 1980; Grader 1960; Liefrinck 1969).
The subak begins with individuals who own their own land within the
systems.
The complexes of ricefields obtaining water from the one conduit or from
the one branch of a conduit are called in Balinese subak, and the owners
of the ricefields making up such a complex constitute a subak association.
(Liefrinck 1969:8)
An irrigation association, or subak, comprises a larger or smaller number
of owners or holders of irrigable fields together forming one consolidated
complex, and has the aim of promoting common irrigation interests….
Subaks have common interests, which manifest themselves above all in
collective ownership of weirs and conduits and in joint worship of tem-
ples. (Grader 1960:269)
In more detail, Geertz explains,
The immediate tasks of wet rice agriculture—plowing, flooding, sowing,
transplanting, weeding, watering, harvesting, and so on—were organized
and carried out at the lowest level of the system, that of the individual,
privately owned terrace or complex of terraces…. So too were the social
arrangements necessary to accomplish them—sharecropping, land renting
or pawning, exchange labor, group work, and so on. At this elemental level,
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the subak as a corporate unit played no active role; it merely set the context
within which the individual peasant, on his own land his own master, was
obliged to work. The subak never acted (and this seems to be one of the few
flat statements one can venture about Bali) as a productive organization in
the proper sense. (Geertz 1980:72–74, emphasis added)
Subaks have a set of elected officials, regularly scheduled meetings,
written constitutions, periodic elections, and scheduled rituals. An
arrangement similar to one described for the Batak (Lando 1979:9–10)
involves the presence of hired “water teams” (seka yeh):
… groups of men, members of the subak, who were delegated by the
subak membership as a whole to carry out these everyday duties and
recompensed accordingly—either in kind, in cash, or by exemption from
various subak taxes and contributions…. The members of the water team
performed what must have been, by a conservative estimate, ninety per-
cent of the labor connected with water control in the subak. The water-
team members, headed by an official elected from among them, the klian
seka yeh, formed the technical heart of the subak. (Geertz 1980:74)
Subaks are also commonly involved in direct reciprocal relations with
other subaks,
Subak associations with common interests, notably as regards irrigation,
may hold joint meetings, or they may meet on the same day in the same
temple but each in a different pavilion, such arrangements facilitate con-
sultation. (Liefrinck 1969:14)
Birkelbach mentions the importance of subaks combining to form “lo-
cal unions”; this is accomplished through a sharing of leadership. Most
such associations involve smaller subaks acting together or, where such
a system shares a border with a larger one, the smaller subak having
sought out the alliance. Such alliances are very common in Ilocos Norte,
but the practice of having a shared leadership is not. Nonetheless,
for subaks corporate persistence remains important and, as Birkelbach
states, “many subaks choose not to lose their identity for a more effec-
tive operating size” (1973:153).
Geertz describes how watershed districts involve the coordination
and potential cooperation of efforts, with a plurality of subaks work-
ing in concert. He estimates that sub-subak, regional work constitutes
perhaps one percent of all labor contributed to individual subaks
(1980:80). However, these alliances and larger inter-subak activities
entail no form of higher corporate organization. It is at the gov-
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ernmental level that systems coordination and activities differ most
significantly from those characteristic of Ilocos Norte. The ritual
coordination of irrigation, the collection of taxes by the official rep-
resentatives of lords, and the presence of an overall, customary set
of water laws (adat yeh) distinguish Bali’s organization from anything
that exists in the northern Philippines.
Despite the ritual coordination of irrigation in Bali and the presence
of government tax collectors, irrigation systems were and are wholly au-
tonomous, self-governing, locally developed institutions.
Technically, the … subak was entirely self-contained. It depended on no
facilities over which it did not have direct control. There were no state-
owned or state-managed waterworks of any sort, nor were there water-
works that were the property or responsibility of autonomous super-subak
bodies of any sort. The whole apparatus—dams, canals, dikes, dividers,
tunnels, aqueducts, reservoirs—upon which any particular landowner de-
pended for his water supply was built, owned, managed, and maintained,
sometimes exclusively, sometimes in partnership, by an independent cor-
poration of which he was a full and, in legal terms anyway, equal mem-
ber…. There was no alienation of the basic means of production. (Geertz
1980:69)
The relationships between irrigation system and residence groups
have been clearly presented as involving separate and distinct corpo-
rate entities.
[The] three main constituents of the village polity—banjar [hamlet],
subak, and pemaksan [temple congregation]—are noncoordinate: their
memberships do not coincide. Rather, they intersect and overlap. Virtu-
ally any irrigation society has members from many different hamlets and
many different congregations. The members of virtually any congregation
come from several hamlets and several irrigation societies. The members
of virtually any hamlet will belong to different irrigation societies. (Geertz
1980:53)
The major difference between irrigation systems in Bali and the mon-
tane systems in northern Luzon and northern Sumatra is that, whereas
communities and irrigation societies are conjoined in the last two areas,
equivalent, corporate connections between community and irrigation
system do not exist in Bali. There, villages and irrigation systems are
corporately separated, not united.
Subaks and zanjeras are distinct from the other irrigation systems
mentioned here in that both are organizations having a distinctive set
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of rituals that focus on the group as a unit—a unit over and above
the individual propitiatory rituals practiced by members at field sites
or altars. The ritual activities briefly referred to by de los Reyes et al.
(1980:18–19) for the Bontok and by Lando (1979) for the Toba Batak are
not practices that set the irrigation systems apart as distinct organiza-
tions.
Liefrinck’s description of subak ritual (1969:29–38) and Geertz’s em-
phasis of this ritual in the larger contexts of villages, districts, and local
kingdoms (1980:75–77, 80–82) show the local elaboration of irrigation
ritual together with its importance in the society at large. Geertz has
contended that it is through the ritual coordination of agricultural activ-
ities that irrigation society and Balinese society are linked. Nonetheless,
each subak is ritually, as well as socially, an autonomous unit with its
own temple and religious authority.
The annual or semiannual pamisas held by zanjeras are ritually pal-
lid events compared with the religious activities of subaks. Zanjeras
have no religious centers as such, nor do they have an equivalent “tem-
ple priest.” Kamarines are used for cooking and serving meals to work
parties, for both casual and formal meetings, as places for afternoon
siestas during the heat of the day, as well as for group rituals. They
are not specifically religious structures. Only the occasional presence
of an offering, an umras, suggests that the site has ritual significance.
The rituals themselves are a syncretism of indigenous beliefs, combined
with imported and reformulated American and Spanish Christian ideas.
Ceremonies may involve—sometimes in alternate years or even during
different phases of the same ritual—a Catholic priest, a Protestant mis-
sionary, a local shaman, or no religious personage at all. With zanjera
officials attired in slacks and short-sleeved shirts (and most members
in ordinary work clothes), ceremonies are performed in an open-sided
shed or hollow-block building (covered by a rusty sheet-iron roof); they
just do not engender the sense of epic drama that is described for subak
rituals.
Given the relative social complexities of zanjeras and subaks, how-
ever, there is much more than meets the ritual eye in the simpler
performance and plain setting of the pamisa. The corporate arrange-
ments and the types and varieties of resources and property involved
in atar-based zanjeras are much more elaborate and complex than are
those of the inkalian or subak-type irrigation systems. The ritual facade
of the zanjera may be less colorful, but more lies behind it—a case of
“more matter, with less art.” The corporate “matter” of atar-based zan-
jeras deserves special consideration.
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Conclusions
If, ethnographically speaking, all roads lead to Bali, theoretically, in the
case of irrigation, they lead to Karl Wittfogel (1957). However, the major
limitations of Wittfogel’s arguments for “oriental despotism” and “hy-
draulic states” as they might apply to Balinese subaks and Batak bondars
have been convincingly dealt with by Geertz (1980) and Lando (1979).
Zanjeras, I would simply reiterate, were independently developed and
are autonomously maintained by peasant farmers. As to the contention
that irrigation in Ilocos Norte is “small-scale,” and therefore represents a
form of “hydroagriculture” which precedes “hydraulic agriculture” (Wit-
tfogel 1957:18), it can only be restated that zanjeras irrigate an estimated
18,000 to 20,000 hectares and, though many are very small, there are a
few as large as 800–1,000 hectares. Whatever “small-scale” may mean in
real hectares, irrigation in northwesternmost Luzon stands as a regionally
impressive example of hydrological development, all of it accomplished in
the absence of Eastern despots and without the interference or direction
of local landlords. Nepotism rather than despotism is a better, though still
misleading, term to describe the basis of irrigation systems in Ilocos Norte
and the other examples considered here.
The zanjeras most similar to irrigation systems elsewhere in the Phil-
ippine lowlands are the inkalian associations. Whether developed by
Ilocano émigrés in Cagayan Valley or by indigenous Tagalogs in central
Luzon, the pattern is one of private landowners uniting to form a corpo-
rate group that owns the water system and collectively holds the rights
to water. The same pattern is characteristic of the Balinese irrigation
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associations. Where land is relatively available, as in Isabela today or
Ilocos Norte in the past, the landowner-operated irrigation system is a
reasonable response, since it provides farmers full, not limited, title to
land. The atar system may be a socially ingenious formulation, but in
part it is a response to a relatively great shortage of land and the ab-
sence of alternatives for irrigators to develop their own fields further or
to open up public lands. Certainly, no attempts were made by Ilocanos
in Isabela to establish atar systems. Though land pressures in Isabela
have increased dramatically since the first inkalian systems were es-
tablished, the eagerness of the national government now to establish
irrigation systems and extend existing ones precludes farmers from be-
ing able to convince landowners to give up 40–60 percent of their lands.
Granting that the following argument is partly teleological, it is reason-
able to assume that the oldest systems in Ilocos Norte were owner-op-
erated and that the more socially complex atar systems developed later.
It is quite unlikely that the earliest irrigation systems would have begun
by diverting water from the main rivers while more manageable, less de-
manding tributary streams and hillside springs were available as sources.
Irrigation must have gone from the simple to the complex, and therefore I
would argue that irrigation must have existed in Ilocos Norte prior to the
earliest recorded date for an atar system (1730). Whatever the totality of
factors that made the creation of atar systems individually necessary and
socially possible, their development required a significant organizational
change resulting in the emergence of a structure unlike anything that pre-
ceded it or is evident in adjacent areas.
As noted, neither inkalian nor atar irrigation systems have an irriga-
tion-to-community relationship similar to that of Bontok irrigation sys-
tems. And, as I have emphasized elsewhere (Lewis 1971), barrios in
Ilocos Norte are socially amorphous, being little more than the places
where farmers live and interact with a narrow set of kin and neighbors.
There are no corporate residence or descent groups in Ilocano com-
munities. In marked contrast, Bacdayan (1974) and Lando (1979) have
shown that Bontok and Toba Batak irrigation organizations are directly
derived from and dependent upon traditional structural arrangements.
Atar systems, on the other hand, are truly revolutionary since there
are no cultural precedents for this kind of organization. Balinese irriga-
tion is similar in that neither hamlet nor village provides either the
organizational basis for or links to irrigation systems. However, subaks
are within the tradition of the Balinese seka, or voluntary association,
and are referred to as seka subak. In this respect there is an organiza-
tional precedent for Balinese irrigation systems. Though short-term,
corporate-like associations are found in marketing arrangements in the
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Ilocos region (Griffiths 1977), as are apparently long-term corporate
agreements over the use of hill swiddens (Ziaclitta, personal communi-
cation), such groups, referred to as sociodads, are not pervasive or
outstanding in the way that voluntary associations are in Bali. Without
evidence of similar structural arrangements from other regions, Ilocano
atar-based systems are unique in the ways in which individuals have
created a corporate irrigation group on the basis of water-for-land ex-
changes. The group owns both water and land (atar, paglakay, and
komon), provides water to the original non-member landowners (the
biang-ti-daga people), shows no indication of connections or social prec-
edents to other social groups, and achieved all of this without subordi-
nating its members to outside authority.
As the comparative examples for insular Southeast Asia have shown,
owner-operated systems are widely distributed throughout the Philip-
pines, are represented by Balinese irrigation associations and, in slightly
variant form, are found among the Toba Batak of Sumatra. In the develop-
ment of inkalian systems in Ilocos Norte and like associations in Isabela,
the same principles of organization were applied by Ilocanos. In this in-
stance culture can be considered a constant, although environmentally
and socially the two areas are quite different. Simply in order to sub-
sist on one-half-hectare farms, the people of Ilocos Norte have had to be
hardworking and industrious, and these “virtues of necessity” are them-
selves influences on behavior. The farming environment has always been
much more difficult in Ilocos Norte, where rainfall is less evenly distrib-
uted throughout the year and where soils are poorer. Likewise, the social
life of the two areas shows considerable variation in the organization and
structure of family and community.
The degrees of corporateness exhibited by domestic families in Ilocos
Norte and Isabela have constituted important differences in the relative
effectiveness of communal irrigation. Families in Ilocos Norte are not
involved in wider groupings of cognatic kin or in open-ended networks
of reciprocal exchange, with the social consequence that they can and
do concentrate their energies on activities more directly relevant to
their economic concerns. At the same time, because family holdings
are so limited, inheritance practice has changed from a bilateral to a
patrili-neal, more corporate emphasis, which is especially evident in the
custom of male land dowry, the sabong. This shift to greater corporate
definition has been especially pertinent in terms of the relationships
between family-owned land and communally controlled irrigation. The
corporate focus (the degree to which property and property relation-
ships are prescribed and corporately delineated) is more clearly spec-
ified in Ilocos Norte; in Isabela the corporate focus of family resource
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is more diffuse, more ramified, with individuals and individual fami-
lies involved in wider, often competing networks of social obligation,
and with family estate dissipated with each generation. Consequently,
though the formal organizational structures of cooperative association
may be the same in both areas, a lack of corporate focus means that on-
going, single-purpose forms of cooperation will function less effectively,
as demonstrated by a comparison of the inkalian systems in Ilocos Norte
and Isabela.
The emphasis on the significance of corporate organizations in an-
thropology has considered the question primarily in terms of unilineal
descent groups or corporate communities.22 On the other hand, Ap-
pell (1976) has argued for the need to consider the domestic family
as a corporate group and of how family property relationships provide
the structure for social groups in cognatically based societies. How
domestic families maintain property and relate to other property-own-
ing families in Ilocos Norte are especially important to irrigation as-
sociations. In the absence of wider networks of effective community
support or demands from kin, neighbors, and other units of reciprocal
exchange, farmers in Ilocos Norte are in a sense freer to concentrate
on maintaining and improving family resources. The zanjeras provide a
way of maintaining (if lands are already within the system) and improv-
ing (if lands are to be opened or expanded, as with atar systems) family
resources in land. Moreover, the corporate interests of the domestic
family and those of the “zanjera family” intersect and are complemen-
tary. In Isabela the specificity of the cooperation required by communal
irrigation is adversely affected by the competition from the wider sys-
tems of obligations within which each member is also involved; there is
much that distracts from and competes for one’s social obligations. In
Ilocos Norte a zanjera member can and must be more attentive to both
domestic and “zanjera family” demands.
Culturally Ilocanos in Ilocos Norte and Isabela are the same, and in
a formal-social sense both are bilaterally structured with kinship mod-
els corresponding (Lewis 1971). Because of environmental pressures,
both social and natural, domestic families in Ilocos Norte have been
more concerned with transfers and uses of property. Ilocano families
in Isabela, under a different set of environmental pressures in which
pioneering conditions favored extended social ties and obligations, have
been more concerned with reciprocity and obligation than with property
as such.23
Other than some hypothetical measure of what irrigation “effi-
ciency” might mean, I would not wish to suggest that being more
corporate is better than being less corporate. Life can hardly be
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described as better in Ilocos Norte than in Isabela, however more
smoothly communal irrigation may work there. In both settings, Ilo-
canos responded and differentially adjusted to nonspecific demands in
the broader social and natural environment. In terms of real income
and sociability, the people of Isabela are wealthier and, it may be sup-
posed, better off.
Atar-based zanjeras are important to understand not merely because
they are so different from other examples of communal irrigation but,
rather, because the difference represents a unique experiment in how
peasant managers created their own corporate resources in both land
and water. In their elaborate exchanges of water for land and their sub-
sequent distributions of atar shares to members, all of it beginning more
than two hundred years ago, they undertook an indigenous program of
“agrarian land reform” long before the phrase was popularized by re-
formists and propagandized by politicians. By their own efforts they have
instituted locally two of the major goals heralded by most Third World gov-
ernments—irrigation and land redistribution. Unfortunately, in what will
be a major local tragedy, it may all be undone as a result of well-meaning
but poorly conceived government irrigation schemes.
Today in Ilocos Norte the government plans to “improve” and “ra-
tionalize” local irrigation by developing large hydrological complexes
that will do away with the need for the multiplicity of zanjeras. Aside
from zanjera concerns about what the loss of diversity and the ability to
repair systems rapidly might mean to individual site and regional stabil-
ity, the farmers are concerned about what this will mean to group and
even personal survival. For atar zanjeras as corporate entities as well
as for individual holders of atar shares, the government’s preemption of
their rights to provide water would permit the titleholders of biang-ti-
daga land to demand the return of atar fields, since the government, not
the zanjera, would then be providing irrigation. This is not just an idle,
paranoic concern of zanjera members; in a few instances losses of atar
lands have already occurred. For example, because of major changes in
river channels and its inability to secure surpluses from a neighboring
system, a zanjera in Vintar negotiated with the government to obtain
its regular supply of water from the Bacarra-Vintar Irrigation System.
This resulted in a legal suit being brought by the zanjera’s biang-ti-
daga owners. The development of the major irrigation systems proposed
for the Laoag River Valley will result in an enormous and complicated
amount of irrigation; the potential losses of land to the zanjeras affected
could be devastating to thousands of people.
Zanjera members are much more aware of the implications of these
proposed changes than are outsiders. They do not believe that “those
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engineers” understand the situation, much less that they know what is
best for zanjeras. Their own municipal federation of zanjeras exists be-
cause the much smaller Bacarra-Vintar Irrigation System threatened to
reduce the valley’s supply of water fifty-five years ago. Although they
see the current proposals for the Laoag River Valley as much more
dangerous to the zanjeras there, they believe that all valleys and all zan-
jeras are potentially threatened. One zanjera elder summed it up,
Government business is government business; they build their dams and
roads to impress other government people or, maybe, the baknangs [rich
people]…. Our zanjera was built almost two hundred years ago and we
built new fields [i.e., extended the irrigation and traded for land] before
the Spanish [period] ended. Now the government wants to take the water
and give it to people, and there will be no more zanjeras. We will have no
land and our sons will have no land. And that will be a terrible thing.
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APPENDIX 1
An Irrigation Agreement
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT:
That we, party of the first part, [name of Zanjera president] and
[name of Zanjera vice-president], Filipinos both married, both of legal
age, and residents of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, as representatives of the
Zanjera Laud Irrigation Association, Incorporated, Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte, and I, party of the second part, [name of landowner], Filipino,
married, of legal age, and also a resident of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte,
hereby make known the following:
1. That I, the party of the second part, [landowner], have a parcel of
land which is irrigated by the Irrigation Ditch called Laud and more par-
ticularly described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of rice land in Bayag, Barrio No. 4, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte.
Bounded on the north by Zanjera Daya’s main canal; on the east by
[two landowners’ names]; on the south by Zanjera Laud (lands for-
merly owned by [name]); and on the west by [landowner’s name]. It
has an area of 7,200 square meters and declared for taxation pur-
pose under Tax No. A-000000 in the name of [landowner].
2. That, whereas if a person has land without irrigation or other persons
have irrigation without land, it is obvious that rice cannot be success-
fully grown. Thus, since neither of us can alone produce rice in such a
situation, the two parties have agreed to divide the said parcel of land
described above. Two-fifths of the land shall go to the Zanjera Laud
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Irrigation Association, Incorporated, in exchange for their work and
hardship, and because the water flowing through the ditch of Zanjera
Laud now gives life to the said parcel of land. The three-fifths portion
that is left belongs to the owner of the land, that is to me, [landowner],
as seen in the sketch at the back of this document and which shows how
the shares belonging to each side are apportioned.
The portion belonging to the Zanjera Laud: two-fifths of the above
described land containing an area of 2,880 square meters more or less.
Bounded on the north by [landowner’s] bigger parcel of land; on the
east by [two names]; south by Zanjera Laud (lands formerly owned by
[name]); and on the west by [name].
The portion of the land pertaining to [landowner]: three-fifths of the
land described above containing an area of 4,320 square meters more
or less. Bounded on the south by Zanjera Laud’s smaller portion; on the
east by [two names]; on the west by [name]; and on the north by Zan-
jera Daya’s main canal.
3. That because of the apportionment of the land described above and
as also stated above, the following agreements are hereby entered into:
(a) That each of the two parties shall pay for the real estate tax
accruing each year on the portion of the original big parcel of
land allotted to each party in proportion and each party shall
also be responsible for whatever assessments the government
shall impose with respect to his share.
(b) That in case the Irrigation Association Laud, Incorporated, shall
no longer irrigate the land described above, the two-fifths por-
tion allotted to the said Zanjera Laud shall revert to the original
owner of the land, the said [landowner], as the right free owner,
and no one shall have the right to prevent its reversion.
In witness thereof, we have executed this document in two copies, in
the Ilocano dialect which we understand, and upon which we hereto af-
fix our signatures in the Municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, this 12th
day of August in the year of our Lord 1945.
SGD. [president]
1st Head and Representative
of the Zanjera Laud Irrigation
Association Incorporated as the
party of the 1st part.
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SGD. [vice-president]
2nd Head and Representative
of the Zanjera Laud Irrigation
Association Incorporated as the
party of the 1st part.
SGD. [landowner]
Owner of the land which is to
be divided and party of the
2nd part.
Signed in the Presence of:
SGD. [witness] SGD. [witness]
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APPENDIX 2
Affidavit of Claim to Land Ownership
The following action was paralleled in a similar document in which a
neighboring zanjera, in a cooperative effort, solidified its claim to a sec-
tion of atar land where the two systems bordered each other. The total
amount of land involved, including the 9 hectares listed below was 22.7
hectares.
Affidavit
I, [name of zanjera president], of legal age, married, Filipino citizen,
and resident of the municipality of Bacarra Province of Ilocos Norte,
Philippines, after being duly sworn in according to the law, depose and
say:
(a) That I am the President or Maestro of the ASSOCIATION ZAN-
JERA DAYA INCORPORADA, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, and as
such I have the right to deal and represent said Association
with any person, partnership, corporation or any Government
entity in any matter pertaining to the properties of said
Association.
(b) That the Association Zanjera Daya Incorporated is a duly
constituted, organized corporation or association in Bacarra,
Ilocos Norte, and duly incorporated in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of the Philippine Commission No. 1459,
and of the Act of the Philippine Legislature, No. 2728, as ev-
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idenced by the Official Certificate signed by the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce dated February 7th, 1933, at Manila,
Philippines, and by the papers which are in my possession.
(c) That in her capacity as a corporation or association she has
properties, personal and real, and among them is one parcel of
orchard situated at sitio Bauang, Barrio No. 4, Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte, Philippines, having acquired it by way of occupation and
prescription, free from liens, charges or encumbrances of any
kind whatsoever, and said land more particularly described and
bounded as follows, to wit:
“ONE PARCEL OF ORCHARD”—located in Bauang, Barrio
No. 4, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, bounded on the south by the
ditch of Zanjera Laud, on the east by the terrenos or rice-pad-
dies of Mr. [name], on the north by the Bacarra-Vintar River,
and on the west by the Kamarine of the said Zanjera Daya.
It contains an area of 9,000 square meters more or less, as-
sessed at P180.00 for the current year 1936, according to
the Declaration of Real Property Tax No. 00000, under the
name of said Association Zanjera Daya Incorporated. Its lim-
its are visible by means of a bamboo fence. The tax of said
orchard for this year, 1936, was paid, as per Official Receipt
No. 000000 issed at Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on April 10, 1936.
(d) That, from the year 1905 the said Association Zanjera Daya In-
corporated possessed and occupied the said orchard above de-
scribed actually, openly, publicly, peacefully, and continuously,
up to the present thirty-one years (31) now, under claim of own-
ership by virtue of occupation and prescription.
(e) That the said Association Zanjera Daya Incorporated, as the true
owner and lawful possessor of the above mentioned orchard had
paid all the annual taxes for the said land (orchard) and had
never been delinquent in the payment thereof.
(f) That, in my capacity as President or Maestro of said Association
Zanjera Daya Incorporated, I hereby request that her right as
owner over said parcel of orchard above described be consoli-
dated into ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP, and that this affidavit BE
REGISTERED in the Office of the Register of Deeds by Ilocos
Norte, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2711, Sec.
194 in as much as the said orchard above described is not regis-
tered either under the Torrens System or under the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
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In witness whereof I have hereunto signed my name at the bottom of
this instrument and at the left margin in quintuplicate after it was read
and translated to me in Ilocano by the Notary Public swearing this doc-
ument, before whom I appeared in the municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte, Philippines, on this 10th day of April, 1936.
[name]
President or Maestro, Association Zanjera Daya,
Incorporada, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte
Read, translated and
signed in the presence of:
[witness] [witness]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
MUNICIPALITY OF BACARRA)
s. s.
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1936, at
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, the herein [name of zanjera president] presented
to me his Residence Certificate No. A-000000 issued at Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte, on February 3, 1936.
Witness my hand and Official Seal, fecha ut supre.
BEFORE ME:
[Name]
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1936
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APPENDIX 3
Notarized Description of Irrigation Contract
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE) SS.
MUNICIPALITY OF BACARRA)
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for this province, on the date
and at the place first stated above, personally appeared [Name “A”] with
Res. Certificate No. A-0000000 issued on February 14, 1968 and [Name
“B”] with Res. Certificate No. B-0000000 issued on March 16, 1968,
both at Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, to me both known to be the same persons
who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that
the same is their free act and voluntary deed.
The foregoing instrument is a contract between the Presidents of
Asociacion Zanjera de Daya, Inc. and the Asociacion Zanjera de Laud,
Inc., [Name “A”] and [Name “B”] respectively, whereby the former, in
consideration of the irrigation on the land of the former by the latter,
said Asociacion Zanjera de Daya cedes and conveys another parcel of
land to the said Asociacion Zanjera de Laud, Inc., for as long as the
irrigation continues and lasts, and should any contingency happen
whereby the said Asociacion Zanjera de Laud, Inc. cannot furnish the
said land with water, the parcel of land herein above ceded and con-
veyed shall be returned and delivered back to the Asociacion Zanjera
de Daya, Inc.
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WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL
[name]
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1970
Not. Doc. No. 48
Page 13, Book IX
Series of 1968
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A Historical Court Case
Documents and maps relating to the original contracts between zanjera
officials and biang-ti-daga landowners are scarce and those that do exist
are treated with some confidentiality. Although zanjera constitutions or
charters are readily accessible, they contain no information about the
extent or varieties of corporate property or the water-for-land arrange-
ments with biang-ti-daga field owners. For legal purposes, the most
important papers held by an atar zanjera are its original land-division
maps, usually one showing the breakdown of lands into atar holdings
and another outlining the biang-ti-daga blocks (Maps 3 and 4). Though
I was shown three sets of block and parcel maps, the zanjeras were
reluctant to have them duplicated or copied in any detail.24 They are
especially concerned that the information therein could, if it became
widely known, result in litigation being brought against them for the re-
turn of atar lands by descendants of the original landowners.
Part of their concern is because many biang-ti-daga fields have changed
hands numerous times, in consequence of bilateral inheritance and resale.
The result is that the residual or primary rights to the corresponding atar
areas, relinquished in the original exchange, are legally ambiguous. The
zanjeras worry that, even under normal operating conditions, the owner-
ship of these membership lands might be contested, however spurious the
grounds, by one or even more parties. They simply feel that the less known
about the specifics of the original land-for-water exchanges the better. De-
tailed as the block and parcel maps are, however, they provide little infor-
mation other than what the physical division of lands entailed: overall size
of the areas, the proportions and blocks held by each party, the names and
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field locations of the original biang-ti-daga owners, sometimes a descrip-
tive word or two about the lands (“swampy,” “tree covered,” etc.), and the
shares and names of the first atar holders. They supply no details about
the negotiations that took place between zanjeras and landowners, nor
were the ones I saw updated to include altered ownership of atar shares or
biang-ti-daga holdings.
From a quite different source, there undoubtedly exist relevant
archival data in the eighteenth and nineteenth century colonial court
records in Spain. Just as sometimes now happens, there were instances
in the past when landowners legally contested a zanjera’s right to atar
lands. As the following case illustrates, when claims were made dur-
ing the early years of a zanjera’s existence, courts were able to obtain
depositions from participants—zanjera leaders, landowners, and local
officials—as to what the original agreements entailed over and above
the bare outlines found in the block and parcel maps. Details from such
a court case were brought to my attention and copies of the available
documents were loaned to me by one of the descendants of a zan-
jera’s founding leader. The case involved a court action initiated by
biang-ti-daga owners in 1806 against two atar-based zanjeras: Zanjera
Sales, one of the larger systems in Bacarra (today approximately 250
hectares), and Zanjera Deniega, the largest system of all (today approxi-
mately 975 hectares).
The court’s deliberations, decisions, and supporting documentation
were recorded in Spanish. Court writs and some evidence were subse-
quently translated into Ilocano and given to the contesting parties.
These translations constitute probably no more than one-sixth of the
entire court record, which, as evidenced in references to particular
page numbers, was more than 370 pages long. The charges, counter-
charges, depositions, and court writs are sometimes more judicially
cryptic than revealing. However, when considered in light of the data
and interpretations presented here and elsewhere by Siy (1982), the ac-
tivities described may be seen in their broader, ethnohistorical context.
Unfortunately, the legal jargon made the transition from Spanish to Ilo-
cano in its entirety. Much of the material—almost half of it—does little
more than establish, then reestablish the persons and places involved
in the litigation. Only a relatively small portion of the 68 pages of avail-
able documents that deal with the relationships between zanjeras and
landowners is presented and commented on here.
The court case began with a petition to the provincial governor from
the original landowners (the plaintiffs) in November 1806 (the exact
day is illegible). In the petition, the owners asked that their lands,
“grabbed and occupied” by the two zanjeras, be returned to them and
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that the irrigation systems be taken over by the municipality. Though
this is the first document in the case, court officials subsequently sub-
poenaed information and obtained depositions on the arrangements in-
volved in the initial water-for-land exchanges. Consequently, the trans-
lated papers include documents and testimony about events that go back
more than thirty years to when Zanjera Sales was established in 1775.
At the conclusion of the case a final court writ is dated March 10, 1837;
altogether, the papers encompass a period of more than sixty-two years.
Because much of the court proceedings and many of the documents
were not included in the Ilocano translations, and even some of these
have since been lost (e.g., several maps referred to by court clerks are
missing), the materials are insufficient to provide a consistent and co-
herent history of what occurred over more than six decades. Groups
and individuals appear and disappear with great irregularity and, al-
though at the time the documents were undoubtedly adequate for the
persons directly involved, the gaps in chronology are enormous. None-
theless, from the information that is available, a reasonably clear pic-
ture emerges of what the contractual relationships and legal issues
were between zanjeras and landowners during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.
A document signed in Vigan by the “Clerk of the Court” and dated
July 12, 1815, refers to events in 1775, 1777, and 1791, noting that the
“original maps” (apparently the block and parcel maps of Zanjera Sales)
provided the basic information on the water-for-land agreement.
The lands were still uncleared and uncultivated at the time of the opening
of the irrigation canal in the year one thousand, seven hundred and sev-
enty five. At that time the lands in question were uncultivated and idle.
They [the zanjera and the landowners] divided the lands, as should be
done in such cases. At the same time, Sales and his companions then con-
structed an irrigation ditch to channel water from a creek in Apaleng. This
can be seen in the map [apparently Zanjera Sales’ block and parcel map]
shown in my presence by the said Sales…. In the year one thousand, seven
hundred and seventy seven, the lands became uncultivated and idle for
the reason that water coming from the creek was insufficient.
The document then notes that in 1791 a new ditch was constructed
by Zanjera Sales, this one coming from the Bacarra-Vintar River.
This irrigation ditch proved very beneficial to the formerly unproductive
lands. It was agreed that no more nor less than half of the lands would be
divided between the landowners and the owners of the irrigation ditch. It
was further agreed upon that this decision should be strictly followed.
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One of the arguments made by landowners in 1806 and restated in
1815 was that the lands within Zanjera Sales were already being culti-
vated by them when the system was developed. Though never actually
specified in the documentation, it appears that it was partly because
Sales experienced the hiatus between 1777 and 1791 that at least some
landowners claimed that their lands were irrigated prior to the opening
(or reopening) of the system in 1791. However, on the basis of the 1775
maps, plus a supporting statement by Zanjera Deniega, the Royal Court
ruled in favor of the irrigation association. The court’s conclusion was
that
on the basis of the evidence presented, I would state that the lands were
given to Don Esteban Viernes de Sales and his companions by landown-
ers when the fields in Day-as were first subdivided and distributed among
[the members]. Don Manuel Parguian [a landowner] opposed this stating
that the lands were under cultivation when the irrigation ditch of the
said Sales association was opened. Deniega [i.e., the headman of Zanjera
Deniega], together with his companions, has opposed the landowner’s po-
sition saying that it is not proper that the lands be given back to the
original landowners except for the little parcels that were cultivated prior
to the opening of the irrigation canal.
The next event referred to also occurred in 1791 and was described
in a letter dated May 14 and addressed to the Mayor of Bacarra, Don
Pedro Crisologo, from the founding officers of Zanjera Deniega. At that
time they were petitioning for official recognition of their irrigation sys-
tem, the canals of which had already been constructed and which put
them in conflict with Zanjera Sales.
Most Honored Mayor:
We, Juan Domingo, Antonio Deniega, Josef Colma and Lorenzo Ignacio,
come to you on behalf of our one hundred thirty companions, all residents
of the municipality of Bacarra. We all pay taxes to His Majesty, the King
(may he be blessed). We come in all humility before His Majesty’s court
which you represent and we declare that:
It is our desire to get the most from lands irrigated by water running
in the ditch that we have constructed. This irrigation ditch was made
with the permission of the mayor whom you succeeded, Captain Josef
Buenaventura, last year—one thousand seven hundred and ninety.
Zanjera Deniega officials then described the land to be irrigated as
extending both east and west of the town, an area that today includes
Zanjera Deniega (in the east), a portion of the lands irrigated by Zan-
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jera Sales (in the west), plus the lands of three smaller zanjeras that
now draw water from Deniega’s main canal. Overall, the area desig-
nated probably included some 2,000 to 3,000 hectares—two or three
times larger than it is today—but its exact size and boundaries can-
not be determined from available court records; nor, during my field
research, were Zanjera Deniega’s block and parcel maps available
for comparison. In any event, the officers of Zanjera Deniega, “Juan
Domingo and his associates,” continued their petition,
We therefore ask Your Honor to approve this. And, we desire also, if it is in
accordance with the law, that it be proclaimed to the whole town so that
those people who own lands which can be irrigated by our ditch will come
to you. We further request that you ask these people whether or not they
would like us to channel water to their lands. Also, may we be informed as
to their response, which we ask that you include in your decision, as well
as the names of all those who present themselves to you. This will serve
as guidance and security for us, the builders of the irrigation system.
The mayor responded by public notice.
On the same day, month and year … that I have received the petition … I
hereby order it proclaimed to all landowners, heads of villages and to all
towns people, in or out of this court, and, in order that more people may
know of it, after the mass on Sunday. To all people who own farms within
the service area of the said irrigation ditch I advise them to report to this
court within six days after this proclamation has been made so that their
wishes are known regarding the request of the petitioners. But if people
fail to present themselves as herewith notified, their declarations will not
be heard and whatever ruling is made it will have to be followed.
One week later, on May 22, 1791, the mayor affirmed that the “doc-
ument has been duly proclaimed.” Over the next six days 109 landown-
ers indicated their wishes on receiving or not receiving water from the
proposed irrigation system.
I, the said mayor of the municipality of Bacarra, declare that from the
twenty-third to the twenty-seventh of this month of May, the people re-
sponding to my proclamation came before me in court. They signified
their willingness to agree to the construction of an irrigation system by
Juan Domingo and his companions. They also reported that they own
lands within the area of the irrigation system.
Following are 54 names, giving their residences and stating that
they owned one or more fields within the designated area. However, 55
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names are listed as being opposed to the irrigation, with the added com-
ment by the mayor that these people
do not want their farms to be serviced by the irrigation system because
they do not have any place where they could plant crops other than rice.
Other people explained that they will open and construct an irrigation sys-
tem of their own; they intend to divert water from the river for irrigating
their fields.
Included among the names of those opposed to the opening of Zan-
jera Deniega is that of Juan Sales [the son of Don Esteban Viernes de
Sales] who, with his “companions” was in the process of reestablish-
ing Zanjera Sales fourteen years after the problems it had in 1777. It
is unquestionably Juan Sales and other officials of Zanjera Sales that
are described as those who “will open and construct an irrigation sys-
tem of their own.” As these and later documents indicate, Zanjera Sales
and Deniega were at variance over water rights and canal rights-of-way
several times during the sixty-two-year period and, according to inform-
ants, at different times after that. However, the record also shows that
they cooperatively opposed landowners when water-for-land exchanges
were locally threatened. The various shifts from adversary to ally can
readily be appreciated given the two major property concerns of zan-
jeras—rights to water and atar lands.
The court documents suggest the ongoing role of municipal officials
in providing legal sanctions to the establishment of zanjeras. By 1775
the record shows that procedures for validating negotiations between
zanjeras and landowners were already established. The legal recogni-
tion of the water-for-land exchanges was especially important for zan-
jeras since the existence of atar lands involved coincident forms of land
tenure (i.e., the original owner’s primary and the zanjera’s secondary
ownership of atar blocks). As is demonstrated later for this case, it was
the combination of block and parcel maps and the recorded municipal
sanctions of the water-for-land exchanges that eventually compelled the
court to rule in favor of the zanjeras.
Despite the considerable involvement of government officials in pro-
viding the initial approbation, there is no indication that cooperative
irrigation either originated with or was dominated by government offi-
cials, least of all any that could be called “Oriental despots.” Irrigation
in Ilocos Norte was neither a cause for nor a product of regional or state
political systems. Since the earliest date given for a zanjera constitution
in Bacarra was 1730, there may well be documents on earlier cases than
the one presented here. Similarly, it may be possible to determine the
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earliest date for the formal organization of atar-based zanjeras, though
not necessarily the origins of communal irrigation in Ilocos Norte, which
I feel would be represented by inkalian-based systems.
I, the mayor of the town of Bacarra, on the twenty-fifth day of May, in the
year one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-one, in the presence of my
subordinates, who stand as my witness, hereby declare that the period in-
dicated wherein people with lands are supposed to present themselves in
court has lapsed. It is my duty to order, as I herewith order, that on the
twenty-sixth of this month, I will go with the landlords, the heads of vil-
lages, including my subordinates who will bear witness for me, to inspect
and examine the lands of the petitioners. The results of this inspection will
be recorded in a document. This information will be conveyed to all con-
cerned, including those who presented themselves as owners of land so
that they cannot pretend that they were not informed.
On the same day a note from the mayor stated that the zanjera offi-
cials had been notified of the inspection and, due to the “urgency” of
their request, on the following date he wrote,
I started my inspection in an unirrigated and uncultivated place called
“Baldias of Pedro Abraham,” or the uncultivated land of Pedro Abraham.
He is an old man past sixty years. As was brought out from questioning
the landlords who went with me, the dense trees that grow on these lands
have prevented the area from being fenced. As could be seen, a heavy
growth of trees stood towards the west, south and east. I inspected the
unirrigated lands of the people who presented themselves to me until I
reached a placed called Narpayat at the limits of this municipality [the
eastern boundary with Vintar]. I found out that it is true that the irrigation
ditch opened by Juan Domingo and his companions can reach and irrigate
the said uncultivated and unirrigated lands.
The mayor then described the overall irrigation area as being bor-
dered on the northwest by the village of Cabaruan and on the south by
the Bacarra-Vintar River. Within this area he mentioned the holdings of
particular individuals, the condition of some of the lands, and whether
or not the owners wished to be included within the irrigation system.
The following selections from his notes reproduce only his comments
about the relationships between landowners and the zanjera.
Josef Bartolome said that he is willing to give one-half of his lands in ex-
change for irrigation, but that the remaining half be his to cultivate. He
requested that in this way he could share in the benefits of the irrigation
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system. He also promised to pay the cost of maintaining the irrigation sys-
tem [apparently an irrigation fee].
I also saw an area of uncultivated land owned by Don Augustin Andres
in which new paddies had been constructed just before the last harvest.
Similarly, Alonzo Ballutag … asked that his land not be irrigated. Since he
does not want irrigation, the said owner stated that he will not blame the
builders of the irrigation system in the event that he is not able to raise
crops on his land. However, in case he decides to plant rice [in rainfed
fields], he will not have the right to use the irrigation water. Francisco
Marcos and his companions also came forward and declared that they
had no objection to having the irrigation ditch pass through their lands in
case they are needed by the owners of the irrigation ditch. [Two others]
declared their willingness to have the irrigation ditch pass through their
lands … [as did] Domingo Raymundo … who declared that he was willing
to give one-half of his lands to be used by the owners of the ditch in return
for the delivery of water. But he stated that the other half remain his to
cultivate and that he should be provided irrigation water for these lands.
He promised to help by contributing to the maintenance of the irrigation
system…. I inspected all of the lands from Corocor to Narpayat [a distance
of approximately 6 kilometers].
Three days later, on May 29, the mayor announced the following:
… as is my right, I hereby declare that … the cultivated and uncultivated
lands of the petitioners who are in favor of being included in the irrigation
system be cleared and cultivated. This is done with the hope that their life
will be made easier and that they can provide money for their tax to the King
and food for their children. And they [Juan Domingo and his companions]
will not extend their irrigation system to the lands of those who objected
to the passage of the irrigation system. However, the ditch can be opened
to the unirrigated lands of those owners willing to share in the water sys-
tem…. Juan Domingo and company are further instructed to allow all those
landowners who accepted that their lands be irrigated to cultivate the re-
maining one-half of their lands. These landowners should not be denied the
use of the irrigation water for their yearly rice plants. They [the irrigation or-
ganizers] should not ask for further expenses to use the water. However, if
the owners of the land irrigated are willing to give some small fee for the use
of water, it should be in accordance with this ruling.
On the first of June the irrigation organizers were read this notice
and provided certified copies of it. A document written forty-six years
later, on July 11, 1814, as part of the total evidence presented in support
of the zanjeras’ counter argument against the charges of the landown-
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ers, records how the same man, the former mayor, was interviewed by
authorities in Manila regarding the events of 1791:
Don Pedro Crisologo, a landowner and village leader in the town of
Bacarra, presented himself before me [the document is simply signed
“Commissioner”]. I received his oath, executed in the name of God and
the Holy Cross as required by law. He swore that he would tell the truth
as he knew it. He was asked what he remembered regarding the contents
of the documents under question and the declarations of the petitioners.
He stated that when he was the mayor in 1791 it was the time that wa-
ter was obtained from the river through the irrigation canal constructed
by Antonio Deniega and his companions which watered the high, unculti-
vated lands. He further explained that since he saw the hardships of those
who constructed the irrigation system, he thought it wise to ask the own-
ers of the lands that were previously uncultivated to have their lands
divided equally with the owners of the irrigation ditch. He said that the
owners of the ditch should not get more than one-half of the lands irri-
gated by their canal…. They made no written contracts; they simply made
a mutual agreement from their own free will…. He knew from experience
that since they could divert water from the river, they channeled the two
irrigation ditches opened by Antonio Deniega and his companions and the
one made later by Don Juan Sales and his companions to the high, unirri-
gated lands within the municipality of Bacarra. This was an improvement
for the whole town, even for those who had no lands.
This sums up his declaration which he swore to. He certified that he
was twenty-eight years old at the time. He signed with me, the Commis-
sioner, including my witnesses.
In August, 1805, a complaint to the mayor of Bacarra was registered
by Zanjera Deniega and an unspecified number of biang-ti-daga owners,
apparently all from within Zanjera Sales, against “Juan Sales and his
companions.” Deniega’s complaint was over the positioning of Sales’s
dam, the landowners’ because of inadequate irrigation water. At this
time the mayor withdrew from an official role in the matter because one
of the petitioning landowners was his son. In his place he appointed a
judge to act for him.
The record for 1805 refers to a detailed map, apparently compiled by
the acting mayor, outlining the areas serviced by Zanjera Sales, Zanjera
Deniega, and two or possibly more other irrigation associations, though
only Zanjera Sales was being challenged at that time. The map is noted
by the judge as being a part of all the documentation made available
to all participants. Unfortunately, like all other maps referred to in the
translations, it is now missing. Except for the acting mayor’s descrip-
tion of a visit to the fields, nothing in his comments indicates how the
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issues were to have been resolved. From subsequent events it appears
that the two zanjeras settled their dispute, at least temporarily, in the
following months. But clearly the problem of water shortages raised by
the landowners remained unsolved.
The charges made by landowners to the provincial governor fifteen
months later continued their complaint of inadequate water, which was
at that time extended to include Deniega as well as Sales. This time,
the landowners went much further and proposed the draconian solu-
tion that both irrigation systems should be operated by the municipality.
Added to this was their request that all atar lands be returned to their
original owners. Leading the signatories are the names of the mayor,
Don Gregorio de la Cruz, and the “council of village chiefs.” The letter,
dated Novmeber 12, begins as if the petitioners were actually mem-
bers of the zanjeras rather than biang-ti-daga landowners. However, the
names, including the mayor’s, are those [though not all of those] that
agreed to give up lands for water in the 1791 exchange.
Because of the scarcity of rain over the past four years our crops have
failed, and we have still had to pay taxes and tribute to the King. We were
earlier asked [apparently by zanjera officials] about extending one or two
of the short ditches in our irrigation system. Against the will of some mem-
bers, two ditches were subsequently opened east of the town by Mariano
Reginaldo [maestro of Deniega] and Juan Sales [maestro of Sales]. The
two ditches are too small, poorly constructed, too close together, and irri-
gate only a limited area.
These ditches have also caused damage in that they often alter course
and the surrounding lands are destroyed. Thus, because of the scarcity of
water and the greediness of the owners of the ditches, the canals do us
little good and we can only watch as our fields dry up. The unequal dis-
tribution of water has been a source of trouble, hatred and conflict which
have been the cause of shame to our town. All of this is inimical to the
common good, as well as peace and order in the town.
Because of our common grievance and complaint, we request you order
that the said irrigation systems be placed under the care, management and
commonuseof the townso thatall peoplemayshare itsbenefits.Wefeel that if
the irrigation systems are improved and better managed that this will release
us from our misery. In this way each person will share in the blessings given by
our river. It will minimize jealousies, suspicions and recriminations, as well as
our expenses, and the harm done to us up to this time. We also ask you to order
the owners of the irrigation ditches to return the lands that they grabbed and
occupied, for they simply used their superior force and the pretext that they
would include us in their irrigation system. Each person should be left in the
peaceful ownership of the land that he has done so much to clear and develop.
130 APPENDIX 4
This is why we entrust this case to the hands of justice and the care
of all village heads. We further ask that all the decisions relating to the
irrigation ditches under question be issued from the court and that these
decisons be made known and enforced. Past village headmen should also
bring forward any documents that they have to help clear up the issue in
order to avoid conflict and trouble over the return of lands to their right-
ful owners. This will also bring about peace and order for the good of all.
We do not doubt that this will be done if the said irrigation ditches re-
main in our care and this will assure the fair sharing of irrigation water.
We ask that you regard us favorably and we have faith in your generos-
ity and sense of justice. Please grant our petition. We assure you that we
come without ill-will. [Signed by 35 landowners]
If accepted, of course, the petition would have resulted in the dissolu-
tion of the two zanjeras as property-owning, corporate groups. Despite
the mayor having removed himself officially from the proceedings, his role
as one of the litigants must have caused great concern for other zanjeras
as well. A letter attacking the position of the thirty-five landowners was
signed by the leaders of Deniega, Sales, and two other zanjeras (which
were identified only by the names of their senior officers) and addressed
to the “Acting Mayor Commissioner,” apparently the judge appointed dur-
ing the previous year’s complaint. From a partly illegible document only a
few of the zanjeras’ comments can be discerned.
Our irrigation systems have provided benefits for the people of Bacarra
since the year one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-one. These ditches
have watered the lands to the east of the town and northwest of the town
all of the way to the seashore at the delta of the river. This was done at the
request of the heads of the villages and our townmates so that they, too,
could share in the services of our water system, as indeed they presently
enjoy….
We ask that you review the statements of the village headmen, for, if they
do not deny it, they will realize how they deceived us in the statements that
they have signed. Consequently, we ask that you verify what our townmates
have stated and then make your recommendations to the village headmen …
and please include, in the writs of instruction that you issue, the facts con-
cerning the greed and cupidity of some village headmen.
No date appears on this letter but, given that it is in response to
the landowners’ petition, it must have followed within a few days. On
November 28 the acting mayor made a public declaration and stated
that a reading of the zanjeras’ joint petition had been made on that
day to an assembly including village leaders, landowners, and the zan-
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jera officials. In reply to the zanjeras’ claim that the canals had been
built at their request, the landowners and village headmen maintained
that the “content of the [zanjeras’] petition was not what was agreed
upon.” The only new information added in the acting mayor’s covering
statement to the governor of Ilocos Province was that the landowners,
“wanted to open another irrigation system and construct another dam
upstream of the two existing irrigation systems.”
On December 13 the provincial governor issued an order in response
to the petitions.
Based on the facts as presented and because I believe that it will be for
the good of all, the irrigation ditches at issue will be placed under the
care of the municipality. But, it is advised that everyone remain on friendly
terms with each other, and that a just settlement be reached regarding
the lands that were owned and occupied before the construction of the
ditches. With this goal in mind, six individuals, such people as hold the
confidence of society, are appointed to look into the matter. All documents
within the custody of the court regarding the disputed lands and irriga-
tion systems are to be brought out. Also, the mayor of the municipality
together with the village headmen are ordered to bring out all agreements
that apply to this case and these should be followed. To avoid conflict and
inequities, the care and management of the distribution of irrigation wa-
ter will be placed in the hands of three judges.
Other than the governor’s one reference to “six individuals … ap-
pointed to look into the matter” and the unclear, somewhat contradic-
tory direction that “three judges” would also have something to do with
the “management and distribution of irrigation water,” no information
is provided as to how the zanjeras were to be run. There is no indication
in the record of atar lands being returned to the biang-ti-daga landown-
ers, though subsequent documents noted the problem that the zanjeras
had in repossessing land from the litigants. The problems that zanjeras
had in repossessing at least some atar lands resulted in the prolonga-
tion of the court action until its conclusion in 1837.
The next document is dated March 3, 1810, and involves the ongoing
dispute between Zanjera Sales and Zanjera Deniega over canal rights-
of-way. A second issue in this writ refers to still another quarrel between
Sales and a third, unnamed zanjera about whether it or Sales would ob-
tain access rights to a new, undeveloped area and so gain additional
atar lands. The governor, Antonio Zurbito, responded to the petitions:
I, the said governor … do hereby declare that Mariano Reginaldo, Juan
Domingo and Manuel Pablo [Zanjera Deniega officers], together with the
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opposing party, Juan Sales, came to my office today. They explained that
they have already arrived at a mutual understanding regarding their peti-
tions [documents not included in the Ilocano translations or else since
lost]. Each now tills the land that is rightfully his own and neither occu-
pies the land of the other. They have tried to find a way for both to operate
their irrigation systems so that others [possibly referring to biang-ti-daga
owners] cannot take the lands that each communally owns.
The said Sales has the responsibility and the duty to construct a conduit
where his canal passes over the irrigation ditch of the above mentioned Regi-
naldo, Domingo and Pablo. Sales is further obligated to pay them for the
lands through which his ditch passes with lands of corresponding size and
quality. Reginaldo and his companions will further retain the ownership to
these lands in spite of the passage of the ditch of Sales. Sales will also be re-
quired to fix the ditch of Reginaldo in the event that the construction of his
conduit causes any damage to the aforementioned ditch.
In dismissing the second matter raised by Zanjera Sales, the gover-
nor continued,
I have witnessed the declarations of the two contending parties and I have
gone over the contents of the documents pertinent to this case. I have
also read their past agreements as contained in these documents, which
I now confirm. I feel it is my duty and obligation to say that there is no
merit whatsoever in the petition of Juan Sales and his companions. Conse-
quently, I hereby order that the said Sales and his companions should not
hinder the opposing party in their rightful control and use of the lands un-
der contention.
Apparently because the case between the landowners and the zan-
jeras was still pending, the governor rather than municipal officials
dealt directly with matters involving zanjeras Deniega and Sales. What-
ever the case, the document shows that both Deniega and Sales were
still functioning and relatively autonomous systems, negotiating with
each other for canal routes, exchanging lands, and (in the case of Sales)
competing with still another zanjera for rights to irrigate new atar
and biang-ti-daga blocks. Nothing in this suggests that the earlier ap-
pointed court officials were actually directing the operations of Sales
and Deniega, much less that the zanjeras had been turned over to local
authorities. Neither is there any mention of the disposition of the con-
tested atar lands.25
Today, when a zanjera’s canals traverse the lands of other zanjeras or
private landowners, the zanjera responsible must compensate for the
lands affected or lost. As shown in Figure 4, the canals of zanjeras in the
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central part of the valley frequently cross the lands of neighboring and
sometimes more distant systems. Compensations can include an exchange
of lands (e.g., those referred to in the governor’s directive), sharing a wa-
ter source or delivery system, extra labor, or even money. Where land ex-
change is involved it may include a trade-off of atar or komon lands—lands
that the zanjeras do not own outright.26
The first legal decision rendered in the case between the landowners
and zanjeras Deniega and Sales was made on July 11, 1814 at the Royal
Court in Manila. The translation is signed by the “Regent,” Martin Ay-
ala. Along with the writ is included the deposition of former mayor Don
Crisologo Mateo (referred to earlier), in which he described the origi-
nal agreements between zanjeras and landowners. The court’s decision
follows the submission of a counter petition by Zanjera Deniega, restat-
ing its argument against the landowners. The petition, however, is not
included in the documentation.
This petition [of Zanjera Deniega] concerns the retention of the lands
which they had gained in 1791 when they provided water to the landown-
ers in exchange for land. The irrigation system was the result of hard
work and the expenses that they endured. The canals that they built were
strong and well constructed, allowing the passage of water to irrigate
fields in Callaguip, Baranio, Barranco and, as they will eventually, adja-
cent lands that are not as yet irrigated. Their original agreement with the
landowners was made in the presence of the then mayor, Don Crisologo
Mateo, who approved the construction….
The case has now reached this court on the petition of Deniega and his
companions. It has been verified that the irrigation ditches have enhanced
the welfare of the community. In his capacity as governor of Ilocos Province,
Don Alonzo Corrales will implement this court’s decree. In so doing he will
follow the dictates and interests of peace and justice. He will determine the
distribution of lands owned by both parties before the construction of the
said irrigation ditches and after the fields were cleared. He will designate six
trusted people from among the landowners and residents of the community
and they will bring forth copies of all documents and agreements relating to
the case. The governor will also direct the mayor to have the owners of the
ditches present all the documents that they have. To avoid conflict during
this period, the fair distribution of the water will be entrusted to the judges
of the community. The original case against Deniega and his companions will
be dismissed. It will then be explained to both parties that they ought to keep
at peace with each other and that they should follow the original agreements
that they made when the ditches were first constructed. This is the decision
of this court which both parties have now acknowledged.
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Five months later, at the request of the zanjeras and as a conse-
quence of the landowners’ apparent attempts to contravene the court
order, a second writ was issued instructing the provincial governor to
take direct action.
This is done in the Royal Court in Manila, on the nineteenth of Decem-
ber, one thousand, eight hundred and fourteen. The regents and ministers
have witnessed the new petition presented by Antonio Deniega and his
companions again asking that the lands previously divided be returned to
them so that they can cultivate the fields as their reward for opening two
irrigation ditches that brought water to lands that were not then irrigated.
The Governor [of Ilocos Province] has explained that the two contending
parties must comply with the agreements made at the time when the ditch
was constructed. Because this was apparently unclear, the decision was
not fully carried out.
In the following month, on January 17, 1815, the governor appointed
his representative to carry out the court order.
Having received the two volumes of documents relating [to this case],
I, Don Francisco Bringgas, the Governor and Captain of War in the Prov-
ince of the Ilocos, declare that Don Gregorio Vicente de los Angeles is
commissioned to investigate the matters under question … and he will see
to it that there is compliance to the court’s decision. He will report back
to me on their compliance with the final order of the court. This decision
has been conveyed to Sales and Deniega so that they too understand.
Within ten days the governor’s representative, Don Vicente, replied
with his description of the action taken in Bacarra.
Most Honorable Governor:
The original petitioners [the zanjeras] lodged their claim against [the
landowners] concerning the lands listed in the first document and found on
page 314. The places where the fields under question are located are those
recognized by the various commissions that were previously directed by the
High Court to look into this matter. These investigations confirmed the set-
ting aside and distribution of the lands [to the zanjeras]. This was done in
accordance with the original agreement accepted by the landowners whose
lands benefitted from the irrigation ditches opened by Deniega, Sales and
their respective companions. This agreement was confirmed by the High
Court, the Royal Court which resulted in the two royal decisions on July 10th
and 11th of last year [1814] ordering their further investigation.
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… The decisions of the court have been carried out as required, this year,
1815, and the fields involved have been properly designated and divided in
order that the rightful owners can reap the benefits from their own land.
The rights to the land have been given to the proper owners as stipulated on
page 259 of the court’s decision. And, although Don Manuel Parguian and
the brothers Reyes [landowners], who are opposed to Sales and Deniega,
objected to the distribution and the granting of ownership over the lands
in Dayas, the commission nonetheless carried out its plan. We have deter-
mined that, in accordance with the agreements between those who dug the
irrigation ditch and those who owned the lands, that all of the lands in the
said place have truly shared the use of the water. As soon as the commission
completed its investigation, we placed survey markers that recognize the
ownership of each party’s land. Don Manuel Parguian [one of the landown-
ers] and Don Esteban Vicente de Sales [one of the zanjera officials] have
overseen the brotherly and fair distribution of the lands in Day-as and the
other lands as described on page 247. The announcement of what was done
was made to the parties involved in this land dispute, including their various
companions on this twenty-seventh day of January, 1815.
Without explanation, though quite obviously because at least some
landowners continued to balk the original court order, the commis-
sioner had to make a return visit to Bacarra in July of the same year. At
that time, the court’s decision and directives were explained to the two
contending parties. The first of two letters provides greater detail on
the court’s understanding and interpretation of the original contractual
arrangements between zanjeras and landowners. In the first of these re-
ports, written to the governor on July 12, 1815, the commissioner wrote:
On the basis of the evidence presented to me, I would state that the lands
were in fact given to Don Esteban Viernes de Sales and his companions
by the landowners when the fields in Day-as were first subdivided and dis-
tributed. Don Manuel Parguian [a landowner] has opposed this, stating that
the lands under question were already under cultivation when the irrigation
ditch of the said Sales was opened. Deniega, together with his companions,
opposed the landowner’s position saying that it was not proper that the lands
be kept by the landowners except for the little parcels that were already cul-
tivated prior to the opening of the irrigation canal.
Although the landowners have opposed this position, ownership has
now been given to the petitioners, the irrigation [associations] of Deniega
and Sales, in accordance with the decision of the court. The giving of
these lands to the irrigation ditch owners, Deniega and Sales, is in ac-
cordance with the original agreement made in the presence of the mayor
[who served] in the year one thousand, seven hundred and ninety one,
136 APPENDIX 4
and whose deputation is found on page 17 of the court record. This is why
I have ordered the division of these lands into two equal parts so as to
compensate for the hardships incurred in constructing the irrigation dam
and canal, which proved beneficial to all the contested lands. In opposi-
tion, the said Parguian [landowner] cites that when Governor Don Antonio
Zurbito was in office he awarded the lands to them and that these lands
should remain in the ownership of himself and his companions as stated
in the decision of Governor Zurbit.
But the said Sales and his companions have reasoned that the lands in
question were the same fields as those given to them for opening the irriga-
tion system in compensation for the labor and expense of reconstructing the
irrigation canal. In addition, the lands were still uncleared and uncultivated
at the time of the opening of the irrigation canal in the year one thousand,
seven hundred and seventy-five. At that time the lands in question were still
uncleared and uncultivated and idle. They [the zanjeras and landowners] di-
vided the lands, as it should be in such cases. Sales and his companions then
constructed an irrigation ditch to channel water from a creek in Apaleng.
This can be seen in the map [apparently Zanjera Sales’ block and parcel map]
shown in my presence by the said Sales as indicated by the letter D.
However, in the year one thousand, seven hundred and seventy-seven,
the lands became uncultivated and idle for the reason that the water com-
ing from the creek was insufficient. So, in the year one thousand, seven
hundred and ninety-one, Don Juan Fruto de Sales, father of the said Don
Esteban, constructed another irrigation canal. This can be seen on the
map marked by the letter P. This irrigation ditch proved very beneficial to
the formerly unproductive lands. It was agreed that no more nor less than
half of the lands would be divided between the landowners and the own-
ers of the irrigation ditch. It was further agreed upon that this decision
should be strictly followed. Just in case the said Parguian has objections,
he can petition elsewhere but it will not violate the ownership of the di-
vided lands. Thus, enforcement of the decision here is entrusted in law.
Just in case the said Parguian and his companions do not comply with the
decision, the mayor can insist on the return of the lands to the ditch own-
ers and he will immediately report to the court anyone who disobeys.
A second letter described a follow-up, final visit by the commissioner,
along with the mayor, several undesignated “companions” of the commis-
sioner, the plaintiffs (then the zanjeras), and the defendants to the field sites
on July 26. A comment by the commissioner indicates his irritation over the
fact that the matter was still unsettled and not yet agreed to by some of the
landowners.
In the places called Corocor, Day-as, Callaguip, Baranio, Bangsarit, Tub-
bao, Dalipaoen, Cadanglaan, and Iguid ti Ili, on the twenty sixth of
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the said month and year, I, the said commissioner, supported by my
conpanions and witnesses, on the presentation of the present mayor [not
named] and the [landowners] held and led the hands of Antonio Deniega
and Don Esteban Viernes de Sales, who represent their companions. And,
in the name of the late King (God bless him) ownership of the lands and
the irrigation canals was returned to them, in accordance with the deci-
sion of the law and the written order that allows it. As demonstration of
this I paused at that moment and threw a clod of dirt and tried to impress
upon all present that the ownership of all contested lands was returned!
It was also ordered that no person shall hinder that ownership and no one
will contest or trouble that ownership under penalty of law. At no time
will their respective ownerships be abrogated unless it is accomplished in
terms of the provisions of this document. This terminates the case and I
sign, along with the mayor who came with me, as well as all those with
knowledge of this case and my witnesses: [the names of the landowners
and the zanjera officials follow].
This would seem to have settled the issue but, sixteen years later, on
November 28, 1831, as shown in a writ from the Royal Court in Manila
(and signed only “Alvares”) the issue had again been raised, the result of
one or more unrecorded petitions from Zanjera Deniega. Unfortunately,
neither the amounts of land affected nor the number of obstructionist
landowners are stated. However, even without documentation, it seems
safe to assume that smaller increments of land still held or claimed by
a few of the landowners were at issue. It is impossible to imagine that
the two zanjeras would or could have functioned without most of the
atar lands being theirs to use. Whatever the case, Don Manuel Parguian
and “his companions” had still not fully complied with the repeated di-
rectives of the court. In his letter Alvares also commented on what had
apparently been the major problem with the original mission carried out
by the governor’s commissioner.
Governor:
… the decision and order of the High Court was still not implemented at that
time [June 1815] because of the fact that the commissioner did not make
use of his authority. Unfortunately, Don Gregorio Vicente de los Angeles, who
was sent by the [then] Governor to subdivide the lands, delegated his power
and responsibility with the result that nothing was done except to set the
landmarkers at those places mentioned…. It is your duty to order and to
make the petitioners [Parguian and “his companions”] understand that their
case has lapsed based upon the decisions of the Royal Court of these islands.
Such decisions must be given all respect and compliance. The decision of
the Royal Court certified the agreement between the owners of the irrigation
systems and the owners of the lands that were irrigated.
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On November 5 of the following year another letter from the Royal
Court to the governor of Ilocos Norte (again signed by “Alvares”) out-
lined in greater detail specific sections from the court record where the
landowners had previously indicated their agreement to comply with the
original division of lands. Perhaps in part clarifying why some of the atar
lands remained in the hands of the landowners, Alvares explained that the
governor’s appointed commission in 1815 had merely divided the lands in
equal size portions and had not taken into consideration differences in the
quality of the lands. He urged that these questions be quickly settled by
a “short and speedy investigation” but went on to stress to the governor
that nothing would be allowed to contravene the central aim of the court’s
decision supporting the overall equitable division of lands that had taken
place between zanjeras and landowners at the times when the two irriga-
tion systems were established in 1775 and 1791.
The final document in the long record of translated materials is dated
five years later—March 10, 1837. In response to still one more peti-
tion from one or both of the zanjeras, which like many others was not
included among the translated papers, the Royal Court sent down its fi-
nal word on the matter. The issue (or perhaps issues) brought forward
in the petition by the zanjeras was not referred to in the note, which
(as is shown in the following comments from Alvares to the governor)
was about a new matter. Whatever the issue was, it appears that the
zanjeras hoped to have it considered under the earlier ruling. However,
Alvares states that the “present conflict” could not be considered on the
basis of the earlier decision.
Governor:
Since the aforementioned case is already completed and the decisions
implemented, the assessor feels that it is not proper that the case be re-
opened. Consequently, he urges you to issue a prompt order restating
the directives referred to on pages 369 and 370 of the court’s decision.
The petitioners still have all the rights provided by law to express their
grievances under the terms of that case which may derive from the harm
that they suffered as a consequence of earlier delays in implementing the
law—this being the result of your predecessor’s failure to act effectively.
Nonetheless, the present conflict must be treated separately and must
not be confused with the earlier issue which has been the case of these
voluminous records.
This final document formally signified the end of the thirty-one-year-
old court case while separating it from a new and unspecified conflict.
No further details of the apparently ongoing disputes between the two
zanjeras and their biang-ti-daga landowners were found or turned over
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to me by the two zanjeras. One other zanjera provided me with a much
briefer record (some ten pages) of a court case in 1856 concerning
a dispute over the placement of a privately owned dam that the zan-
jeras considered to have been placed too close to their own on the
lower reaches of a tributary stream. In that dispute no lands were be-
ing contested and the court simply considered the issue on the basis of
proprietary water rights and ruled in favor of the zanjera.
A zanjera in the adjacent municipality of Vintar made available to
me a copy of its “official history,” which was little more than a long se-
ries of the leaders’ names and a few one-sentence descriptions of major
developments. Three comments referred to disputes with landowners
(though they did not indicate whether or not court trials were involved)
about rights to water and atar lands. Unfortunately, court records were
not available nor did the zanjera officers know the details of these ear-
lier conflicts.
A search for court records held by zanjeras and landowners would
undoubtedly provide similar examples of past disputes regarding land
and water, though zanjeras might well be reluctant to turn over such
documentation. Probably the only records available in Ilocos Norte are
the partial and, consequently, inadequate Ilocano translations. The com-
plete record of events will most likely be found only in Spanish colonial
archives. An ethnohistorical study based on the background of ma-
terials provided here and by Siy (1982) would provide an important
comparative and chronological overview of the initial contractual and
subsequent competitive relationships among zanjeras, landowners, and
government officials.
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NOTES
1. The following ethnographic notes are derived from field notes and, some-
what less reliably, the memory of particular events. In all cases the names used
for informants are pseudonyms. In about half of the examples, the information
has not appeared before although it may have been included as a part of the
data for earlier publications (e.g., in sections on neighbor relationships, politics,
farming practices, etc.). For me, these examples, and many more not described,
represent some of the best moments, and one or two of the not so great mo-
ments, of having done fieldwork in Ilocos Norte and Isabela.
2. The term “Kalinga,” the name of a mountain tribal people, is used in this
context to equate with “savage,” and is applied to all non-Christian, mountain
peoples. The people referred to by the informant were undoubtedly non-Chris-
tian Gaddang with whom the Ilocanos were displacing from their traditional
tribal areas.
3. Figures provided by the Provincial Irrigation Office (PIO) of Ilocos
Norte listed 665 communal irrigation associations for the province. For what
are surely only administrative reasons, the PIO counts irrigation groups only
on the number of water sources involved, although frequently two, three, or
more associations share a single dam. For instance, in the municipality of
Bacarra the PIO lists 32 irrigation groups, yet by both my own count and by
figures provided by the municipal mayor’s office, there are 47 in all. An even
greater discrepancy is found in the adjacent municipality of Vintar where
provincial figures list 58, and the municipal offices list a total of 118. In Vin-
tar, many of these systems are found along small, interior mountain streams
and some are listed by the Vintar Office of the Mayor as being two hectares
or less, with the smallest one noted as 0.4 hectare. On the basis of the PIO’s
accounting procedures and the contrasting larger numbers furnished by mu-
nicipal offices, a reasonable guess would be that for the province of Ilocos
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Norte as a whole there are 850–950 communal systems. The actual number
of associations in any given area is complicated by other factors, all of which
are discussed in the following sections.
4. Griffith’s (1978) work discussed a barrio in the southern portion of Ilocos
Norte which subsequently became a municipality and which, as both barrio and mu-
nicipio, held an annual fiesta. In general, however, villages do not hold fiestas since,
in a communal sense, there is little to celebrate or recognize.
5. Ilocanos returning from the United States after years of work, usually as agri-
cultural laborers in Hawaii or California, may offer money, often large amounts of
money, as part or all of the sabong negotiations. I have discussed this situation in my
earlier work (Lewis 1971:26–28) but a much fuller discussion can be found in Grif-
fiths (1978).
6. In both areas the sabong is important to the upper class. Given that
wealthy families show a greater corporate concern with family estates, plus
the complicating conditions relating to maintaining prestige and, very often,
obtaining and maintaining political power, the exact functions and configura-
tions appear to be different for them than for peasant families. In the
southern Ilocos region (in Pangasinan) the sabong is, in ritual form at least,
important in premarital arrangements but, as in Isabela, it lacks the sig-
nificance that is associated with land inheritance in Ilocos Norte (James N.
Anderson, personal communication). Griffiths (1976, 1978) reports an almost
identical sabong pattern for the Badoc area of southern Ilocos Norte to what
I have found for Bacarra.
7. In 1978 I was asked by a banker in Laoag if I could identify, at least
to say whether it was an obvious fake, a Canadian $1,000 bill. After I com-
mented that it appeared genuine to me, while admitting that it was the first
I had ever seen, he said that it was brought in by a woman whose daughter,
a nurse in Toronto, had sent it to her enclosed in a Christmas card! Such
casual transfers of money are apparently not uncommon (if probably not in
such large amounts or denominations) though considerable care has to be
taken not to alert postal employees.
8. Zanjera [pronounced san-hera or sang-hera (“z” is not an Ilocano conso-
nant)] was rendered as “zangjera” in my earlier work (1971). This was the
unfortunate consequence of using the spelling that appeared in the charter of the
one irrigation group most intensively studied in 1963, and the one most nearly
within the physical limits of Buyon. Given that the central focus of my earlier
study was on the barrio as a social entity plus the anthropological myopia for
seeing our own cases as archetypes for larger cultural domains, “zangjera” be-
came my term for zanjeras in general.
9. A comprehensive and very important study of zanjeras in the Bacarra-
Vintar River Valley was completed by Robert Y. Siy in 1982. His work concerns
nine zanjeras that range in size from just over 14 hectares to 140 hectares;
together they make up a small confederation that irrigated 505 hectares. As a
student of management engineering and rural planning, Dr. Siy is concerned
with systems evaluation and the potential applications that his study has for
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cooperative irrigation in developing areas. Though our descriptive materials
overlap, his study provides important quantitative data on conditions relating
to water delivery whereas mine concentrates on questions of comparative cor-
porate organization.
10. Prior to the introduction of the new high-yield varieties, farmers obtained
only two crops per year, a pattern I have previously described (Lewis
1971:49–65). The newer, so-called miracle rice types grow in a much shorter pe-
riod (120 days) than do the traditional varieties (180–200 days), thus permitting
the extra or third crop. Siy (1982) reports that peanuts are the most important
third crop for nine zanjeras along the northern edge of the valley.
11. This pattern of elongated fields with equal access to canals is found in
other areas of the Philippines where irrigation and land distribution have gone
hand-in-hand. The large rice haciendas of central Luzon are an example where,
with the construction of large irrigation systems, landlords were in a position
to distribute land to tenants in the same way (Brian Fegan, personal communi-
cation). Similar field types are also shown for north central Sri Lanka by Leach
(1961).
12. The largest zanjera in Bacarra has 8 atar blocks, 4 deriving from the ini-
tial land exchange agreements, and the remaining 4 from subsequent expansions
to the system. According to what I was told, no single individual has land in all
eight blocks, but individual holdings are widely scattered and, collectively, mem-
bers have interests and responsibilities that are system-wide.
13. Like the names of other zanjeras referred to in this work, “Danao” is a
pseudonym.
14. In some of their records and often in conversation the federation is called
the Federation of Communal Irrigation Societies of Bacarra. Both names are
used but the difference apparently has no significance.
15. When asked about similar situations where an existing zanjera might
have to negotiate with another zanjera for a new water source, I was told
that the atar lands would be protected in the contractual agreement made
between the two groups involving reciprocal obligations. However, as far as I
could determine from actual agreements, the “protection” is only implied at
most. Zanjeras seem to view reciprocal arrangements with other zanjeras as
simply another aspect of their obtaining water from any other source. No such
agreements, much less reciprocity, are involved when a zanjera seeks water
from a government source. In any event, I could find no examples of where
the original landowners legally challenged a zanjera when it began deriving
water from another zanjera.
16. The term Hawaiiano applies to Ilocanos who have lived or now live in the
State of Hawaii, though it is also applied to those living on the U.S. mainland as
well.
17. The issue is not strictly between working and nonworking members
since I observed that in at least two zanjeras with prohibitions against land-
lords voting, the rule was not strictly enforced. Questioning revealed that the
landlords in these instances were former working members who, largely due
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to age, had become peasant landlords. The stated concerns about landlord
influence are more specifically against upper-or middle-class landlords—true
outsiders.
18. The idea of St. Elmo’s fire and the association with optical illusions and
water is obvious, as is the Ilocanization of the Spanish San Elmo.
19. Two important works are in advanced stages of preparation, one the
study of a lowland system by Romana P. de los Reyes and the other an upland
system by June Prill-Brett.
20. De los Reyes also notes that association officials are exempted from irri-
gation fees and that they receive an honorarium in the form of rice, a small part
of the total collected in fees. However, these exemptions are distinct from those
afforded the “special members.” By contrast, whereas zanjera officials in Bacarra
are also relieved of some or all member obligations, I know of no examples in-
volving the inkalian-based systems with the kind of “special members” described
for Silag-Butir.
21. Unfortunately Bacdayan does not indicate the number of hectares wa-
tered by the system. On the basis of the data provided by de los Reyes,
however, for the sixteen systems which she and her colleagues examined (the
averages for most individual Bontok systems being reported as 500–1,000
square meters, with some larger and others smaller) it is safe to assume
that the member-to-land ratio is consistently small, with 1,000 square meters
being a generous estimate. The system in Tanowong is not more than 100
hectares, and probably smaller.
22. Summary discussions of the concept of corporation and problems of so-
cial organization and descent can be found in Brown (1974, 1976). For specific
references to works on communities as corporate groups the reader should start
with Rambo (1977).
23. As a counterpoint to farmer networks of sociability, wealthier people
in Isabela are much more concerned with property and property relationships.
Certainly, upper-class people are much engaged with questions of inheritance,
descent, and marriage. Likewise, in irrigation associations in lowland areas other
than Ilocos Norte, the upper-class landowners are frequently the movers and
shakers. As with farmers in Ilocos Norte, the concern with questions of prop-
erty is rather less than with those of reciprocity. The small-farm owners of Ilocos
Norte and wealthy people in general share a common corporate focus, the one
because of greater wealth and the other because it is so limited.
24. Siy (1982:45,52) was shown such maps by one of the zanjeras he studied.
The maps that appear here are simply modeled after his and the ones I was
shown, and the names of the zanjeras and landowners are fictitious.
25. It is possible that some (and it is even conceivable that all) of the
atar lands reverted to the landowners while the membership kept the systems
operational if there were also large sections of inkalian land owned by zanjera
members. This would have permitted the members to continue to operate the
systems while keeping up efforts to regain the disputed atar lands. Today Zan-
jeras Deniega and Sales both contain fairly large sections of inkalian land
(perhaps as much as thirty percent of each), a fairly good indication that most
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such fields existed from the start. Unfortunately, there is no information in the
documents to indicate the amounts or even presence of member-owned lands at
that time.
26. The comments by the governor concerning “the lands that each commu-
nally owns” and that Deniega would “retain the ownership of the lands in
question” suggest that atar and/or komon lands were involved. This may have
been part of the zanjeras’ “mutual understanding” rather than a full appreciation
of zanjera property relations on the part of the provincial governor.
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GLOSSARY
Ading Younger sibling.
Ammuyo Reciprocal exchange of labor in agriculture.
Anito Local spirit.
Arayat Social savings association.
Atar Lands obtained in exchange for water and corporately con-
trolled by zanjeras. The landowners’ retained share or shares are called
biang ti daga.
Balay ti zanjera The meeting house or, literally, the home of the zan-
jera. Most frequently referred to by the Spanish term of kamarine.
Barrangay The official government term now used for village and
substituted for the historically traditional Spanish term barrio.
Basbas A form of ritual held between two zanjeras that jointly share
a dam, canal, or other irrigation feature.
Basi Wine made from fermented sugarcane juice.
Biang ti daga Portion of land remaining to the original landowners
after an exchange of water for land with zanjeras, the zanjera’s portion
being atar land. Literally translated as “the business of the land”.
Bingay An individual member’s portion of the total atar lands held
by a zanjera.
Gorospe A local variety of rice developed by farmers from one of the
147
new, high-yield types developed by the International Rice Research In-
stitute.
Gunglo Groups or “gangs” of 25–30 and sometimes more members
that make up the larger group.
Inkalian Lands owned outright by individual members; some zan-
jeras are composed entirely of member-owned lands.
Inkalupo Individuals or groups of individuals that buy water from
zanjeras for one-tenth of any one or more crops. Also referred to as
razco.
Kaaroba Neighbor.
Kali Primary or main canal.
Kamarine Meeting house of a zanjera. Also called balay ti zanjera.
Kantura Chanter who sings the mass for deceased members of a
zanjera during part of the annual pamisa ritual.
Karkama Alternate term for masasarrat or ghost.
Komon Communal property or land, after the Spanish comun.
Lechon Whole roasted pig.
Manang Older sister.
Manong Older brother.
Masasarrat The ghosts of founding members. Sometimes referred
to as karkama.
Nana Mother.
Paayos Irrigation ritual held in Ilocos Sur.
Padul Rock and cement or concrete dam, usually located on small
streams or at hillside springs.
Pagbibinoludan Watergate which is used to place water from higher
canal into lower during times of emergency.
Paglakay An honorarium provided zanjera officers, usually in the
form of plots of land given them to use for term of office.
Pamisa From the Spanish misa or mass, a ritual involving prayers
for the dead. A family ritual, it is also the major ceremony employed by
zanjeras.
148 GLOSSARY
Panglagip An alternate term for umras that involves an offering of
food for deceased members of a family or zanjera.
Panglakayen The leader of a work group or gunglo who also serves
as a member of a zanjera’s “board of directors.”
Pangolo President of a zanjera. The Spanish term maestro is more
commonly used.
Pasayak Alternate Ilocano term for zanjera or irrigation society.
Puttot Rock and bamboo weir placed in main channels of rivers.
Sabong Male land dowry.
Sanselmo From the Spanish San Elmo, a spirit or anito associated
with water.
Sapayot A water barrier and, also, an auxiliary zanjera that draws its
water from the overflow of a parent system.
Tagnawa Communal assistance provided by kin, friends, and neigh-
bors.
Tata Father.
Umras From the Spanish honras, or obsequy for the dead, an offer-
ing to the spirits of the dead made at a pamisa.
Zanjera From the Spanish zanja or ditch, an irrigation society; the
Ilocano term pasayak is also, but less frequently, used.
Zanjero Individual member of a zanjera.
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No. 30 Songs of Nepal. Siegfried Lienhard. 1984.
No. 31 The Origins of Japan’s Modern Forests: The Case of Akita. Conrad Totman.
1985.
No. 32 Thailand in Transition: The Role of Oppositional Forces. Ross Prizzia. 1985.
No. 33 Law and the State in Traditional East Asia: Six Studies on the Sources of
East Asian Law. Edited by Brian E. McKnight. 1987.
No. 34 Buddhist and Taoist Practice in Medieval Chinese Society: Buddhist and
Taoist Studies II. Edited by David W. Chappell. 1987.
No. 35 An American Scientist in Early Meiji Japan: The Autobiographical Notes of
Thomas C. Mendenhall. Edited by Richard Rubinger. 1989.
No. 36 A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna. Hi-
rakawa Akira. Translated and edited by Paul Groner. 1990.
Orders for Asian Studies at Hawaii publications should be directed to the University
of Hawaii Press, 2840 Kolowalu Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. Present standing or-
ders will continue to be filled without special notification.
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